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Introduction

In Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, l the United States
Supreme Court, sua sponte, denounced the doctrine of IIhypothetical jurisdiction,II a doctrine that, in some circumstances, allowed courts to assume, arguendo, the existence ofjurisdiction and to address the merit questions presented
by cases. Several ofthe Justices distanced themselves from the denunciation,
however, and despite the vociferousness ofthe position taken by the majority,
even it found that there were exceptional circumstances in which the Court
had acted properly (and presumably in which other courts would act appropriately) in assuming jurisdiction arguendo and addressing merits questions. The
opinion left open a number of questions with which the federal courts and
commentators have begun to grapple. In this Article, I focus on matters left
unclear by Steel Co. and, in particular, on the effects ofthe Court's denunciation ofthe work ofthe federal appellate courtS.
1.

523 U.S. 83 (1998).
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The first Part describes the Steel Co. opinion and highlights several ofthe
estions it raised. Part II considers how the Court's denunciation of hypoetical jurisdiction has changed the appellate courts' approach to cases in
bich they find issues concerning the district courts' jurisdiction. It does not
t to answer all the interpretive issues left open by Steel Co., as that case
lies to district court jurisdiction, nor does it tackle the myriad issues that
,Urts will face in detennining whether particular matters go to the district
,Urts' "jurisdiction," for Steel Co.'s purposes. Part II does, however, focus,
yway of example, on the primary area ofcontroversy that arose in the wake
fSteel Co. as it applies to district court jurisdiction: whether the Eleventh
endment defense is jurisdictional in the sense.that courts may no longer
it to be inapplicable or unavailable, and may decide cases on their
erits.
Part ill initially provides a transition from appellate handling of issues
f district court jurisdiction to issues of appellate jurisdiction. It begins by
dressing the apparent tension between the Court's denunciation ofhypothetca1.jurisdiction and its restriction ofthe scope of appellate jurisdiction when
. interlocutory appeals, and stakes out a position on which matters of
.ct court jurisdiction appellate courts may entertain upon interlocutory
ppeals. Part III then examines how appellate courts had employed hypothetiappellate jurisdiction and how the Court's seeming prohibition on hypoetica1jurisdiction applies to matters ofappellate jurisdiction. This undertakrequires consideration ofthe constitutional provisions, statutes, rules and
octrines that govern appellate jurisdiction and an evaluation of which re. ementsno longer may be assumed to be satisfied, to allow an appellate
wt to reach merits issues.
Finally, Part IV looks at the effect of Steel Co. on the kinds ofissues that
~courts of appeals are deciding. It then comments on the value of this
effect.
.

some

1 The Many Questions Left Unanswered by Steel Co. v. Citizens

for a Better Environment
A. The Court's Opinion and an Initial Critique

An environmental protection organization, Citizens for a Better Environment (CBE), had suoo, alleging that the defendant had violated the Emergency
Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act of 1986 (EPCRA) by failing
to timely file certain reports. CBE sought declaratory and injunctive relief.
The Court granted certiorari to decide whether EPCRA authorizes suits for
purely past violations.2 The Court decided instead that it had no jurisdiction
2.

[d. at 86-88.
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to resolve this merits issue because the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue. 3 A
diatribe against "hypothetical jurisdiction" was not necessary to its decision,
and the parties had neitherbriefed nor argued the subject. 4 Nonetheless, en
route to its conclusion as to plaintiffs' standing, the Court attacked the practice of many district courts and several federal courts of appeals to decide
merits questions that are more readily resolved than jurisdictional objections,
when "the prevailing party on the merits would be the same as the prevailing
party were jurisdiction denied. lIS
In an opinion by Justice Scalia, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices
O'Connor, Thomas, and Kennedy, the Court stated, ''We decline to endorse
such an approach because it carries the courts beyond the bounds of autho. rized judicial action and thus offends fundamental principles of separation of
powers. ,,6 Adverting to courts' lack ofpower to declare the law in the absence
of jurisdiction, the Court addedtha~ when jurisdiction ceases to exist, a
court's only function is to announce that fact and dismiss the case. Moreover,
'" [o]n every writ oferror or appeal, the first and fundamental question is that
ofjurisdiction, fir~ ofthis court, and then ofthe court from which the record
comes. '''7 "The requirement that jurisdiction be established as a threshold
matter 'spring[s] from the nature and limits ofthe judicial power ofthe United
States' and is 'inflexible and without exception.,,,8
The Court conceded that some of its own decisions had "diluted the
absolute purity ofthe rule that Article ill jurisdiction is always an antecedent
3. /d. at 109-10.
4. See id. at 121-22 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (commenting on Court's
discussion of hypothetical jurisdiction not having been informed by adversary submissions of
parties); Scott C. Idleman, The Demise ojHypothetical Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 52
VAND. L. REv. 235,271-72 (1999) (stating that neither party raised hypothetical jurisdiction
at district court, court of appeals, or Supreme Court level; rather, Supreme Court decided issue
sua sponte, without notice to parties) (citations omitted); id. at 274-80 (commenting on
jurisprudential and institutional significance, as well as irony, of Court's reaching out, in these
circumstances, to address hypothetical jurisdiction inter alia prior to verifYing subject-matter
jurisdiction over case).
5. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 93. For a description ofthe variations in the doctrine as adopted
by various courts ofappeals, see Idleman, supra note 4, at 245 (noting that "standard" formulation provides that courts may rule on merits without reaching jurisdictional contention "[w]hen
the merits ofthe case are clearly against the party seeking to invoke the court's jurisdiction, the
jurisdictional question is especially difficult and far-reaching, and the inadequacies in the record
make the case a poor vehicle for deciding the jurisdictional question"). Idleman found that some
courts had looked only to whether the difficulty of resolving the jurisdictional question was far
greater than that entailed in resolving the merits ofa sUit. [d. at 246-47.
6. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 94.
7. [d. (quoting Orcat S. Fire ProofHotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449,453 (1900».
8. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 94-95 (quoting Mansfield, C. & L.M.R. Co. v, Swan, 111 U.S.
379,382 (1884».
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question, ,,9 but insisted that all ofthe decisions that the lower federal courts
other Justices relied upon as precedent legitimating hypothetical jurisdicwere distinguishable from and did not "even approach[ ] approval of a
doctrine ... that enables a court to resolve contested questions of law when
[the court's] jurisdiction is in doubt." IO None of those cases "pretenni[tted]
the jurisdictional question as a device for reaching a question of law that
otherwise would have gone unaddressed."11 The Court thus excoriated hypothetical jurisdiction as "produc[ing] nothing more than a hypothetical judgmem[,] . . . an advisory opinion, disapproved by this Court from the beginning."12 It concluded that
[t]he statutotyand (especia1ly) constitutionalelernentsofjurisdictionare an
essential ingredient ofseparation and equilibration ofpowers, restraining
the courts from acting at certain times, and even restraining them from
actingpennanentlyregardingcertainsubjects.... Foracourttopronounce

upon the meaning or the constitutionality ofa state or federal law when it
has no jurisdiction to do so is, by very definition, for a court to act ultra
vires.!3
Foreshadowing an array of issues that lower federal courts have to resolve in
the wake of Steel Co., the Court rejected Justice Stevens's view that the
question whether EPCRA authorized the cause of action that plaintiffs sought
to assert was 'Jurisdictional" and so had equal claim to being resolved first. 14
Focusing on the Supreme Court cases that the lower federal courts had
relied upon as legitimating hypothetical jurisdiction, the Court portrayed
several cases as having characterized as jurisdictional issues or requirements
that had been assumed arguendo, when that characterization was in error. IS
When one looks at the cases in question, particularly Secretary of Navy v.
Avrech and United States v. Augenblick, one sees that the Court explicitly
9. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 101.
10. Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 15-23 and notes 29-31.
11. Id. at 98.
12. Id. at 101.
13. Id. at 101-02 (citations omitted).
14. Id. at 90-93; see id. at 112-31 (Stevens, J.,concurring). Justice Stevens opined that
actionability of past violations of EPCRA was statutoI)' jurisdictional question that could be
addressed before Article ill standing issues, and nonnally should be addressed before constitutional questions. Id.
15. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83,98-100 (1998) (describing
issue in both Sec'y o/Navy v. Avrech, 418 U.S. 676 (1974), and United States v. Augenblick,
393 U.S. 348 (1969), as whether court-martial judgment could be collaterally attacked by suit
for back pay, among other relief, alleging constitutional defect in military decision); Schlesinger
v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738,744-53 (1975) (squarely holding this issue not to be jurisdictional).
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stated that it was assuming arguendo the jurisdiction of the federal COurt,l6
Even ifthe Court later changes its mind about the jurisdictional nature of an
issue, the cases that assumed arguendo matters that the Court then regarded
as jurisdictional continue to exemplifythe Court's earlier approbation ofhypo.
thetical jurisdiction.
The Court sought to destroy the value of additional decisions as precedents for hypothetical jurisdiction by now characterizing as jurisdictional the
issue that the Court had reached prior to other jurisdictional issues. I? In
Chandler v. Judicial Council o/Tenth Circuit,18 for example, a federal district
judge had challenged the authority of a Judicial Council to strip him of cases
that had been assigned to him and to impose conditions on the exercise of his
constitutional powers as a judge. 19 .The Court declared that the "very knotty'I20
"threshold question in this case is whether we have jurisdiction to entertain
the petition for extraordinary relief, "21 However, the court declined to decide
whether it had appellate jurisdiction, and concluded that, because other
avenues of relief remained open, the complaining judge had not made a case
for extraordinary relief. 22 There is no indication that the Chandler Court itself
regarded the issue ofexhaustion of alternatives as jurisdictional, although the.
Steel Co. Court viewed the issue that way.. Despite the Court's later change
of mind about the jurisdictional nature of an issue, cases in which the Court
decided what it then regarded as non-jurisdictional matters before the Court
decided issues that it then regarded as jurisdictional may again exemplify the
Court's earlier approbation ofhypothetical jurisdiction.23
B. Questions Left Unanswered

Beyond this questionable handling of precedent, the Steel Co. majority
opinion raises a number of questions. For example, a great deal of language
in the opinion suggests that the Court sought to ensure that lower federal
16. Avrech,418 U.S. at 677-78; Augenblick, 393 U.S. at 350-52.
17. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 100 (describing Chandler v. Judicial Council o/Tenth
Circuit, 398 U.S. 74 (1970), as having permissibly addressed whether petitioner for writ of
prohibition or mandamus had exhausted all alternative avenues of relief, while reserving
question of Court's jurisdiction to issue such writ in that case, because exhaustion question
itself was "at least arguably jurisdictional, and was clearlytreated such").
18. 398 U.S. 74 (1970).
19. Chandler, 398 U.S. at 82.
20. ld at 88.
21. ld. at 86.
22. ld. at 86-89.
23. See infra text at notes 48-59, however, concerning the decision ofprocedural issues
.
before merits issues.

as
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Courts will not reach merits questions24 without first detennining that an
Article ill case or controversy is present. 25 Insofar as only constitutional
]imitations on judicial jurisdiction are the Court's concern, lower· federal
courts may be free to resolve merits questions before jurisdictional questions
that are of a merely statutory, prudential or common law nature. 26 But this is
not entirely clear. Other language in the opinion, in particular that in which
the Court stated that "[t]he statutory and (especially) constitutional elements
24. These would include whether the complaint stated a claim on which relief could be
granted.
25. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 92, 95 (arguing that Justice Stevens had failed to cite any
elise in which Supreme Court had decided whether complaint stated claim before resolving "the
existence of an Article m case or controversy," and stating that arguments asserting that court
may decide cause of action question before resolving Article mjurisdiction are readily refuted).
In Steel Co., the Court conceded that some of its cases had "diluted the absolute purity of the
rule that Article Injurisdiction is always an antecedent question." Id. at 101 (emphasis added).
26. See Nat'l RR. Passenger Corp. v. Nat'IAss'n ofR.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453,45556,464-65 & n.13 (1974) (determining merits question - whether private right ofaction existed
to enforce particular statutory duties, thereby pretermitting issues of plaintiff's statutory
standing to bring such suit and whether district court had statutory jurisdiction to entertain such
suit); Bd. ofEduc. v. Kelly E. ex rei. Nancy E., 207 F.3d 931, 934 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding
prudential standing requirements to be forfeited when not raised in timely manner because such
requirements are nonjurisdictional); Hodgers-Durgin v. De La Vina, 199 F.3d 1037, 1042 n.3
(9th Cir. 1999) (concluding that, in assuming Article m standing and resolving case based on
plaintiffs' failure to establish prerequisite for equitable relief, court did not violate Steel Co.' s
denunciation of hypothetical jurisdiction because it affirmed summary judgment for defendants
based on scope ofits equitable. power to grant injunctive relief, not based on merits ofplaintiff's
claims); Cablevision, Inc. v. Pub. Improvement Contm'n, 184 F.3d 88, 100 n.9 (1st Cir. 1999)
(finding that "whatever the scope of Steel Co.'s recommended order of analysis, ... [it] does
command that initial considerstion be given to the existence of Article m standing, where
SUch ... is in doubt"); P8rella v. Ret. Bd. ofthe Rl Employees' Ret. Sys., 173 F.3d 46,53-54
(1st Cir. 1999) (describing Steel Co. as having "declared that courts should generally determine
whether Article m jurisdiction exists before reaching the merits," and as having distinguished
between Article m and statutory jurisdiction, "holding that the former should ordinarily be
decided before the merits, but the latter need not be"); Kauthar SDN BlID v. Sternberg, 149
F.3d 659, 663 n.4, 669 n.13 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that, because complaint alleged Article m
case or controversy and Article m standing, court had jurisdiction to address questions of
statutory standing and merits issues; but, it addressed only merit issues, concluding that it could
"elide" issue of prudential standing); Idleman, supra note 4, at 318-20 (noting that insofar as
Steel Co. holds that Article m court cannot decide merits of dispute without first verifYing that
Article m's case or controversy requirements have been satisfied, it does not necessarily
prohibit decision of merits issues without prior verification of merely statutory or judge-made
jurisdictional requirements). Professor Freer has noted that a "case in which the plaintiff lacks
only statutory standing nonetheless falls within Article m. Determining the merits of such a
case without addressing the statutory standing issue does not implicate the constitutional
separation of powers problem at the center of Steel Company." Richard D. Freer, Observations
on the Scope of the Supreme Court's Rejection of "Hypothetical Jurisdiction," 8 FED. LIT.
GUIDE RPm. 247, 250 (Oct. 1999)(emphasis added).
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of jurisdiction are an essential ingredient of separation and equilibration of
powers, restraining the'courts from acting at certain times, and even restraining them from acting pennanently regardiilg, certain subjects, II suggests that
the Court's denunciation of hypothetical jurisdiction extends to arguendo
assumptions of jurisdiction that, while unquestionably constitutional, are
doubtful as a statutory matter. 27 Thus, the 'Court has laid the groundwork for
playing Steel Co. either way.'
The majority opinion also raises questions about the scope ofthe denunciation of hypothetical jurisdiction by its embrace, rather than disavowal, of
cases in which the Court itself lldiluted the absolute purity ofthe rule"28 that
jurisdiction always is a threshold question. IfNorton v. Mathews,29 Philbrook
v. Glodgett,30 §ecretary ofNavy v. Avrech,31 Chandler v. Judicial Council of
27.

28.'

Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 1016.
[d.
427 U.S. 524 (1976). In Norton, the Court declined to decide the jurisdictional

, 29.
question whether the action had properly been brought in a three-judge district court and hence
was properly before the Supreme Court on a direct appeal. Norton v. Mathews, 427 U.S. 524,
527-31 (1976). The Court justified its bypass ofthe jurisdictional question on the grounds that,
because the merits question was decided in a companion case, resolution of the jurisdictional
question would have had no effect on the outCome: ifjurisdiction had been invoked correctly,
the Court would have affirmed summary judgment for the defendant. If jurisdiction were
lacking, the Court would have dismissed the appeal, vacated the judgment and remanded, but
the identical outcome would have been foreordained in subsequent proceedings before a single
federal judge. [d. at 531-32. Thus, avoidance of the jurisdictional question did not allow the
Court to decide a question that otherwise would have gone unaddressed. In Steel Co., the Court
also indicated that Norton could be read not to have avoided the jurisdictional question at all,
but to have concluded that, in light ofthe companion case, NorIan should be dismissed for lack
of a substantial federal question. SteeICo., 523 U.S. at 98; see Norton, 427 U.S. at 530~31
(stating that disposition of companion case rendered "the merits. in the present case a decided
issue and thus one no longer substantial in the jurisdictional sense"). For commentary on
Norton, see Idleman, supra note 4, at 301-02 (observing that second reading "legitimates the
power of an appellate court to issue a prejudicial judgment (an affirmance on the merits)" and
commenting on how the two readings ofNorton differ in how they undermine the Court's effort
to repudiate hypothetical jurisdiction, but asserting that both do so).
Judge O'Scannlain, dissenting in Claw v. U.S. Dep 't a/Housing & Urban Dev., 948 F.2d
614 (9th Cir. 1991), argues that Norton is in no way precedent for hypothetical jurisdiction
'
because
the knotty jurisdictional question that the Norton Court abstained from deciding
was not a question ofjurisdiction vel non, but a question of which oftwo juris,dictional schemes . . . properly applied. . .. (IJt implicitly acknowledged that the
district court's jurisdiction - in one form or another - was certain and that nothing
depended upon a resolution of the precise nature of that jurisdiction because the
same party would prevail on the merits in either event.
/d. at 627 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting).
30. 421 U.S. 707 (1975). Philbrook presented an issue of pendent party jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) that the parties had not adequately briefed and that the Court
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Tenth Circuit,32 and United States v. AugenblicJr3 - all cases that lower federal courts had relied upon as legitimating hypothetical jurisdiction - remain
good law, the line separating assumptions ofjurisdiction that are forbidden
regarded as a "subtle and complex question with, far-reaching implications." Id. at 721. Despite
or perhaps b~use of this, the Court concluded that the "unusual conteid" of the appeal
permitted an exception to the general rule that the Court has a duty to inquire into the jurisdiction of the district court. Id. The ,unusual conteid apparently consisted of the foregoing
circumstances and the additional facts that (1) the substsntive issue decided by the district court
would have been decided in regard to a co-defendant even ifthe Secretary of HEW were not a
proper party and (2) the pendent party Secretary had announced his intent to comply with the
judgment if the Court's decision on the merits was adverse. Concluding that the exercise of
jurisdiction over the claim against the Secretary had resulted in no adjudication on the merits
that could not have been properly made without him, and had resulted in no issuance ofprocess
against him which he properly contended to be wrongful, the Court bypasSed the question of
Ststutory subject-matter jurisdiction over the claim against the Secretary (and perhaps even the
question of the constitutionality under Article m of pendent party subject-matter jurisdiction),
and simply dismissed the Secretary's appeal from the judgment below. Id. at 721-22; see also
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59,72 n.16 (1978) (declining
to resolve whether Duke Power was proper party because jurisdiction over claims against
Nuclear Regulatory Commission was established, and Duke's presence or absence made no
material difference either to Court's consideration of merits or to its authority to award requested relief).
In later cases, the Court assumed arguendo that Article mwould permit the exercise of
pendent party jurisdiction (so long as the claim against the pendent party arose out ofa common
nucleus of operative fact with a sub!itsntial federal question claim and was such that, disregarding the claims' federal and state natures, respectively, the plaintiffwould normally be expected
to try them together), but the Court disapproved such exercises ofjurisdiction as inconsistent
\Vith the ststutory bases of jurisdiction on which the courts had to rely. See FiDley v. United
States, 490 U.S. 545, 549 (1989) (disapproving pendent party jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346, having assumed, without deciding, that constitutional criteria for pendent party jurisdiction are analogous to those for pendent claim jurisdiction); Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S.
I, 15-18 (1976) (disapproving pendent party jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C; § 1343(3), after
stating that extension of United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966), to pendent party
jurisdiction "presents rather different statutory jurisdictional considerations") (emphasis added);
see also Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365,371 n.lO (1978) (assuming,
without deciding, that common nucleus of operative fact test also determines outer boundaries
of constitutionally permissible federal jurisdiction based upon diversity ofcitizenship).
31. 418 U.S. 676 (1974). Avrech also presented a situation in which a Supreme Court
decision, Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974), decided after certiorari had been granted in
Avrech but a few weeks before Avrech was decided, definitively answered the question presented on the merits by Avrech. Id. at 678. Thus, Avrech too could be viewed as exemplifYing
the notion that hypothetical jurisdiction may be permissible when the merits determination
would not constitute a holding with precedential significance. See Steel Co., 523 U.s. at 98-99
(noting that Avrech should not be cited for proposition that courts may decide "easy" merits
questions based on assumption ofjurisdiction).
32. 398 U.S. 74 (1970); see supra teid accompanying notes 18-22.
33. 393 U.S. 348 (1969); see supra teid accompanying note 16.
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from those that are permissible is blurry.34 By way ofexample, as Professor
Freer has noted, Norton could be read lito permit hypothetical jurisdiction
whenever the merits detemrination does not require a precedential holding. 1135
The same could be said ofAvrech and Philbrook. 36 The pre-Steel Co. understanding that hypothetical assumptions of jurisdiction are proper only when
the merits are easy to decide37 is consistent with this principle, for it is precisely when. precedent clearly dictates the outcome of a case (so that its
decision will not be of significant precedential value) that decision ofthe case
on the merits is easiest.
Even on the Court's own reading of Chandler, that case can be read to
pennit one jurisdictional question to be avoided or assumed in favor of
deciding another such question. 38 As so interpreted, Chandler is a precursor
34. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 98-100 (purporting to distinguish these cases); see also
Cross-Sound Ferry Servs., Inc. v. I.C.C., 934 F.2d 327,342-45 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and concurring ill denial of petition for review) (arguing that none of four
cases sometimes cited in support of hypothetical jurisdiction does so; in particular, arguing that
"[i]n Augenblick, ... the ground passed over was at least arguably non-jurisdictional, and in
Chandler, Avrech, and Norton, the ground rested upon was at least arguably jurisdictional").
The view of then-Judge Thomas seemed to be, however, that, given the "woolliness" and
elusiveness ofthe concept ofjurisdi~onand the fact that some provisions can be jurisdictional
in some contexts and not in others, the rule that federal courts must satisfY themselves oftheir
jurisdiction and not decide cases when they lackjurisdiction to do so may not apply ifthe ground
passed over sufficiently partakes of the Dature of a merits ground or ifthe ground rested upon
sufficiently partakes ofthe nature of a jurisdictional bar. Cross-Sound Ferry, 934 F.2d at 341.
Extensive discussion of the Supreme Court cases that lower federal courts relied on as
authority for the assumption of jurisdiction arguendo can be found in Idleman, supra note 4;
Comment,Assuming Jurisdiction Argueildo: The Rationale and Limits ofHypothetical Jurisdiction, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 712, 746 (1979).
Another Supreme Court opinion that may be viewed as employing hypothetical jurisdiction, but only as to one aspect ofthe case, is New York". United States, 505 U.S. 144,183-85
(1992). There, in considering plaintiffs' contention that certain provisions of a congressional
act were inconsistent with the Constitution's Guarantee Clause (guaranteeing to every state a
republican form of govemment), the Court avoided deciding whether the claim was a non-·
justiciable political question. ld. The court stated, "Even ifwe assume that petitioners' claim
is justiciable, [the challenged provisions did not] deny any State a republican form of government." ld. at 185. But see Comment, supra, at 746 (arguing that deciding a case on its merits
while assuming arguendo the nonexistence of a political question creates a logical conflict). In
doing so, "[t]he issue purportedly reserved - whether the controversy is a proper subject for
judicial resolution - has in fact been decided in the affirmative. . .. [D]ecidillg the issue on the
merits necessarily implies a decision that no political question exists." ld.
35. Freer, supra note 26, at 250 (emphasis added).
36. See supra notes 30-31.
37. See supra text accompanying note 5.
38. Professor Idleman has written that, in addition to the doctrines discussed above that
Steel Co. apparently preserved despite its denunciation ofhypothetical jurisdiction generally, the
Court also appears to have left intact some other doctrines that relate to hypothetical jurisdiction.
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o(the Court's decision in Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co. ,39 where the Court
held that there is "no unyielding jurisdictional hierarchy" requiring a federal
to decide that it has subject-matter jurisdiction over a removed case
before deciding whether it has personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 40
If issues concerning a court's subject-matter jurisdiction may be postponed, and perhaps permanently avoided, while the court addresses personal
jurisdiction issues and other jurisdictional requirements, one may well ask
what other issues are "jurisdictional" so that courts may give them sequenciIlg priority over issues that bear upon su;bje~-matter jurisdiction and so that

court

Ifleft intact the doc1rine that federal courts may dismiss a case for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction when the ostensibly federal claim asserted is wholly "insubstantial" and frivolous.
Idleman, supra note 4, at 290-91; see Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 89 (stating that district courts have
Jurisdiction unless purportedly federal claims fit this description). The Court also left intact the
converse doctrine that whether a cause of action exists is not a question of jurisdiction. In
Professor Idleman's view, there are a number of tensions between the insubstantiality doctrine
and Steel Co.'s position on hypotheticaljurisdiction. See Idleman, supra note 4, at 293-97.
39. 526 U.S. 574 (1999); see also Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43,
66-67 (I997) (deciding case on basis ofmootness, without first determining whether appellants
had standing to appeal, explaining that both questions affect Article ill jurisdiction).
40. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574,578 (1999). Marathon Oil and
others had sued Ruhrgas in' state court, and Ruhrgas had removed to district court, asserting
three bases of federal jurisdiction: diversity ofcitizenship, federal question, and 9 U.S.C. § 205
(1999), which authorizes removal of cases that relate to international arbitration agreements.
[d. at 579. Ruhrgas then moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, and
:Marathon moved to remand for lack of federal subject-matter jurisdiction. [d. at 580. The
district court granted the former motion, finding that Ruhrgas lacked the minimum contacts with
Texas that were required by Fourteenth Amendment due process and hence by the Texas longstatute. [d. The Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, vacated and remanded, holding that the district court ought to have reached the question of personal jurisdiction only after concluding that
it had subject-matter jurisdiction. [d. at 582. By so sequencing the issues, the district court
would have reduced the threat ofusurping the state court's authority to decide the sweep ofits
poW'erto exercise personal jurisdiction. See Marathon Oil Co. v. Ruhrgas, 145 F.3d 211, 21819 (5th Cir. 1998), rev'd, Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574 (1999).
The Supreme Court declined to conclude that the nature and unwaivability ofthe subjectmatter jurisdiction requirement made it necessarily more fundamental than the requirement of
personal jurisdiction, observing that, in this case, the objection to the former was merely statutory whereas the objection to the latter was constitutionally based. Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 58485. It found that, in a dismissal for want of personal jurisdiction, there was no assumption of
J'IOVI'er that violated the jurisdiction-before-merits principle emphasized in Steel Co. v. Citizens
for a Beuer Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998). [d.
The Court opined generally that the federal design permitted federal courts to consider
such matters as judicial economy, the relative difficulty and novelty of the two jurisdictional
questions, and federalism, that is, sensitivity to state courts' coequal stature, in deciding whether
to address first a motion to remand for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction or a motion to dismiss
for lack of personal jurisdiction. [d. at 587-88. Thus, although subject-matter jurisdiction
ordinarily should be decided first, "where . . . a district court has before it a straightforward
personal jurisdiction issue presenting no complex question of state law, and the alleged defect
in subject-matter jurisdiction raises a difficult and novel question, the court does not abuse its
discretion by turning directly to personal jurisdiction." [d. at 588.

arm
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courts must address them before reaching issues on the merits. 41 The candidates include a defendant's Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit,42
the argument that a federal court should abstain from deciding a case under
the doctrine of Younger v. Harris 43 or other abstention doctrines,44 and many
41. See Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 353 n.4 (1984) (concluding that
Congress's preclusion ofjudicial review. ofSecretary ofAgriculture's market or4ers when sought
by consumers was "in effect jurisdictionsl," and therefore that Court did not need to address
challenge to consumers' standing to challenge those orders); Moor v. Alameda County, 411 U.S.
693, 711-17 (1973) (approving discretionary declination ofpendentjurisdictionwithout deciding
non-discretionary jurisdictional question whether pendent jurisdiction could extend to state law
claims against new party); Fla. Ass'n ofRehab. Fscilities, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't ofHealth & Rehabilitative Servs., 225 F.3d 1208, 1227 n.14 (11th Cir. 2000) (concluding that question ofmootness
ought to be resolved before Eleventh Amendment issues because former is an "even more basic
. question ofjurisdiction that cannot be waived and goes to the very heart ofthe 'case or controversy' requirement ofArticle ill"); United States v. Hurd, No. 98-7129, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS
8715, at *6 (10th Cir. May 7, 1999) (finding serious question as to whether appellant had filed
timely notice ofappeal ofdenial of post~judgmentmotion to dismiss, but vacating district court's
ruling on basis of latter's lack of jurisdiction to consider merits of motion); La. Envtl. Action
Network v. Browner, 87 F.3d 1379, 1384-85 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (dismissing for lack of ripeness
where plaintiffs also may have lacked standing); Can v. United States, 14 F.3d 160, 162 (2d Cir.
1994) (affirming on political question grounds district court's judgment dismissing claim for lack
of subject-matterjurisdiction, reasoning that justiciability also is threshold question and, where
it poses a less knotty question, may be addressed ftrst). But see In re Papandreou, 139 F.3d247,
256 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (advising that, because Supreme Court has classified "act of state" doctrine
as substantive rule oflaw, resolution ofthis case on that ground, without addressing jurisdiction
under Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), would exceed district court's power).
42. Compare Parella v. Ret. Bd. oftheRI. Employees' Ret. Sys., 173 F.3d 46, 53-56 (tst
Cir. 1999) (holding that Steel Co. docs not require courts to address arguments ofentitlement to
Eleventh Amendment immunity before addressing merits ofclaim, reading Steel Co. to hold that
only Article ill jurisdictional questions ordinarily should be decided before merits; and concluding that Eleventh Amendment issues do not fall into category ofArticle ill questions that Steel
Co. would define as necessarily antecedent given, inter alia, ways in which EleventhAmendment
differs from ordinary restrictions on subject-matter jurisdiction and fact that decision of merits
before consideration of Eleventh Amendment arguments docs not threaten court's underlying
power to decide law) with Seaborn v. Fla. Dep't ofCorr., 143 F.3d 1405, 1407 (11th Cir. 1998)
(holding that Eleventh Amendment issues must be addressed before merits, having characterized
assertion of Eleventh Amendment immunity as challenge to federal subject-matter jurisdiction)
(citing Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996». For further discussion of the
Eleventh Amendment issue, see infra text at rtotes 81-142.
43. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). .The Court inYounger held that federal courts may not enjoill
pending state criminal proceedings except where the threat to federally-protected rights cannot
be adequately addressed by plaintiff's defense ofthat prosecution. Id. at 54. Compare Weekly
v. Morrow, 204 F.3d 613, 614-16 (5th Cir. 2000) (concluding that Younger abstentiop. is not
based on lack ofjurisdiction but reflects prudential decision not to exercise equity jurisdiction
that court possesses, and dismissing suit without reaching Younger issue where district court
lacked jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman doctrine), and Falanga v. State Bar orOa., 150 F.3d
1333,1335 n.2 (11th Cir. 1998) (concluding thatappeals court could assunte that lower court's
refusal to abstain was proper and address merits because Younger abstention issues are not
jurisdictional), with Steel Co, v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 US. 83, 100-01 n.3 (1998)
(purporting to distinguish its decision in Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426,434-35 (1975), from
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otherS. 45

Insofar as these issues arCf not jurisdictional in the relevant sense,
courts will have to address "truly" jurisdictional issues before reaching them,
'but courts may continue to assume arguendo against them46 and address the
situations ofhypothetical jurisdiction). In Ellis, the Court reversed and remanded a case, to be
reconsidered in light ofrecent Court precedent in the Younger line ofcases, despite having grave
doubts as to whether a case or controversy existed. According to the Steel Co. Court, this was
permissible because the Court has treated Younger as jurisdictional. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 10001 n.3. The Court however instructed the district court, on remand, to decide the Article ill
isllues before reaching the Younger issues. Ellis, 421 U.S. at 435; see also Kendall-Jackson
Winery, Ltd. v. Branson, 212 F.3d 995, 997 (7th Cir. 2000) (distinguishing Younger abstention
from subject-matter jurisdiction, relying upon waivability of former, which court found to be
incompatible with subject-matter jurisdiction); Benavidez v. Eu, 34 F.3d 825, 829 (9th Cir. 1994)
(holding that trial court had jurisdiction to permit or deny intervention after having dismissed
Plaintiffs' case on Younger grounds because Younger abstention is notjurisdictional but reflects
prudential decision not to exercise jurisdiction that court does possess).
44. See Kendall-Jackson Wmery, Ltd., 212 F.3d at 997 (distinguishing Pullman abstention
from matters of subject-matter jurisdiction); Black Sea Inv., Ltd. v. United Heritage Corp., 204
F..3d 647, 650-52 (5th Cir. 2000) (addressing whether abstention doctrines announced in
ColoradoRiver Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976), and in Brillhart
'V. Excess Insurance Co. ofAmerica, 316 U.S. 491 (1942), are jurisdictional). The Fifth Circuit
concluded that the Colorado River abstention doctrine is notjurisdictional, and that the Brillhart
abstention doctrine "speaks to the propriety ofassuming federal jurisdiction over the instant case"
and, in part for that reason, was properly addressed upon review of a Colorado River stay of
proceedings, although the issue was raised for the first time on appeal. ld. at 652. See Southmark
Corp. v. Coopers & Lybrand (In re Southmark Corp.), 163F.3d 925, 929 (5th Cir. 1999) (opining
that, before reaching preclusion issues, bankruptcy court should have decided issues concerning
its jurisdiction and its obligation under bankruptcy laws, to abstain from hearing case).
45. Idleman asserts that there are "countless issues the status ofwhich - especially their
bypassability - remains uncertain in the wake ofSteel Co." Idleman, supra note 4, at 328. Those
issues include the amount in controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction, supplemental
jurisdiction, the reviewability of detention decisions related to deportations, the procedural
requirements of Rules 3(c) and 4(b) of the Federsl Rules of Appellate Procedure, certain
exhaustion ofremedies requirements, and certificate ofappealability requirements. ld. at 328-29.
A sample ofadditional issues that courts recently have had to categorize as jurisdictional or not
includes the following: Hillv. City ofSeven Points, 230 F.3d 167, 168 (5th Cir. 2000)(whether
absence ofjudge's signature from order ofreference to magistrate judge is jurisdictional defect);
United Statesv. Gama-Bastidas,222 F.3d 779, 784.~85 (10th Cir. 2000) (whether law ofthe case
or mandate rule, which generally requires trial courts. to conform with articulated appellate
remands, is jurisdictional); Lemonds v. St Louis County, 222 F.3d 488, 492 (8th Cir. 2000)
(whether Rooker-Feldman doctrine is jurisdictional, so that it may be addressed for first time on
appeal and raised sua sponte); Hurley v. Motor Coach lndust, Inc., 222 F.3d 377,379 (7th Cir.
2000) (whether "forum defendant rule," which prohibits removal ofnon-federsl question case
only if no properly joined and served defendant is citizen of state in which action was brought,
is jurisdictional, 90 that its violation is non-waivable defect).
46.· For example, courts might assume arguendo that no Eleventh Amendment immunity
requires dismissal, and might assume arguendo that abstention would be inappropriate. See
Davoli v. Webb, 194 F.3d 1116, 1129-30 (10th Cir. 1999) (having concluded that whether Title
IT of ADA applies to employment discrimination docs not raise jurisdictional question; court
assumed that it applied and turned to issues on appeal).
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merits first. 47
On the other hand, ifthere is a category ofmatters that may be addressed
before (and even instead ot) statute-based or even Article ill-based subjectmatter jurisdictional issues (the latter issues sometimes being entirely bypassed), the questions arise whether that category encompasses matters that
are not jurisdictional in any sense and how broad that category is. It appears
that Article ill issues may be bypassed in favor of procedural issues,48 although theoretically not in favor of merits issues. As Professor Freer has
noted, there is some evidence that this is the Supreme Court's view ofthe law.
In Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corporation,49 the Court concluded that it could avoid
addressing the argument that some of the members of a "limited fund" class, so
47. For further discussion ofEleventhAmendment immunity issues, see infra text at notes
81-142.
48. As Professor Idleman has noted, some issues are neither jurisdictional nor meritsbased. Idleman, supra note 4, at 321. Being something other than merits-based, these issues
can be reached by the courts without the courts frrst having satisfied themselves of their jurisdiction, or, at least, so Steel Co. seems to imply. Id. at 321-23. The issues in this category often
would be categorized as procedural, remedial or evidentiary. Id. at 322 & n.364.
Both Eleventh Amendment immunity and Younger abstention have a procedural cast
because·they speak to whether the federal court mayor ought to hear a dispute, not to·who
should win "on the merits." Eleventh Amendment immunity always would be raised by a
defendant, and requests for abstention typically come from defendants as well, because plaintiffs
would not have sued in federal court if they did not want that court to decide the dispute.
49. 527 U.S. 815 (1999). The Court decided Ortiz about five weeks after deciding
Ruhrgas.
50. Rule 23(bXl)(B), FED. R. CIV. P., provides that
[a]n action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a)
are. satisfied, and in addition: the prosecution of separate actions by or against
individual members of the class would create a risk. of ... (B) adjudications with
respect to individual members of the class which would as a practical ma~ be
dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudication, or
substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests.
Situations in which "claims are made by numerous persons against a fund insufficient to satisfy
all claims" fall within this description. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(bXl)(B) Advisory Committee
Note.
In Ortiz, the Court examined the varieties of suits traditionally encompassed by Rule
23(bXl)B) and discerned three characteristics that typifY "limited fund" class actions and whose
presence suffices to justifY (bXl)B) certification. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 838. The traits are:
- a fund with an ascertained limit which, at its maximum, is demonstrated to
be exceeded by aggregate liquidated claims, set at their maxims;
- all ofwhich fund is to be distributed to those with liquidated claims that are
based on .a common theory ofliability; and
- all claimants sharing a common theory of recovery to be treated equitably,
typically by a pro rata distribution ofthe fUnd.
Id. at 838-41.
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Certified by the district court, had not suffered a cognizable injury in fact and
thus lacked standing to sue, and could instead (first) address the propriety of
the class certification, although the Court remained '''mindful that [the Rule's]
requirements must be interpreted in keeping with Article m constraints'. ,,51
The. Court rationalized this result in part.on the ground that the certification
issUes themSelves "pertain[ed] to statutory standing [an assertion that the
Court did not explain],S2 which may properly be treated before Article m
standing, ,,53 and in part on the theory that the propriety of class certification
\VaS "logically antecedent" to standing because, absent proper.certification of
a class including these individuals, no issue as to their standing would arise.54
The Court concluded that these chlll'lUiteristics are presumptively necessary for limited
fund (bX1)B) certiticationand that a proponent of any departure from those norms would have
the burden ofjustifYing that departure. [d. at 841-42.
51. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 831 (quoting Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Wmdsor, 521 U.S. 591,61213 (1997)). The sentence in Amchem quoted in Ortiz continued, "[and mindful that Rule 23's
requirements must be interpreted in keeping with] the Rules Enabling Act, which instructs that
rules of procedure 'shall not abridge, enlarge or modifY any substantive right'." Amchem, 521
. U.S. at 612-13.
In Ortiz the Court overturned a global agreement settling the personal injury claims of a
large class of persons who had sued Fibreboard for asbestos exposure, rmding that the requirements ofRule 23 were not satisfied. The class members alluded to in the text were those who
had been exposed to asbestos but had, as yet, manifested no physical injury.
52. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 831. The assertion is by no means self-evident. FED. R. CIV. P.
23(a) recites that
[o]ne or more members of a class may sue ... as representative parnes on behalf
of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions oflaw or fact common to the class, (3) the claims ... of
the representative parnes are typical of the claims ... of the class, and (4) the
representative parnes will fairly and adequately protect the interests ofthe class.
See supra note 50 (reciting FED. R. CIV. P. 23(bX1XB)). The only aspects ofthese requirements
that seem to be remotely redolent of standing requirements are the references to parties and
claims.
53. The power of the courts to bypass the Article ill standing question apparently was
thought to fall within the scope of National Railroad Passenger Corp v. National Ass'n of
Railroad Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974), supra note 26. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 96-97
(noting that National RailroadPassenger Corp. decided issue ofstatutory standing, not whether
there was Article ill case or controversy); accord Grand Council of the Crees v. Fed. Energy
Regulatory Comm'o, 198 F.3d 950,954 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that, under Steel Co., court
properly could consider prudential standing while leaving constitutional standing in doubt
because there was no required sequencing ofjurisdictional issues).
54. Ortiz, 527 U.S. Ct. at 831; see alsoAmchem, 521 U.R at 612 (approving opinion of
Court ofAppeals for Third Circuit in this case, in which it had bypassed challenges to justiciability and subject-matter jurisdiction on grounds that issues ofjurisdiction in this case "would
not exist but for the [class action] certification" (quoting Georgene v. Amchem Prods., 83 F.3d
610,632 (3d Cir. 1996))).
It is not entirely clear why the jurisdictional or standing issues in either Amchem or Ortiz
would not have existed without the class certification. If one or more of the purported class
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In the Court's view, these circumstances made it proper to address the propriety of the class certification without first addressing the standing of all those

in the plaintiffclass. 55
Still another recent example of the Court's view that Article ill issues
may be bypassed in favor ofprocedural issues is Lambrix v. Singletary.56 The
Court indicated there that, when a state court rejects a convicted person's
representatives, suing individually as well as on behalf of a class, were exposure-only plaintiffs,
their standing to sue would be before the court regardless of whether class certification was
proper.
55. See Pederson v. La. State Univ., 213 F.3d 858, 866 & n.5 (5th Cir. 2000) (purporting
to follow Ortiz, concluding that it would address jurisdictional issues of standing, mootness,
state sovereign immunity, and class certification "in no particular order," and noting that class
certification issues that were not outcome determinative (unlike in Ortiz and Amchem Products,
Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997», did not need to be treated first, although court did
discuss them first).
The Ortiz Court's avoidance ofthe standing issues is questionable on a number ofgrounds.
In addition to those suggested in notes 52, 54, supra, I would add these: Although the Court
often has allowed non-class suits to go forward so long as some plaintiff had standing, typically
in those instances injunctive relief was sought that would benefit those whose standing was left
unresolved even if they did not remain formal parties. See, e.g., Waters Corp. v. Millipore
Corp., 140 F.3d 324, 325-26 (tst Cir. 1998) (concluding that court did not need to decide
whether Waters plan and its fiduciaries were proper plaintiffs beCause individual plaintiffs had
standing as participants in Millipore plan, which enabled court to address substantive issues
posed by appeal)~ Director, Office ofWorkers' Compo Programs v. Perini N. River Assocs., 459
U.S. 297,302-05 (1983) (holding that Court did not have to consider standing to appeal of
Director because injured worker had standing to seek review of court of appeal's decision
concerning whether he was covered by Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act)~ Viii. ofArlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,263-64 & n.9 (1977)
(holding that Court did not need to address stsnding of Metropolitan Housing Development
Corporation to assert rights of potential inhabitants of proposed housing because plaintiffwho.
sought and qualitied for proposed housing had standing). By contrast, in Ortiz money damages
were soughtthat would individually benefit those whose stsnding was in question.
In addition, past case law had indicated that a court can properly decline to address
whether a plaintiffhas standing, and whether his claim is ripe and not moot, only ifall the issues
on the merits that the plaintiff raises also are raised by another plaintiff who has stsnding, and
the ripeness, and "liveness" ofwhose claims have been recognized by the court. See, e.g.,Sec'y
of Interior V. California, 464 U.S. 312, 319 n.3 (1984) (noting that Court need not address
standing of respondents ''whose position here is identical to the State's" because State of
California had standing)~ Blue Cross Ass'n V. Califano, 473 F. Supp. 1047,1060-65 (W.o. Mo..
1979), rev'd on other grounds, Blue Cross Ass'n V. Harris, 622 F.2d 972 (8th Cir. 1980)
(investigating separately standing of plaintiffs in each of two consolidated actions, in part
because plaintiffs in one had asserted some claims not asserted by plaintiffs in other). In Ortiz,
the issues on the merits raised by absent plaintiff class members whose standing was challenged
may well have differed in some particulars from those posed by other absent class members.
For example, only the former would have presented the question whether persons who had not
yet manifested any physical injwy resulting from their exposure to asbestos had stated a claim
upon which reliefcould be granted.
56. 520 U.S. 518 (1997).
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:federal law conteirtion as procedurally barred, without considering its merits,
afederal court hearing a challenge to that rejection ordinarily should consider
it before detennining whether the rule that the criminal defendant seeks to
l1ave applied to him is applicable retroactively on federal habeas under Teague
v.Lane. 57 This "ordinary" sequence is consistent with the view that the courts
should consider their appellate jurisdiction before reaching issues on the
.1llerits or even unrelated procedural issues because, if the federal law contentiOn was properly procedurally barred in the State courts, that bar constitutes
adequate and independent state law ground which the federal courts,
in.cluding the U.S. Supreme Court, lack jurisdiction to review. s8 The question
'Whether an argument is available under Teague is not jurisdictional, despite
'the Court's instruction that Teague retroactivity decisions should be made
before courts consider the menu ofa case. S9
What is remarkable about Lambrix is that, having said all this, the Court
cautioned that it did not "mean to suggest that the procedural-bar issue must
invariably be resolved first . . .. Judicial economy might counsel giving the
Teague question priority, for example, if it were easily resolvable against the
habeas petitioner, whereas the procedural-bar issue involved complicated
issues of state law. ,,60 The Court thus again recognized that judicial economy
in general, and ease of resolution of issues in particular, have a rightful place
in .the courts' decisions as to the sequence in which they should address
issues. Moreover, faced with several contentions as to why Lambrix's claim
was not procedurally barred, the Court chose not to prolong the litigation by

an

57. 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (holding that habeas petitions cannot seek recognition of new
constitutional rights unless those rights would apply retroactively).
58. In Lambrix, the Court noted that
[t]he "independent and adequate state ground" doctrine is not technically jurisdictional when a federal court considers a state prisoner's petition for habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, since the federal court is not formally reviewing a
judgment, but is determining whether the prisoner is "in custody in violation ofthe
Constitution or laws or treaties ofthe United StatCs." [To further federalism and
comity,] [w]e have nonetheless held that the doctrine applies to bar consideration
on federal habeas offederal claims that have been defaulted under state law.
Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 523 (1997) (citations omitted). When neither the challenge to the procedural bar nor the Teague issue is jurisdictional, the sequence in which the
issues are addre88ed is unimportant for purposes of this Article.
59. Id. at 524; see Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37,41 (1990) (holding rule of Teague
v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), prohibiting retroactive application of new rules to cases on
collateral review, not to be jurisdictional in that Court must raise and decide issue sua sponte).
The Court thus addressed the merits of a criminal defendant's ex postfacto claim, without first
deciding the Teague retroactivity issue that the State had not argued. Collins, 497 U.S. at 41;
see Lambrix, 520 U.S. at 524 (noting that postponing Teague inquiry also is consistent with
general principle that constitutional issues are generally to be avoided).
60. Lambrix, 520 U.S. at 525.
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remanding for the lower federal courts to address .those contentions, but
instead decided the case on the Teague grounds. This appears to me to be
exercise of hypothetical appellate jurisdiction (or something very like it),61
with the Court assuming, without deciding, that its jurisdiction was not lacking by virtue ofan adequate and independent state ground for the decision (in
the forin of a procedural bar), and proceeding to decide the case against the
petitioner on non-jurisdictional grounds that the Court apparently views as
procedural, or at least as other than lion the merits. II
If federal courts sometimes may bypass Article ill issues in favor ofprocedural issues, which procedural issues may be given such sequential preference, and under what circumstances, remain to be elucidated. More fundamentally, why federal courts should have authority to address such procedural
issues without having first satisfied themselves of their subject-matter jurisdiction and of compliance with related Article ill requirements (including the
standing of all plaintiffs seeking individual relief), when it would be ultra
vires for them to resolve merits issues, has not been well-explained by the
Court, although the Court repeatedly has asserted courts' authority to decide
procedural issues before they address their jurisdiction.62 Intuitively, the
notion that, if a court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction in a case, it ought not
to resolve any issues, procedural or on the merits, has some appeal. Perhaps
the answer lies in practicalities: A court may need to enter orders regarding
pleadings and discovery before it can make a well-grounded detennination as
to whether subject-matter (or personal) jurisdiction exists. It may appropriately impose sanctions if such discovery orders are disobeyed. In light ofthe
propriety ofthe courts' ruling upon procedural matters to enable the courts to
detennine their subject-matter (or personal) jurisdiction, the Court may implicitly have concluded that, as a matter of power, there are no limits on the
procedural issues that a federal court can decide before determining its jurisdiction. I would suggest, however, that deciding procedural issues that have
no bearing on the court's jurisdiction before detennining that the court has
jurisdiction might, in many circumstances, constitute an abuse of discretion. 63

an

61. . See supra note 4.
62. See, e.g., U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co.v. Bonner Mall P'ship, S13 U.S. 18,20-22
(1994) (concluding that no statute could authorize federal court to decide legal question posed
in absence of Article mcase or controversy ... "[b]ut reason and authority refute the quite
different notion that a federal appellate court may not take any action with regard to a piece of
litigation once it has been determined that the requirements of Article m no longer are (or
indeed never were) met"; noting that, in cases that have become moot, courts nonetheless have
power to award costs and enter dismissal, and holding that they have power to vacate judgments
entered by lower courts).
63. See Citizens for a Better Env't v. Steel Co., 230 F.3d 923, 927 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting
that "courts possess no more authority to issue advisory opinions (or otherwise exceed their
jurisdiction) in 'procedural matters' than in other mstters").
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The distinction between procedural issues and merits issues, even if
theoretically justifiable, is difficult to implement in light of the overlap that
often exists between procedural questions and the merits. The Court itselfhas
held that the propriety of class certification is not sufficiently separate from
the merits issues presented by a proposed (}lass action to permit the grant or
denial of class certification to be immediately appealed under the collateral
order doctrine. 64 Other courts have observed overlaps between the merits and
Eleventh Amendment immunity c1aims6s and other procedural issues. 66
64. coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 (1978) (fmding that "the class
determination generally involves considerations that are 'enmeshed in the factual and legal
issues comprising the plaintitrs cause of action' " (quoting Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Langdeau,
371 U.S. 555, 558 (1963»). Immediate appeal is permitted under the collateral order doctrine
only when an order is conclusive on the matter it addresses, resolves questions that are too
independent of the merits to need to be deferred, is too important to be denied review, and
involves important rights that will be lost if immediate review is not afforded. [d. at 468; see
Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 867~8 (1994) (reiterating requirement of collateral order doctrine); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp. 337 U.S. 541, 546
(1949) (for first time, articulating collateral order doctrine); see also Blair v. Equifax Check
Sem., Inc., 181 F.3d>832, 835 (7th Cir. 1999) (observing that "[d]isputes about class certification cannot be divorced from the merits").
65. See United States a rei. Long v. SCS Bus. & Tech. Inst., Inc., 173 F.3d 890, 895-966
(D.C. Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1202 (2000) (positing that analysis ofwhether states'
Eleventh Amendment immunity had been abrogated would entail analysis similar to that for
determining whether statute allowed states to be liable); Parella v. Ret. Bd. ofthe R.I. Employ~
ecs' Ret. Sys., 173 F.3d 46, 56 n.6 (1st Cir. 1999) (concluding that to address whether state
retirement board was protected from suit by Eleventh Amendment would require court to first
consider merits of plaintiffs Takings Clause and Contract Clause claims). But cf. Puerto Rico
Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 145 (1993) (upholding appeal,
under collateral order doctrine, from order denying claim of state sovereign immunity pursuant
to Eleventh Amendment, and fmding, inter alia, that motion to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment
grounds involves issue, resolution ofwhich "generally will have no bearing on the merits ofthe
underlying action").
66. The Court has held immediate appeal unavailable under the collateral order doctrine
when such appeal was sought ofthe following: an order denying a motion to disqualifY counsel,
see Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 376 (1981) (assuming, without deciding, that disqualification question was completely separate from merits); an order granting
Ii. motion to disqualifY counsel. see Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 268~9 (1984)
(noting that requirement of complete separation from merits is not. satisfied if violation of
petitioner's right requires prejudice to defense); Richardson-Merrell Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S.
424, 437-40 (1985) (observing that, if prejudice is prerequisite to reversal, disqualification
orders are not sufficiently separate from merits to qualifY for immediate appeal); an order denying intervention as of right and allowing permissive intervention, subject to limits on participation, see Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370, 375 (1987) (assuming,
arguendo, that intervention issue was completely separate from merits); an order denying a stay
offederal court proceedings pursuant toColorado River Water Conservation District v. United
States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976), pending completion of parallel state court proceedings, see Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271,278 (1988) (finding that order
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Given the absence of hard and fast separation·between procedmal and
jurisdictional issues, on the one hand, which the Court has held or implied
may be addressed before subject-matter jurisdiction, and merits issues, on the
other hand, the absoluteness of the prohibition against addressing merits
issues before subject-matter jurisdiction seems untenable in some applications. Indeed, the Steel Co. Court itself recognized that the merits question
whether a particular plaintiffhas stated a cause of action under a statute, and
the standing question whether any plaintiff has such a cause of action, are
closely connected, and may even be identical. 67 This makes it artificial at best
to say that the courts may decide the latter,· but not the former, in advance of
reaching other aspects of subject-matter jurisdiction.68
failed to meet requirement of conclusive detennination of disputed question); an order denying
amotion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds or because the defendant claims immunity from service of process, see Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 527-29 (1988)
(holding that convenience oHorum is not distinct from merits); an order refusing to give effect
to a forum selection clause, see Lauro Lines S.R.L. v. Chasser, 490 U.s. 495,498-501 (1989)
(denying interlocutory appeal because order was adequately vindicable after final judgment);
and an order vacating a settlement agreement and a dismissal, thereby subjecting the parties to
trial, see Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 868 & 869 n.2 (1994)
(resting decision on same grounds as Lauro Lines, commenting that court of appeals' conclusion that separability condition was satisfied was not beyond question). See generally 15A
WRIGltt ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION 2D § 3911-12 (1992 &
Supp.2001). In Flanagan, Richardson-Merrell, and Van Cauwenberghe the reasoning was,
at least in part, that the merits and procedural issues were nOt sufficiently independent to make
ail interlocutory appeal appropriate.
Courts generally have regarded deeisiona to abstain as immediately appealable under the
collateral order doctrine. See, e.g., Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 714-15
(1996) (holding abstention based on Burford 11. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943), appealable
under collateral order doctrine,.and noting that order determines whether federal court should
decline to exercise. its jurisdiction in interest ofcomity and federalism, which is issue separate
from merits); Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 12 (1983)
(holding Colorado.River abstention appealable under collateral order doctrine, having found
that "[a]n order that amOllD.ts to a refusal to adjudicate the merits plainly presents an important
issue separate from the merits"); Confederated Salish v. Simonich, 29 F.3d 1398, 1403 (9th Cir.
1994) (holding abstention based on Younger to present important issue separate from merits,
although order here failed. to satisfY requirement that review after fmal judgment would be
inadequate); Mazanec v. N.Judson-San Pierre Sch. Corp., 750 F.2d 625, 627 (7th Cir. 1984)
(holding abstention under RailroadCommission 11. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941), immediately appealable). Immediate appealability under the collateral order doctrine implies that the
order is separate from the merits, at least sufficiently so that there is no need to postpone appeal
until after final judgment.
67. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83,97 n.2 (1998).
68. See Orand Council ofthe Crees v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n. 198 F.3d 950,
959-60 (D.c:. C?ir. 2000) (noting that Steel Co. permits ~ision of merits questions, such as
whether plamtiff has stated claim, before ststutory standing questions, because they may overlap).
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There also is an irony that federal courts (1) ·may decide merits. issues
efore detennining whether to certify a ClasS69 and other procedural issues and
Consider also the doctrine that when a"factua1 attack on subject-matter jurisdiction overItaPs with the merits of a dispute, the proper course is for the district court to find that jurisdictionexists and treat the objection as going to the merits. See, e.g., United States v. North
Carolina, 180 F.3d 574, 580-81 (4th Cir. 1999) (because merits of action [alleging pattern or
'ce of discrimination] related closely to issue that court characterized as· jurisdictional,
er issue was not suited for resolution by motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter
iJrisdiction); Garcia v. Copenhaver, Bell & Assocs., M.D.'s, 104 F.3d 1256, 1261 (11th Cir.
997) (stating that proper course is to treat such jurisdictional question as going to merits);
9lark v. Tarrant County, 798 F.2d 736, 741-42 (5th Cir. 1986) (interpreting law to be that
~[w]here the challenge to the court's jurisdiction is also a challenge to the existence of a federal
cause of action, and assuming that the plaintiff's federal claim is neither insubstantial [or]
'V'olous, ... the district court should fmd that it has jurisdiction over the case and deal with
the defendant's challenge as an attack on the merits"); Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404,
415-16 & n.l0 (5th Cir. 1981) (stating that when defendant's challenge to jurisdiction is also
challenge to existence of federal cause of action, it is proper to deal with jurisdictional objection
as attack on merits because no purpose is served by indirectly arguing merits in context of
federal jurisdiction, and because judicial economy is better served by dismissal of claim on
merits). Williamson sees such jurisdictional attacks as indirect attacks on the merits, from which
plaintiffs can be better protected if defendants are forced to proceed under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) or by moving for summary judgment. Id. The court fmds the scope ofttre
district court's power in each of these contexts to provide greater protection than a court can
provide when opemting under Federal Rule of CivilProcedure 12(bXl). [d. at 416.
Steel Co. seems implicitly to disallow this approach. But see United States ex rel Long
v.. SCS Bus. & Tech. Inst., Inc., 173 F.3d 890, 896 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (arguing that Court's
explanation in Steel Co. that merits questions can be decided before statutory or prudential
standing questions because they overlap to such extent that it would be artificial to distinguish
between them indicates that merits questions can be decided before at least quasi-jurisdictional
matters, such as Eleventh Amendment issues, when they overlap). Even without regard toBteel
Co. issues, courts may determine subject-matter jurisdiction without reaching the merits. See,
e.g., Gould Electronics, Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 178 (3d Cir. 2000) (in context of
FTCA claim, merits of which overlapped with jurisdictional issues, asserting that court may
determine subject-matter jurisdiction without reaching merits so long as court demands less in
jurisdictional proof than would be appropriate at trial ofmerits).
69. Indeed, an empirical study by the Federal Judicial Center found that merits decisions
on motions to dismiss or for summary judgment frequently precede certification, see Thomas
E. Wdlging, Laura! L. Hooper & Robert J. Niemic,An EmpiricalAnalysis ofRule 23 toAddress
the IWlemaking Challenges, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 74, 105-08 (1996) (discuasing conclusion of
studies on whether courts believe that ruling on motion to dismiss may precede ruling on class
certification), although that is not the preferred course. See 2 HERBERT NEWBERG & ALBA
CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS§ 7.15 (3d ed. 1992) (explaining that, for reasons of
judicial efficiency, to guide litigation stmtegy, and to avoid one-way intervention, class certification issues generally should be addressed before dispositive motions); MANuALFOR COMPLEX
LITIGATION § 30.11 at 214 (3d ed. 1995) (stating that precertification merits ruling raises
concerns: "[w]hile it binds only the individual parties, it may have precedential effect on the
putative class members. When it is clear that the action lacks merit, dismissal will avoid unnecessary expense ... and burdens ... , but the court should consider whether the interests of
putative class members may be prejudiced." (citations omitted».
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(2) under Ortiz, may decide class certification issues before reaching standing
and other jurisdictional issues, but (3) under Steel Co., may not decide merits
issues before reaching standing issues - at least those that arise under Article
m. The response ofthe Steel Co. majority to an analogous argument made by
Justice Stevens was that such a combination of results is "no more illogical
than many other 'broken circles' that appear in life and the law. "70 Adapting
the rest ofits answer to the particular ironynoted above, the Court presumably
would say that the reasons to allow merits questions to be decided before
certification questions do not support allowing merits questions to be decideti
before Article TIl questions. Deciding such questions as whether any cause of
action exists before-or-rather-than the questions implied by Rule 23's certification requirements IJdoes not take the court into vast, uncharted realms. of
judicial opinion-giving, whereas the proposition that the court can reach.a
merits question when there is no Article jurisdiction opens the door to all
sorts of 'generalized grievances,' ... that the Constitution leaves for ... the
political process. ,,71

m

C. The Concurring and Dissenting Opinions in Steel Co.
Still additional questions concerning the scope of Steel CO.'s repudiation
of hypothetical jurisdiction are raised by the concurring and dissenting opinions in the case. Only five ofthe Justices joined in the repudiation by joining
Part TIl of Justice Scalia's opinion. 72 . Two of them (Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy) expressed a significantly less hard-line stance in a concurring opini~ authored by Justice 0 'Connor. The two urged that the Court's opinion not
be read exhaustively to catalog the circumstances in which federal courts may
exercise judgment in reserving difficult questions of jurisdiction, in order to
resolve a case on the merits in favor of the party challenging jurisdictionY
This concurrence raises the question whether Justice Scalia's position is due
even the respect ordinarily commanded by the dicta in majority opinions of
the Supreme Court. 74
70. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 97 n.2. This is not a very satisfYing response.
71. ld. (citations omitted).
72. The other signatories were Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy,
and Thomas. ld. at 85.
73. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 110 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
74. See Hardemon v. City ofBoston, 144 F.3d 24, 26 (1st Cir. 1998) (noting that various
opinions in Steel Co., read as whole, do not make clear whether, or to what extent, that case
undermined Circuit's earlier practice ofbypassing jurisdictional issues when party challenging
jurisdictionwould easily prevail on merits); see Idleman, supra note 4, at 286-88 (discussing
alignment of Justices and its effect on strength of repudiation). Several, if not all, circuits take
the position that they should follow the carefully considered dicta ofthe Court. See, e.g., Stone
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Justice Breyer agreed only that courts often and typically should decide
standing and other jurisdictional questions in advance of the merits. He rejected the notion that the Constitution requires them· always to do so, opining
that the doctrine that courts may reserve difficult questions of jurisdiction
when·a case may more easily be resolved on the merits in favor of the jurisdiction-challenging party makes both theoretical and practical sense, especially in a world ofheavy caseloads. Rigil:l rules that make the judicial system
llnnecessarily cumbersome may increase the risk that justice will be denied. 7s
Justice Stevens's and Justice GinSburg's views of hypotheticaljurisdiction were not revealed in Steel Co.; the fonner proclaimed the doctrine irrelevant to the case at hand,76 while the latter concurred in the judgment but
offered no comment on the hypothetical jurisdiction controversy.77 At a later
date, either or both of them might embrace the denunciation in Steel Co. or
explicitly disagree with it.
... ... ...
As the different views ofthe courts of appeals and particular judges in
the district and appellate courts, of commentators, and ofthe Supreme Court
Justices illustrate, the cases that generated the doctrine of hypothetical jurisdiction are subject to varying interpretations. In light ofthe cases' malleability, the views that the courts, especially the Supreme Court, take ofthese cases
and of cases since and yet to be decided will determine the degree of flexibility that the federal courts will have in reaching and deciding the issues that
cases potentially raise. The courts have ample "ammunitionll for interpreting
the cases to either stringently limit~ or to facilitate flexibility in selecting, the
issues that they may decide. Thus, I proceed to an examination ofthe possibilities for hypothetical jurisdiction in the federal courts whose decisions have·
weight as precedent and whose decisions usually constitute the last judicial
vvord, the courts of appeals. In that context, I further elaborate my views on
how past cases are best understood.
Container Corp. v. United States, 229 F.3d 1345, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (giving respect to
Supreme Court statements that were explicit and carefully considered), cert denied, Smurlit.Stone Container Corp. v. United States, 121 S. ct. 1601 (2001); Natural Res.Def. Council, Inc.
v.NRC, 216 F.3d 1180, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (stating that carefully considered language of
Supreme Court, even if dictum, generally must be treated as authoritative); Gaylor v. United
States, 74 F.3d 214, 217 (10th Cir. 1996) (stating that court considers itself bound by Supreme
Court dicta, almost as firmly as by Court's outright holdings, particularly when dicta is recent
and not enfeebled by later statements).
75. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 111-12 (Breyer, J., concurring).
76. [d. at 123 (Stevens, J., concurring).
77. [d. at 134 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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II. The Handling ofDistrict Court Jurisdiction by the Courts ofAppeals

The ambiguities in Steel Co., elaborated earlier, leave it unclear whether
district courts are completely forbidden to exercise hypothetical jurisdiction.
Part of Steel Co. 's legacy is that it compels not only the district courts, but
also the courts of appeals, to sort out just how far Steel Co. goes in limiting
district court exercises of hypothetical jurisdiction.78 Among the tasks both
tiers of the courts face is that of deciding what issues are jurisdictional for
purposes ofthe prohibition against arguendo assumption and for purposes of
the mandate that jurisdictional issues be decided before merits issues.
This Article does not tackle the myriad issues that courts will face in
determining whether particular matters go to the district courts' '~urisdiction, II
for Steel Co.' s purposes, nor does it attempt to answer all the other interpretive issues left open by Steel Co. as it applies to district court subject-matter
jurisdiction. It does however focus, by way of example, on the primary area
of controversy that arose in the wake of Steel Co. as it applies to district court
jurisdiction: whether the Eleventh Amendment defense is jurisdictional in the
sense that courts may no longer assume it to be inapplicable or unavailable,
and may decide cases on their merits.issues. Although the Supreme Court
resolved this particular issue in the year 2000, the lower courts' prior struggle
with it illustrates the kinds ofchallenges courts face. Moreover, I believe that
the Court's decision ofthis issue further muddies the sequence in which issues
must be addressed.
Example: Eleventh Amendment Issues after Steel Co.
There generally is no sequence or hierarchy in which courts inevitably
must address jurisdictional issues, among themselves, or merits issues, among
78. But see Prayze FM v. FCC, 214 F.3d 245, 250-51 & n.3 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding that
assuming jurisdiction of district court to decide constitutional contentions did not violate Steel
Co. because Steel Co. prohibited courts from assuming only their own jurisdiction to reach case
on merits). Where it was unclear whether the district court had jurisdiction to consider the
constitutionality of FCC regulations in an FCC enforcement proceeding, and it was necessary
for Prayze to establish its jurisdiction to successfully defend, the courts of appeals nonetheless
concluded that it did not need to resolve the jurisdictional question because, even assuming that
such jurisdiction existed, Prayze would lose its appeal of a preliminary injunction entered
against it because the FCC had sufficiently demonstrated that it was likely to prevail. [d. at 25051. The appeals court concluded that this assumption ofjurisdiction did not violate Steel Co.'s
proscription of hypothetical jurisdiction which it found prohibited courts from assuming their
own jurisdiction. [d. at 251 n.3. Here, the appeals court's jurisdiction was clear, nail was the
district court's jurisdiction to issue the injunction." [d. For purposes of deciding whether the
FCC sufficiently estsblished a likelihood of prevailing on the constitutional challenge, the
Second Circuit concluded that it could assume, arguendo, that the constitutional contentions
could be brought properly before the district court.ld.
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themselves. 79 In addition, it appears that courts often can decide issues that fall
into neither category (jurisdictional or merits); such as procedural issues, in
advance of, as well as interspersed among, jurisdictional issues and merits
issues. Steel Co. indicates, however, that the federal courts must address and
confirm their subject-matterjurisdiction before deciding the merits issues that
cases present. This schenie makes it essential for courts to be able to distinguish jurisdictional issues from merits issues.
. One ofthe most challenging ~ks of issue categorization concerns Eleventh Amendment defenses and sovereign immunity defenses more generally.
Distinguishing jurisdictional issues often is difficult because the meaning of
the tenn "jurisdiction" is protean and elusive. 80 The Eleventh Amendment
area is extraordinarily challenging because the Court has given many contratfiMnTV signals concerning the natpre of this defense.

A. A BriefBackground Discussion ofthe Nature of
Eleventh Amendment Immunity
The Eleventh Amendment, as construed by the Court over the years, is
an exceedingly complex matter, and the .scholarly literature concerning its
correct interpretation is mammoth. 81 I will, for the most part, confine my
79. Sometimes logic, policy or precedent suggests a sequence, however. See Kalka v.
Hawk, 215 F.3d 90, 96-98 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (finding that courts should address nonconstitutiona! grounds before addressing constitutional questions); id. at 99-102 (Tatel, J., concurring
in part and in judgment) (discussing at length whether, in evaluating claim of qualified immunity, court must first determine whether plaintiff alleged deprivation of actual constitutional
right before examining whether such right Was clearly established at time of alleged violation).
80. See Prou v. United States, 199 F.3d 37, 45 (1st Cir. 1999) (referring to "chameleonofterm "jurisdiction"); United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 191 F.3d 30,40 (1st
Cir.
(observing that word "jurisdiction" is "protean" with meanings varying depending
context); United States v. Vaughan, 13 F.3d 1186, 1188 (8th Cir. 1994) (noting that jurisdiction is protean concept); Cross-Sound Ferry Servs., Inc. v. I.C.C.,934 F.2d 327, 341-45
(D.C. Cir. 1991) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in denial ofpetition for review)
(commenting upon elusiveness of concept ofjurisdiction and noting that some provisions can
be jurisdictional in some contexts and not in others); see also Citizens for a BetterEnv't v. Steel
Co., 230 F.3d 923, 926 (7th Cir. 2000) (observing that courts may have jurisdiction to decide
issues but not others). The court of appeals held here that the court had jurisdiction to
award costs and attorneys' fees to the prevailing party, although it lacked jurisdiction to resolve
the merits ofplaintifPs claim. Id. at 926-27. In his concurrence, Justice Ripple explained that
"lack of jurisdiction" has different meanings including lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; loss
of power to proceed although a case is within federal judicial power - as when a court has
entered a final judgment; and a lack of power to proceed that rests on the case or controversy
requirement ofArticle ill, as when a plaintiff "packs up ... and goes home." Id. at 932-33.
81. See generally Symposium, State Sovereign Immunity and the Eleventh Amendment,
75 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 817 (2000); Symposium, Federalism After Alden, 31 RUTGERS L.J.
631 (2000); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Sovereign Immunity, Due Process, and the Alden Trilogy,
109 YALE L.J. 1927 (2000); F. Ryan Keith, Must Courts RDise the Eleventh Amendment Sua
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attention here to the Court's pronouncements on the nature ofthe Amendment
and the effects ofthat nature, and to the federal courts of appeals' attempts to
respect Steel Co. as applied to the Eleventh Amendment and other sovereign
immunities.
The initial language of the Amendment (liThe Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to ..."82) appears to impose a
constitutional limit on federal subject-matter jurisdiction,83 although, in the
view of several commentators and U.S. Supreme Court Justices, the Amendment, correctly cOnstrued, limits only diversity subject-matter jurisdiction.84
A majority of the current Justices on the Court does not regard the bar. of the
Amendment as so limited, but instead takes the broad view that this prohibition of suits· against a State applies regardless ofthe basis of federal subjectmatter jurisdiction, and hence applies to suits against a State by its own
citizens.8s This position is particularly difficult to justifY because the Eleventh
Amendment does not, by its literal terms, address such suits. It speaks only
of the judicial power of the United States not extending. to suits in law or
equity "commenced or prosecuted against one ofthe United St;ates by Citizens
of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects ofany Foreign State. 1186
The Court has suggested that the Eleventh Amendment may not even be
a matter of subject-matter jurisdiction, however, pointing out, as recently as
Sponte?: The Jurisdictional Difficulty ofState Sovereign Immunity, 56 WASJ{. & LEE. L. REV.
1037 (1999).
82. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
83. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hasp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89,98 (1984) (noting that

principle of sovereign immunity limits federal judicial power established by Constitution in
Article Ill); Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 25 (1933) (noting that Eleventh Amendment
explicitly limits judicial power ofUnited States).
84. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 301-02 (1985) (Brennan,
Marshall, Blackmun, & Stevens, J.J., dissenting) (arguing that if federal jurisdiction is based
on federal question, Eleventh Amendment is irrelevant). See generally pavid L. Shapiro,
Wrong Turns: The Eleventh Amendment and the PennhurstCase, 98 HARv. L. REv. 61 (1984);
John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: AReinterpretation,
83 COLUM. L. REv. 1889 (1983); William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation ofthe Eleventh Amendment: A Na"ow Construction ofan Affirmative Grant ofJurisdiction Rather than
a Prohibition AgainstJurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REv. 1033 (1983).
85. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996) (indicating that

ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas subscribe to view
that Eleventh Amendment bars suits founded on either diversity or federal question subjectmatter jurisdiction); Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 39 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (expressing view of some Justices that Eleventh Amendment
reflects broad constitutional principle of sovereign immunity, applicable regardless of subjectmatter jurisdictional basis for suit); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hasp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89,
98 (1984) (same).
86. U.S. CONST. amend. XI (emphasis added).
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98, that it has not decided that question. 87 Citing the importance of state
win analyzing Eleventh Amendment questions and the ability of States to
've this defense, the Court had earlier declined to reach Eleventh Amendt issues that had not been briefed to the Court, stating, "[W]e have never
ldthat [the Eleventh Amendment] is jurisdictional in the sense that it must
raised and decided by this Court on its own motion."88 On the other hand,
eCourt still earlier had approved a court of appeals' resolution of an ElevAmendment defense that had not been raised in the district court because
eEleventh Amendment defense sufficiently partakes of the nature of a
'1Jrisdictional bar so that it need not be raised in the trial COurt."89 The .Court's
Statement, in its 1998 decision in Wisconsin Department ofCorrections v.
chacht,90 that "a court" need not raise the Eleventh Amendment on its ownJI
y alter the weight ofauthority in the appellate courts as to whether they (as
ilistinguished from the Supreme Court) have a duty to raise Eleventh Amendment issues sua sponte.
In another noteworthy aspect of Schacht, the Court held that the presin an otherwise removable case, of a claim that the Eleventh Amendment may bar, does not destroy jurisdiction, upon removal of the case from
tate court. 92 Emphasizing that the Eleventh Amendment does not automaticarry destroy original jurisdiction because the defense it provides.is waivable,

ence,

87. Wis. Dep't ofCorrections v. Schacht, 524 U. S. 381,391 (1998).
88. Patsy v. Board ofRegentB ofFla., 457 U.S. 496, 515 n.19 (1982); see Schacht, 524
U.S. at 389 (citing Atascadero State Hasp. 473 U.S. at 241, as well as Patsy).
89. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,677-78 (1974). The courts of appeals have been
divided on the issue, although it appears that, at least up until a few years ago, more regarded
~as •appropriate to raise Eleventh Amendment immunity sua sponte, because of its juriSdictional
Ilature' than took the opposing view. Compare Sullivanv. Bamett, 139 F.3d 158, 179-80 (3d
Cir.1998) (raising issue sua sponte), V-I Oil Co. v. Utah State Dep't of Pub. Safety, 131 F.3d
1415, 1419 (10th Cir. 1997) (same), Suarez Corp. Indus. v. McGraw, 125 F.3d 222, 227 (4th
Gir. 1997) (same), andAtlantic Healthcare Benefits Trust v. Googins, 2 F.3d 1,4 (2d Cir. 1993)
(same), with Boochard Transp. Co. v. Florida Dep't ofEnvtl. Protection, 91 F.3d 1445, 1448
(11th Cir. 1996) (stBting "that Eleventh Amendment is notjurisdictional in sense that courts must
raise it sua sponte). See also Flores v. Long, 110 F.3d 730, 732-33 (10th Cir. 1997) (finding
it unclear whether Supreme Court would consider Eleventh Amendment affirmative defense or
Waivable jurisdictional bar for purposes of removal stBtute); Archuleta v. Lacuesta, 131 F.3d
1359, 1363 (10th Cir. 1997) (Baldock, J., dissenting) (stBting that assumption that Eleventh
Amendment is liinit on federal subject-matter jurisdiction, rather than waivable affirmative
defense, is debatable at best); TexaS Hosp. Ass'n v. Nat'l Heritage Ins. Co., 802 F. Supp. 1507,
1517 (W.D. Tex(1992) (concluding that because Eleventh Amendment immunity appears to
be hybrid of subject-matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and general prudential concerns,
.it does not defeat federal court's original jurisdiction and therefore does not bar removal of
action containing claims baITed by Amendment)..
90. 524 U.S. 381 (1998).
91. Id.at389.
92. Id.
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the Court concluded that post-removal invocation of the Amendment places
particular claims beyond the power ofthe federal court to decide, but does not
destroy jurisdiction over the entire case that was removed. 93 In so holding, the
Court ag~ distinguished the effects ofthe Eleventh Amendment from ordinary aspects offederal subject-matterjurisdiction. Normally, ifthe sole claim
ostensibly to "arise under" federal law (and hence to fall within federal
subject-matter jurisdiction) is held not to do so, the entire case (that claim and
any claims asserted as supplemental thereto) must be dismissed or, if it was
removed, remanded, for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction - assuming, of
course, that no other basis ofjurisdiction, such as diversity, empowers federal
courts to hear the case or controversy.94 By contrast, under Schacht, if a
plaintiffwere to assert a federal question claim against a state and supplemental claims against non-state parties, successful post-removal invocation ofthe
Eleventh Amendment would not require remand of the supplemental claims
for lack ofsubject-matter jurisdiction, although a court might chose to remand
them, in its discretion. 95
Thus, the Amendment is unlike limits on federal subject-matter jurisdiction in that states may waive Eleventh Amendment immunity while other
limits on subject-matter jurisdiction are not waivable. Furthermore, courts
appear not to have the same duty to raise and determine Eleventh Amendment
objections sua ~ponte as they have with respect to other defects in subjectmatter jurisdiction.96 Alternative theories of the Eleventh Amendment vieW
it as a common law immunity from suit, rather than as a limit on subjectmatter jurisdiction.97
93. Id. at 390-91.
94. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) provides that "[i]f at any time before final judgment if appears
that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded." ·28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(c) (1994) (emphasis added). See. e.g., Jones v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 541 F.2~
660,665 (7th Cir. 1976) (remanding case to state court in absence offederal question); see ais,
Fent v. Okla. Water Res. Bd., 235F.3d 553, 557-59 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that wheresWt
against federal and state defendants was properly removed but claim against United States WIlS
barred by sovereign immunity and claim against state was barred by Eleventh AmendmCllt
immunity, court was required by 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) to remand suit to state court for Iackllf
subject matter jurisdiction).
95. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill. 484 U.S. 343, 357 (1988) (upholding
to state court ofpendent claims after plaintiffdismissed all federal claims).
96. See supra text accompanying note 89. Whether lower courts, as opposed to the S
preme Court, are free ofthe obligation to raise Eleventh Amendment issues sua sponte has
somewhat controversial. See Coolbaugh v. Louisiana ex rei. La; Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr
136 F.3d 430,442 n.5 (5th Cir. 1998) (Smith, J., dissenting) (noting cases taking diffe .
positions on question and observing that most academicians seemed to have concluded that
on sua sponte review is prudential and discretionary, rather than mandatory).
97. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION §7.3 (3d ed. 1999)
. scribing different theories ofEleventh Amendment).
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The Lower Federal Courts' Categorization ofEleventh Amendment
Issues for Purposes of Steel Co.

one examines the cases that had to categorize the Eleventh Amendand sovereign immunity as jurisdictional or not, for purposes of Steel
0., one finds (not surprisingly) that they were as inconsistent, and sometimes
ambiguous, as the Court's signals have been. On the one hand, several
esheld that the Eleventh Amendment, and sovereign immunity generally,
jurisdictional for Steel Co. purposes. 98 They relied upon the Court's
ces to a state's consent-to-suit as defining the courts' jurisdiction,99 the
wt's characterizations ofthe sovereign immunity defense as jurisdictional
as restricting the judicial·power under Article ITI,100 and the Court's
98.

See Galvan v. Fed. Prison Indus., 199 F.3d 461, 463 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding that

IJrt could properly address sovereign immunity before deciding whether suit presented case
fcontroversy or was nonjusticiable, and stating that "[s]overeign immunity questions clearly
belong among the non-merits decisions that courts may address even where subject matterjuris'on is uncertain"); Mixon v. Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 397 & n.6 (6th Cir. 1999) (concluding that
IJrt had to address Eleventh Amendment immunity issue because it is jurisdictional, and
hoosing to raise issue of lack ofjurisdiction sua sponte); United States ex rei. Foulds v. Tex.
(:ch. Univ., 171 F.3d 279, 285-87 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1202 (2000) (declaring
a.t because Eleventh Amendment is jurisdictional and supplements restraints on judicial power
vided in Article ill, court must resolve Eleventh Amendment issues before deciding statutoI}'
ues going to merits); FJletech SA v. France Telecom SA, 157 F.3d 922, 929-32 (2d Cir.
98) (addressing whether defendant was immune from suit under FSIA before addressing other
sues, viewing that sequence as consistent with Steel Co., and advising lower court that it need
crt address issue ofinternational comity unless it resolved question ofsubject-matterjurisdiction
ill.favor ofplaintifl); United States v. Vazquez, 145 F.3d 74, 79·80 (2d Cir. 1998) (addressing
/l()'Vereign immunity, among other issues, before reaching merits); Seaborn v. Dep't ofCorr., 143
F.3dI405, 1407 (11th Cir. 1998) (concluding that "an assertion of Eleventh Amendment
'[l]JJlunity must be resolved before a court may address the merits ofthe underlying claims(s)");
East Bay Mun. Utit. Dis!. v. United States Dept. of Commerce, 142 F.3d 479, 482 (D.C. Cir.
998)(viewing "claim" to federal sovereign immunity as jurisdictional, and broadly construing
upreme Court opinions to require decision of scope of waiver of i~unity before addressing
IIl.erits, even when there was no question that court had jurisdiction over some aspects of suit);
l"re Papandre(>u, 139 F3d 247, 256 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (opining that it would exceed district
~ourt's power to resolve case under "act of state" doctrine, substantive rule of law, before
addressing jurisdiction under Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act); see also Calderon v. Ashmus,
523 U.S. 740, 745 (1998) (deciding whether inmate's declaratol}' judgment action challenging
limitations period applied in habeas corpus proceedings presented Article ill case or controversy
before reaching Eleventh Amendment issue). Calderon's sequencing is not inconsistent with
the conclusion that the Eleventh Amendment is jurisdictional for Steel Co. purposes and must
be decided against the party claiming immunity before the court may address merits issues.
99. See East Bay, 142 F.3d at 482 (quoting United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586
(1941)).
100. See Galvan, 199 F.3d at 463 (citing FDIC v. M<:yer, 510 U.S. 471,475 (1994));
Foulds, 171 F.3d at 285 (citing Atascadero State Hosp., 473 U.s. at 238 (quoting Pennhurst
for proposition that "[t]he significance of [the Eleventh Amendment] lies in its affirmation
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willingness to consider Eleventh Amendment issues urged for the first time
on appeal to the COurt.10l On the other hand, a number of cases resolved
merits questions without reaching disputed issues of a defendant's entitlement
to an Eleventh Amendment or other sovereign immunity, concluding that,
because thes~ immunities are not jurisdictional, proceeding to the merits did
not violate Steel CO. I02 While acknowledging similarities between the Eleventh Amendment and ajurisdictional bar, these courts emphasized that the
Eleventh Amendment and other sovereign immunities are waivable,103 that the
that ... sovereign immunity limits the grant ofjudicial authority in Article ill' "». The court
also cited Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54, and Blatchford Y. Native Viii. ofNoatak, 501 US.
775, 779 (1991), for the proposition that the Eleventh Amendment restrict:ll judicial power and
authority under Article ill. Foulds, 171 F.3d at 285 n.9. The court also referenced Puerto Rico
Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. Y. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993), for the proposition that "[the Eleventh Amendment's] withdrawal ofjurisdiction effectively confers immunity
from suit. II Id. at 285.
101. Mixon, 193 F.3d at 397 (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Dep't of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459,
467 (1954»; see also Parella v. Ret. Bd. ofthe R.I. Employees' Ret. Sys., 173 F.3d 46,54 (1st
Cir~ 1999) (citing courts of appeals decisions that Eleventh Amendment questions can be introduced sua sponte).
102. See In re Sealed Case No. 99-3091, 192 F.3d 995, 1000-01 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (concluding that court did not have to decide quasi-jurisdictional issue of sovereign immunity before
merits, and would not do so where disposing of case on merits had virtues of avoiding constitutional issue !If first impression and providing needed clarification); Kennedy v. Nat'l Juvenile
net. Ass'n, 187 F.3d 690, 696 (7th Cir. 1999), cert denied, 528 U.S. 1159 (2000) (affirming
dismissal of complaint for failure to state claim, and deciding that court would decide case on
non-constitutional grounds because Eleventh Amendment immunity is not jurisdictional);
Bowers v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 9 F. Supp. 2d 460, 498 n.15 (D.N.J. 1998) (dismissing Sherman Act claim for failure to state claim as against certain defendants without resolving
whether those defendants were entitled to assert sovereign immunity, viewing latter as basis for
dismissal on merits); see1also Lorubbio v. Ohio Dep't ofTransp., No. 98-3578, 1999 U.S. App.
LEXIS 10916, *3-4 (6th Cir. May 21,1999) (affirming summary judgment for defendant without reaching question whether Congress abrogated Eleventh Amendment in enacting Americans
with Disabilities Act because plaintiff could not state ADA claim); Gordon v. Texas, 153 F.3d
190, 196 n.4 (5th Cir. 1998) (rejecting argument that court had to decide Eleventh Amendment
issues before reaching justiciability questions); Whitehead v. The Orand Duchy ofLux., No. 972703,1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 22307, *10-12 (4thCir. Sept. 11, 1998)(concludingthat Foreigll
Sovereign Immunities Act's limitation on federal jurisdiction flowed from respect for other
nations' sovereignty rather than from inherent inability of federal courts to hear cases against
those nations, and so long as court did not affront nation's sovereignty, it could resolve easeoJl
grounds other than claimed immunity).
'
Whether a decision grounded upon a forum selection clause is procedural or on the merits
is not entirely clear. See Marra v. Papandreou, 216 F.3d 1119, 1122-24 (D.C. Cir.2000)
(exploring whether disposition of case on forum-selection grounds was non-merits dismissal and
permissible under Steel Co. before consideration of FSIA defense, but ultimately concluding
that reliance on forum selection clause was waiver ofFSIA defense with respect to that clause,
giving district courtjurisdiction to address forum-selection defense first).
103. See Kennedy, 198 F.3d at 696 (concluding that because Eleventh Amendment immunity can be waived, it is not jurisdictional); In re Sealed Case, 192 F.3d at 1000 (concluding
e
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Court bas distinguished Eleventh Amendment immunity from subject-matter
jurisdiction,104 and that the Court has held that it is not obliged to raise Eleventh .Amendment issues sua sponte. lOS
Some courts noted that the Steel CO. prolubition on the exercise ofhypothetical jurisdiction does not appear to be absolute, and viewed Steel Co. as
indicating that the jurisdiction that ordinarily must be decided before merits
issues is Article ill jurisdiction. 106 Thus, the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit in Parella v. Ret. Bd. of the Rhode Island Employees' Retirement
System lO7 framed the question as "whether Eleventh Amendment questions
should be treated as Article ill jurisdiction questions for the purposes of Steel
CO ."1OB After surveying the reasons for treating Eleventh Amendment questions in that fashion, the court cited all ofthe previously mentioned reasons not
to view Eleventh Amendment
questions as Article ill jurisdiction questions for
purposes ofSteel CO. 109 It added that the latter reasons suggestthattheAmendInent is as much a defense as it is a limitation on courts' jurisdiction, which, in
tum, implies that Eleventh Amendment issues are not in the Category that Steel
requires be given priority.no Most notably, the court explained that, as
compared with exercising hypothetical jurisdiction where a court's Article ill
jurisdiction is in doubt, deciding.the merits before reaching an Eleventh.
Amendment argument does not present the same risks of acting without power
todecIarethe law, offending separation ofpowers principles:

.co.

[B]ecause Eleventh Amendment itnmunity can1Je waived, the presence of
an Eleventh Amendment issue does not threaten the court's underlying
power to declare the law. If this were not the case, sua sponte consideration of aposSlole Eleventh Amendment bar would have to be obligatory,
not discretionary - but the Supreme Court has now clearly stated that
that because Eleventh Amendment immunity can be waived it is less than purely jurisdictional);
Bowers, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 498 n.l5 (citing Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 267
(1997) (stating that "[t]he Eleventh Amendment ... enacts a sovereign immunity from suit,
mther than a nonwaivable limit on the fed~ral judiciary's subject-matterjurisdiction."».
104. See, e.g., Gordon, 153 F.3d at 196 n.4 (citing Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 267,
which states that Amendment enacts sovereign immunity from suit, mther than non-waivable
limit on federal subject-matter jurisdiction).
105. See, e.g., United States ex rei. Long v. SCS Bus. & Tech. Inst., Inc., 173 F.3d 890,
892 (D.C. Cu. 1999) (citing Wis. Dep't ofCorrections v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381 (1998».
106. See, e.g., Parella v. Ret. Bd. of the R.I. Employees' Ret. Sys., 173 F.3d 46,53 (1st
Cir. 1999) (noting that "Supreme Court recently declared that courts should genemlly determine
whether Article ill jurisdiction exists before reaching the merits'') .
107. 173 F.3d46 (1stCir. 1999).
108. Id. at 54.
109. Id. at 54-55.
110. Id. at 55.
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courts are free to ignore possible Eleventh Amendment concerns if a
defendant chooses not to press them. 11l

So viewing t:1W situation, the most relevant maxim became that which admonishes courts to avoid constitutional questions when reaching them is not necessary. Abiding by this principle allowed the court to save the resources that
otherwise would have had to be devoted to Eleventh Amendment issues, and
avoided forcing the defendants to expend their resources on Eleventh Amendment issues that they preferred to avoid, without waiving the immunity.ll2
Probably the most carefully reasoned intermediate court of appeals opinion on this subject was that of the Court ofAppeals for the District ofColumbia in United States ex rei. Long v. SCSBusiness & Technical Institute, Inc. 1l3
Acknowledging the conflicting signals thatthe Court has given concerning the
nature ofthe Eleventh Amendment bar, ~d also acknowledging that the Court
recently had stated that whether Eleventh Amendment immunity is a matter
of subject-'matter jurisdiction is an open question,114 the court elaborated
several reasons for deciding whether the False Claims Act provides for a qui
tam action against a state before or, depending on the answer to that question,
instead of, addressing whether the Eleventh Amendment bars such a suit in
federal court. First, it argued that the state's request that the court initially
decide the statutory question amounted to a consent-to-suit on the statutory
question which pennitted, if not required, the court to proceed in that order,
in light ofthe court's probable lack ofobligation to raise the Eleventh Amendment issue sua sponte: llS
Steel Co. 's rule is premised on a court's lack ofpower to reach the merits
without establishing itsjurisdiction. In the EleventhAmendment context,
where a court lacks power only if a state claims that it does, it is arguable
that we have no obligation to decide the Eleventh Amendment issue first
if the state does not demand that we do 80. 116

Second, the court focused upon the Supreme Court's decision in Calderon v. Ashmus,117 as indicating that the Eleventh Amendment is not sufficiently
Id.
Id. at 56-57 & n.7; see also U.S.I. Prop. Corp. v. MD. Constl'. Co., 230 F.3d 489, 495
(1st Cir. 2000) (purporting to follow Parella in concluding that it could forego difficult Eleventh Amendment issue in favor of more readily disposing of case in favor of state on basis of
111.

112.

lack ofancillary enforcement jurisdiction).
113. 173 F.3d 890 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cerL denied, 530 S. ct. 1202 (2000).
114. Id. at 892 (citing Schacht, 524 U.S. at 391).
115. Id. at 892-93.
116. Id. at 893.
117.· 523 U.S. 740 (1998).
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jurisdictional to require a federal· court to decide a state's claim of Eleventh

.Amendment immunity before turning to the merits. As described in Long, in
Calderon,
the Supreme Court decidedthatit "must first address" whether a parti~
action for a declaratory judgment was an·Article m case or controversy
before decidingthe EleventhAmendmentquestiononwhich certiorari had
beengranted, observingthatthe EleventhAmendment is "notco-extensive
with the limitations ofjudicial power in Article m." ... Thatthe Court in
Calderon thought itself obliged to decide the case or controversy question
first suggeststhat the EleventhAmendment, a less than purejurisdictional
question, need not be decided before a merits question. us

Third, the court argued, as the U.S. Supreme Court later did in Vermon,
United States ex reI. Stevens, 119 that the deter:rnination that a particular action is properly asserted against a state is a logical
prerequisite to the jurisdictional inquiry, and that the "merits" question is
pwxtricably related to the '~urisdiction" question. 120 The Eleventh Amendment
'.'bars a federal court from hearing only a 'suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one ofthe United States,' and so it would seem perfectly
appropriate - perhaps even necessary 7"" for courts to detennine whether there
e'Ven is such a suit before the court. "121 Elaborating, the court continued,

~gency ofNatural Resources v.

[W]e have not chosen to decide a pure (and relatively easier) merits
questiononthe assumption that we havejurisdiction -the paradigmofthe
hypothetical jurisdiction model. When a court decides, as we do, that a
statute does not provide for a suit against the states, there is no risk at all
that the court is issuing a hypothetical judgment- an advisory opinion by
a court whose very power to act is in doubt . . .. Rather, the conclusion
that the statute does not provide for suits against the states in federal court
is, ineffect, a resolution ofthejurisdictional question, in that the Eleventh
Amendment can no longer be said to apply (which is quite different from
saying, as courts do under the hypothetical jurisdiction doctrine, that
jurisdiction does not matter because the same party arguing a lack. of
jurisdiction prevails on the merits) .... The Fifth Circuit's view instead
is that a court must assume that states are defendants under the Act and
address the EleventhAmendmentquestion atthe outset, lestthe court give
an interpretation ofthe statute that it has no power to give. . .. But such
an approach ostensibly avoids the evils of 'hypothetical jurisdiction' (not
118.
119.

Long, 173 F.3d at 893-94 (citations omitted).
529 U.S. 765 (2000).
120. Long, 173 F.3d at 894.
121. [d. For reasons that are not entirely clear to me, the court referred to this inquiry as
falling within the category of "jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction," [d.

888

58 WASH. &LEEL. REV. 855 (2001)

really at issue) in favor of deciding a purely hypothetical jurisdictional
issue- thatis, ajurisdictional issue that arises solely byvirtue ofthe statutory question assumed. Since the Eleventh Amendment issue in this· case
"would not existbut for" that assumption, ... we think itis appropriate for
us to decide the logically prior issue first 122
In explicating how the court viewed the merits and the jurisdictional questions

as intertwined, the court said,
[E]ven if we were to assume that states are defendant persons, and then
actually to decide that the Eleventh Amendment applied., we would then
have to ask whether, for abrogation purposes, the statute contains a clear
statementthat states are to be defendantS - which is more-or-less the same
statutory analysis that we previously undertook. 123
It believed that these logical and factual relationships between the questions
provided an independent groundon which to distinguish Steel CO. 124
Finally, the Court found the conclusion to which all of the foregoing
reasoning leads (that the statutory interpretation question ofapplication to the
states can be addressed before Eleventh Amendment issues) to be confinned
by pre-Steel Co. cases in which the Court had addressed "cause of action"
questions before turning to Eleventh Amendment issues, and not to be.prohibited by any Supreme Court decisions. l2S Given that history, and the preference
for avoiding difficult constitutional'issues, it adhered to its decision to decide
the case on statutory grounds. 126
In VermontAgencyofNaturalResources v. UnitedStates exrel. Stevens127
the Supreme Court answered the question that had tested the federal appeals
122. Id. at 896 (citations ~tnitted).
123. Id. at 895. This is apparently the way in which the court viewed the merits and the
jurisdictional questions to be inextricably related.
124. Id. at 895.
125. Id. at 896-98.
126. The opinion discussed here was a supplemental opinion which complemented the
earlier decision on the merits in United States ex rei. Long v. SCS Business & Technicallnstitute, Inc., 173 F.3d 870 (D.C. Cir. 1999). See also Riley v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp., 196
F.3d 514,522-23 (5th Cir. 1999) (reasoning that Article mstanding is more basic jurisdictional
requirement than Eleventh Amendment, that it therefore has to be addressed before court may
consider latter, and that discussion of standing in Foulds, see supra note 98, was not dictum,
despite case's additional conclusion that Eleventh Amendment barred suit). But see id. at 53738 (DeMoss, J., specially concurring) (disapproving court's interpretation of Foulds case and
of Supreme Court's opinion in Calderon v. Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740 (1998), concluding that
Ruhrgas "abolishes any inference from Calderon, that the Foulds panel must have necessarily
decided the Article m issue to reach its determination that the Eleventh Amendment posed
jurisdictional barriers").
. 127. 529 U.S. 765 (2000).
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courts. Like Long, this was a qui tam action brought against a state agency
under the False Claims Act. The defendant had moved to dismiss; arguing
both. that a state agency is not a "person" subject to liability under the FCA
and that the action was barred by the Eleventh Amendment. l28 Consistent
with Steel Co., the Court first addressed whether the plaintiffhad Article ill
standing to maintain the suit. 129 Having found that a qui tam relator under the
FCA has Article ill standing, the Court ''tum[ed], then, to the merits."130
Recognizing that questions ofjurisdiction should be addressed first and that
courts ofappeals had disagreed as to the order in which statutory and Eleventh
Amendment questions should be resolved, the Court observed that it had
routinely addressed the question whether a statute permitted a cause of action
to be asserted against states before addressing whether the Eleventh Amendment forbade the particular cause to be so asserted. 131 The Courtjustified this
sequencing by finding the statutory question "logically antecedent" to the
immunity issue, and by reference to the lack of possibility that, in addressing
the statutory question, the Court would expand its power beyond the limits
that the jurisdictional restriction imposed. 132 That is, as a practical matter, the
Court would not "pronounce upon any issue, or upon the rights ofany person,
beyond the issues and persons that would be reached under the Eleventh
Amendment inquiry anyway."133 It concluded that the "combination oflogical
priority and virtual coincidence of scope" made it appropriate to decide the
statutory question first. 134
Aspects ofthe reasoning in Long and Vermont Agency can be challenged.
For example, the Long court concedes that one could argue that whether a
cause of action has been pleaded is logically antecedent to whether a court has
jurisdiction over that cause, butthe Court in Steel Co. nonetheless held that the
jurisdictional issue has to be decided first. 135 The argument that the inquiry
into whether a particular civil action is properly asserted against a state logically precedes any inquiry into whether the Eleventh Amendment nonetheless
bars the suit should not be persuasive if, as Steel Co. suggests, logical antecedence is not a compelling reason to put a merits question before a jurisdictional
128. Vt. Agency ofNatural Res. v. United States ex reI. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765,770 (2000).
129. Id. at 771.
130. Id. at 778.
131. Id.at778-79.
132. Id at 779 (citing Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 612 (1997».
133. Id.
134. Id. at 779·80. Vermont Agency was followed and extended in Floyd v. Thompson,
227 F.3d 1029, 1035 (7th Cit. 2000) (holding that appeals court could bypass Eleventh Amend- .
ment issue in favor ofmore readily made determination, based on settlement agreement suggesting that there was no possible basis for suit against state).
135. Long, 173 F.3d at 896 n.4.
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one. One also could question the Long court's and the Supreme Court's reli~
ance ontheir conclusion, onthe merits, that states are not persons suable under
the FCA, in support oftheir position that it is pennissible to reach that merits
issue before Eleventh Amendment issues. That reasoning allows the outcome
of the merits question to detennine whether it may be addressed first,. which
seems inappropriate. Had the courts decided that states are suable under the
FCA, they would not have been able to say that resolution of the statutory
question in effect resolved the jurisdictional question; the applicability ofthe
Eleventh Amendment would have remained in issue.
It seems to me that Vermont Agency, at least arguably, represents yet
another instance ofthe Court diluting the purity of the principle that jurisdictional issues should be resolved before merits issues. 136 While one can address
whether states can be sued under a statute before addressing whether unconsenting states can be so sued, one could address the latter question, while
assuming arguendo an affinnative answer to the former. 137 Since the statutory
interpretation question is non-jurisdictional, there is no prohibition against
making an arguendo assumption about its answer. The "logical priority" ofthe
statutQry question, 138 therefore, is not a compelling reason to depart from the
usual sequence ofdecision, whichthe Court supports with weighty invocations
that, "if there is no jurisdiction[,] there is no authority to sit in judgment of.,
anything else. ,,139 In the VermontAgency opinion itself, the Court characterizes
the Eleventh Amendment as jurisdictional and yet addresses first what is
clearly a merits question, whether the FCA provides for suits against states.
The second purported justification offered for addressing the statutory
question first, that as a practical matter the Court would not "pronounce upon
any issue, or upon the rights ofany person, beyond the issues and persons that
would be reached under the Eleventh Amendment inquiry anyway, ,,140 seems
to me similarly assailable. In addressing the statutory question whether the
FCA provides for suits against states, the Court is pronouncing upon an issue
that it would not have to reach under the Eleventh. Amendment (as suggested
136. This is true, so long as the Eleventh Amendment is viewed as jurisdictional. Insofar
as the Eleventh Amendment is viewed as inextricably bound-up with Article ill limits on federal
court jurisdiction,·the case arguably represents another instance ofthe Court diluting the purity
ofthe principle that Article illjurisdictional issues must be resolved before merits issues.
137. See, e.g., United States ex reI. Foulds v. Tex. Tech. Univ., 171 F.3d 279, 288 (5th Cir.
1999) (addressing Eleventh Amendment question, having assumed that states are defendants
under act ofCongress in order to avoid interpreting statute that court had no power to interpret).
138. I do concede that the question whether particular entities can be sued under a statutory
scheme is, or can be viewed as, logically antecedent to the question Whether those entities are
entitled to an immunity from the suits.
139. Vt. Agency ofNatural Resources v. United States ex reI. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 778
(2000).

140.

ld. at 779.
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above, the Court could assume arguendo anaffinnative answertotbis question)
and,.because ofthe precedential authority ofthe Court's opinions, the Court is,
as a practical matter, potentially affecting the rights of persons beyond the
current parties. Had the Court decided, for example, that the states were
persons suable under the FCA,141 then qui tam relators could have sued various
states under the statute and succeeded in their suits where the facts supported
their claims and where the pertinentstates had waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity or where the states' immunity had effectively been abrogated.
Had the Vermont Agency Court not addressed the statutory question, that question would have remained open, to be reached only if and when an immunitywaiving state were sued under the FCA, or if the Court held the immunity to
have been abrogated. At the very least, we now have yet another qualification
to the Steel Co. rule: a court may reach merits issues before Eleventh Amendmentissues (andperhaps other quasi-jurisdictional or evenpurelyjurisdictional
issues) when the IIcombination of logical priority and virtual coincidence of
scopell makes it appropriate to decide a statutory merits question first. 142
The lower courts' struggle With the Eleventh Amendment illustrates the
kinds of challenges courts face in detennining what issues are jurisdictional
for Steel Co. purposes. I believe that the Court's decision of that particular
issue has, if anything, further muddied the sequence in which issues must be
addressed. But whatever the llright answerll to the Eleventh Amendment question, and whatever effects Vermont Agency Will have on the analysis of other
sequencing dilemmas, the judicial debate concerning the status of the Eleventh Amendment for Steel Co. purposes illustrates how the Steel Co. opinion
l1as invigorated and compelled appellate (as well as district court) attention to
questions that those courts otherWise might not have addressed. At the same
time, Steel Co. requires district and appellate courts to eschew merits questions thatthey might prefer to address, when they find that the district court
lacked jurisdiction.\

m.

Hypothetical Appellate Jurisdiction Before and After Steel Co.
A. The Determinants ofFederal Appellate Jurisdiction
Article ill, Section 1, of the United States Constitution provides that
II [t]hejudicial Power ofthe United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court,
ll.nd in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
e.stablish. 1I143 Section 2 then states the categories ofcases and controversies to
141. In fact, it held to the contrary. See ;d. at 783-84 (finding that while certain provisions
of FCA define "person" to include states, particular provisions relating to qui tam liability do
not, thereby indicating that states are not persons under that provision).
142. VI. Agency, 529 U.S. at 779-80.
143. U.S. CONST; art. III, § 1.
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which the judicial power shall extend and declares which ofthose .cases shall
be within the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction and which shall be within
its appellatejurisdiction "with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as
the Congress shall make.11144
Pursuant to the powers alluded to in Article III, Congress has passed
legislation detailing the original and appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
COurt.14S Although the Supreme Court has promulgated rules to govern the
practice before it,146 and some of those rules could be read to impose additional jurisdictional requirements,147 these restrictions are not truly '~urisdic144. U.S. CONST. art. ro. § 2. It also provides in pertinent part
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws ofthe United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority; - to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
ministers and Consuls; - to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; - to
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party; - to Controversies
between two or more States; - b~een a State and Citizens of another State; between Citizens of different States; - between Citizens ofthe same State claiming
Lands under Grants ofdifferent States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof,
and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
In all caseS affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and
those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have
appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under
such Regulations as the Congress shall make.
ld.
145. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1251-59 (1999). These sections are set forth in the Appendix
to this Article.

Just how much power Congress has to limit the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is a
controversial matter, but one beyond the scope of this article. See generally The Supreme
Court, 1995 Term, Congressional Power to Resbict the Supreme Court's Appellate Jurisdiction, 110 HARv. L. REv. 277 (1996); Barty Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The Supreme
Court, Congress, andFederalJurisdiction, 85 Nw. L. REv. i (1990); Eugene Gressman &. Eric
Gressman, Necessary and Proper Roots ofExceptions to Federal JUrisdiction, 51 GBO. WASH.
L. REv. 495 (1983); Ralph A. Rossum, Congress. the Constitution, and the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: The Letter and the Spirit of the Exceptions Clause, 24 WM. &.
MARyL. REv. 385 (1983); Lawrence Gene Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term - Foreword:
Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jun'sdiction ofthe Federal
Courts, 95 HARv. L. REv. 17, 19·20 (1981). Additional writings are cited in Louise Weinberg,
TheArtic1e Box: The Power of"Congress" to Attack the ''Jurisdiction'' of"Federal Courts,"

m

78 TEx. L. REv. 1405, 1406 n.2 (2000).
146. 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) provides in part that "[t]he Supreme Court ... may from time to
time prescribe rules for the conduct of [its] business. Such rules shall be consistent with Acts
of Congress and rules of practice and procedure prescribed under section 2072 ofthis title." 28
U.S.C. § 2071(a) (1994~
147. See SUP. CT. R. 14.1(a) (stating in part that "[o]nly the questions set out in the petition, or fairly included therein, will be considered by the Court"); see also Quilloin v. Walco;
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tiona! or absolute. They have been created by the Court, and are subject to
modification by the Court when it believes that the reasonable procedures
embodied in the general rules are outweighed by other considerations. 11148
Thus, the rules do not limit the Court's power.
Pursuant to the power conferred in Article I, section 8, lito constitute
Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court, 11149 Congress also has created federal
aPI)ellate COurts150 and conferred a defined appellate jurisdiction upon them. 151
U.S. 246,253 n.13 (1977) (finding that. where contention that adoption statutes created
l[eOloel'·oaseo distinctions which violated Equal Protection Clause of Constitution was not
presented in appellant's jurisdictional statement. although it was raised in final paragraph of
appellant's brief, Court would not consider that claim); Phillips Chem. Co. v. Dumas Indep.
Sch. Dist, 361 U.S. 376, 386 n.12 (1960) (commenting that Court considers only issues raised
by jurisdictional statement in appellate brief 01 petition for certiorari).
In a number of cases, the Court has specifically held thilt Supreme Court Rules governing
times for filing and docketing and governing service are not jurisdictional. See Parker v. Levy,
417 U.S. 733, 742-43 n.l0 (1974) (holding that technical noncompliance with rule requiring
persons not admitted to bar of Supreme Court to prove service by affidavit does not deprive
Court ofjurisdiction over appeal from grant of habeas corpus where court-martialed serviceman
had actual notice offiling of notice of appeal with Court); Communist Party ofIndiana v. Whitcomb, 414 U.S. 441,445-46 &. n.4 (1974) (holding timely docketing ofjurisdictional statement
not to be jurisdictional requisite, where notice·of appeal to Court was timely); Schacht v. United
States, 398 U.S. 58, 63-64 (1970) (holding that rule requiring petition for certiorari to review
judgment in criminal case to be filed within 30 days after court of appeals' judgment is not
jurisdictional and can be waived by Court. and stating generally that procedursl rules adopted
by Court to govem its own judicial business are not jurisdictional, and can be relaxed in Court's
discretion when ends ofjustice so require); Taglianetti v. United States, 394 U.S. 316,316 n.l
(1969) (per curiam) (holding time limitation for filing petition for certiorari not jurisdictional,
and that failure to timely file petition did not bar Court's exercise of discretion to consider
case); United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 42 (1966) (holding that petitioner's failure to
comply with Supreme Court rule requirements as to service did not defeat jurisdiction because
requirements were not jurisdictional, no prejudice resulted, and failure was inadvertent).
148. ROBERT L. STERNET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE § 6.26, at 345 (7th ed. 1993)
(citing cases in which Court addressed questions not raised in petition for certiorari, and sometimes not raised by parties at all, with Court sometimes bolatering its authority to decide such
questions with option reserved by Court in Supreme Court Rule 24.1(a), to "consider a plain
error not among the questions presented but evident from the record and otherwise within its
jurisdiction to decide").
149. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
150. These include the circuit courts of appeals and the United States Court ofAppeals for
the FederalCircuil In thepliSt it had created others such as the Temporary Emergency Court
ofAppeals (created by section 211 (b) ofthe Economic Stabilization Act of1970, and abolished
by section 102(d),(e) ofPub. L. 102·572 (Ocl29, 1992».
151. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291,1292,1295 (1999). These sections are set forth in the
Appendix to this Article.
Just how much power Congress has to limit the jurisdiction ofthe lower federal courts is
a controversial matter, too, but also is beyond the scqpe of this article. For recent writing on
the subject. see generally Akhil Reed Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure ofthe Judiciary Act of
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The intennediate courts ofappeals have statutorily-eonferredjurisdiction
over appeals from final decisions of the federal district COurts152 and over
specified interlocutory decisions. 1S3 Through the collateral order doctrine, an
interpretation of the final judgment rule,154 the intennediate appellate courts
also have jurisdiction to hear appeals from particular orders: those that are
conclusive on the matter they address, resolve questions that are too independent ofthe merits to need to be deferred until final judgment and too important
to be denied review, and involve important rights that will be lost ifthe order
is not immediately reviewed.155 In addition to this and other less well-known
common law refinements ofthe notion of finality,156 the Rules Enabling Act
allows the Court to prescribe rules defining when a district court ruling is
"final" for purposes ofthe final judgment rule codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1291.157
1789, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1499 (1990); John HarriSOll, The Power ofCongress to Limit the
Jurisdiction ofFederal Courts and the Text ofArticle
64 U. Cm. L. REv. 203 (1997); Vicki
C. Jackson,Introduction: Congressional Control ofJurisdiction and the Future ofthe Federal
Courts - Opposition, Agreement, and Hierarchy, 86 OED. L.J. 2445 (1998); Daniel J. Meltzer,
The History and Structure ofArticle III, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1569 (1990); Weinberg, supra note
145. For a listing of additional distinguished writings on the subject, see Weinberg, supra note

m,

145, at 1405 n.l.
152. This generalization is subject til an exception for those situations in which a direct
review may be had in the Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1999), Appendix; see, e.g.,
28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1999) (providing for direct appeals from decisions of three-judge district
courts).
153. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1999); see also Carr Park, Inc. v. Tesfaye,229 F.3d 1192,
1194 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that 28 U.S.C. §1292(b)'s ten-day filing period is jurisdictional).
154. In earlier times, the collateral order doctrine was'(more frequently than nowadays)
characterized as an exception to the final judgment rule. See, e.g., Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S.
299,314-15 (1996) (Breyer, J" dissenting) (stating that collateral order doctrine is, in effect,
judge-made exception to 28 U.S.C. § 1291); Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S.
794, 798-800 (1989) (referring to collateral order "exception" til final judgment rule); Abney
v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 663 (1977) (same); see also Michael E. Solimine, Revitalizing
InterlocutoryAppeals in the Federal Courts, 58 OED. WASH. L. REv. 1165, 1167 n.1 0, 1168-71
(1990) (referring to collateral order doctrine as exception to finality requirement).
155. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) (articulating requirements for order to be immediately appealable as collateral order); see Digital Equip. Corp. v.
Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863,867 (1994) (same). For a thoughtful exegesis ofthe prongs
ofCohen, see genera1ly In re Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 954 (3d Cir. 1997).
156. Regarding other common law refinements ofthe notion offinality, see generally 15A~
B WRIGm ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION 2D §§ 3095-3939.10
(1992 & Supp. 2001).
157. The Rules Enabling Act provides:
Rules ofprocedure and evidence; power to prescribe:
(a) The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules ofpractice and procedure and rules ofevidence for cases in the United States district courts
(including proceedings before magistrates thereof) and courts ofappeals.
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ule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which the Court also
romulgated under the authority ofthe Rules Enabling Act, further detennines
e. jurisdiction of the intermediate appellate courts by permitting district
(;(lutts to direct the entry of a final judgment as to fewer than all ofthe claims
()rparties in a civil action, in prescribed circumstances. lss Congress also has
allowed the Court to authorize by rules immediate appeal of interlocutory
a.ecisions not provided for under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a),(b), (c), or (d).159 The
sole exercise ofthis power thus far is the 1998 addition of Rule 23(f) of the
f'edera1 Rules of Civil Procedure, which authorizes a court of appeals, in its
discretion, to permit appeal from a district court order granting or denying .
class action certification, ifapplication is made to the appeals court within ten
days after entry of the order. l60 The courts ofappeals and the Supreme Court
(b) Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modifY any substantive right. All
laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules
have taken effect.
(c) Such rules may define when a ruling of a district court is final for the
purposes ofappeal under section 1291 ofthis title.
The Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1994).
Note in particular section (c). Thus far, no rules have been promulgated under this section. The Seventh Circuit has opined that this grant has gone unused at least in part because "it
invites the question whether a particular rule truly 'defmes' or instead expands appellate jurisdiction." Blair v. Equifax Check Setvs., Inc., 181 F.3d 832, 833 (7th Cir. 1999).
158. See FED. R. av. P. 54(b). It provides in pertinent part:
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action ... or when multiple
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a fmal judgment lis to one or
more but fewer than all ofthe claims Or parties only upon an express determination
that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of
judgment.
ld. If an order is erroneously certified under Rule 54(b) and no other basis for immediate appeal
exists, the appellate court must dismiss for lack of appellate jurisdiction. See. e.g., Eldredge v.
Martin Marietta Corp., 207 F.3d 737, 740, 742 n.2 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that Rule requirement that court have disposed of one or more claims or parties is jurisdictional, although requirementthat court have made express determination that there is no just reason for delay is
not, and dismissing appeal of partial summary judgment, for want ofjurisdiction, where former
requirement was not met given strong factual overlap between appealed claim and matters still
pending in trial court).
159. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e) (1994).
160. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(f). InBlair v. Equifax Check Services., Inc., 181 F.3d 832 (7th Cir.
1999), the Seventh Circuit became the first court to apply the new Rule. Blair, 181 F.3d at 833.
It took the occasion to review the reasons Rule 23(f) came into being. Id. at 834-35. In its
view, the Rule is intended to provide the opportun~ty for immediate appellate review ofan order
granting or denying class certification when denial of class status seems likely to be fatal and
the plaintitfhas a solid argument that the district court's decision was in error, when "the stakes
are large and the risk of a settlement or other disposition that does not reflect the merits ... is
substantial," if appellant demonstrates "that the ruling on class certification is questionable"
considering the deferential standard of review that applies, and when an interlocutory appeal
would facilitate development of the law on fundamental issues that otherwise would be likely
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also review trial court decisions in advance of final judgmentwhen the higher
courts grant litigants' petitions for writs ofmandamus or similar extraordinary
reliefunder the All Writs Act. 161 On the other hand, on some occasions, Congress has specifically denied appellate jurisdiction that the courts otherwise
would enjoy.162
The Supreme Court and several intermediate federal appellate courts
have held a few ofthe requirements imposed by the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure to be jurisdictional, so that the appeals courts lack authority to
act on the merits of cases in which those requirements have not been satisfied.
Most prominent among these requirements are Rule 3(a)'s requirement that
an appeal pennitted as of right from a district court to a court of appeals be
taken by filing a notice of appeal with the district clerk within the time allowed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4; Rule 3(c)'s requirements
that the notice of appeal (1) specify the parties taking the appeal by naming
each in the caption or body ofthe notice (subject to a liberalization for attorneys representing more than one party), (2) designate the judgment, order, or
part thereof being appealed, and (3) name the court to which the appeal is
to evade effective review at the end ofthe case. Id. The court noted that, in this last instance,
it is less important that the trial judge's decision be "shaky." Id. at 835. The court also
indicated that when class certification has induced judges to remake substantive doctrine in
order to render litigation manageable, that too justifies an interlocutory appeal of the certification decision. Id. at 834; see also Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Mowbray, 208 F.3d 288, 294
(1st Cir. 2000) (following Blair with modification that third category be restricted to "instances
in which an appeal will permit the resolution of an unsettled legal issue ... important to the
particular litigation as well as . . . in itself'). See generally Michael E. Solimine & Christine
Oliver Hines, Deciding to Decide: Class Action Certification and Interlocutory Review by the
United States Courts ofAppeals Under Rule 23(/), 41 WM. & MARYL. REv. 1531 (2000).
161. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1994) provides: "Writs: (a) The Supreme Court and all courts
established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their
respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of laW; (b) An alternative writ
or rule nisi may be issued by a justice or judge of a court which has jurisdiction." See, e.g.,
Schlagenhaufv. Holder, 379 U.S. 104,110 (1964) (upholding grant ofmandamus to detecmin~
district court authority to order Rule 35 examinations of defendant). Although the request foc
an extraordinary writ is an original application to the court ofappeals, the grant ofthe writ to an
inferior court is an appellate power. See Ex parte Republic ofPeru, 318 U.S. 578, 582 (1943)
(noting that Supreme Court has authority to issue writs of mandamus or prohibition to district
courts only insofar as such writs aid appellate jurisdiction).
162. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (stating that "[a]n order remanding a case to the State
court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise, except that an order
remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed pursuant to section 1443 of this
title shall be reviewable by appeal or otherwise"). Congress has denied this review notwithstand-.
ing that remand orders are final decisions because they effectively put litigants out of federal
court. Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706,713-15 (1996); see also United States
v. Key, 205 F.3d 773, 774-75 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that, because 28 U.S.C. § 2244(B)(3XA)
is jurisdictional bar to district court's assertion of jurisdiction over successive habeas petitions
until appellate court has granted petitioner permission to me, appeals court lackedjurisdiction
to review denial ofmotion for appointment ofcounsel to ftle habeas petition).
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taken; and Rule 4(a)(1)'s requirements concerning the time for filing a notice

of appeal. 163 Perhaps these Rules are regarded as jurisdictional while com163. FED. R. APP. P. 3(a),(c),4(a)-(c). Cases holding the aforementioned Rules to be
jurisdictional include the following:
Rules 3(a), 4(a): See Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312,315 (1988) (holding both party specification provision of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c) and time
limits for filing appeal set forth in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4 to be jurisdictional).
"[A] litigant's failure to clear a jurisdictional hurdle can never be 'harmless' or waived by a
court." Id. at 317 n.3. See Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co.,459 U.S. 56,61 (1982)
(per curiam) (observing that timely filing of notice of appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional,
and concluding that premature notice ofappeal was nullity under Federal Rule ofAppellate Procedure 4(a)(4), as it was then framed); Browder v. Dir., Dept. of Corr., 434 U.S. 257,264
(1978) (stating that compliance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4 is mandatory and
jurisdictional); United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 224 (1960) (holding that late notice
of appeal under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure does not confer jurisdiction on appellate
court); United States v. Hirsch, 207 F.3d 928, 930-31 (7th Cir. 2000) (dismissing late-filed
appeal for lack ofjurisdiction despite contention that clerk failed to file notice on defendant's
behalf despite request to do so, but inviting defendant to claim inadequate assistance of counsel
entitling him to vacation of judgment and reimposition of sentence, permitting appeal); Anderson v. Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 439, 44647 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that, where
.time to appeal had not been extended by motion for reconsideration, notice of appeal that was
filed late did not vest court of appeals with jurisdiction to review sanction); see also FED. R.
APP. P. 26(b) (disallowing courts from extending time to file notice of appeal or similar petition,
except as authorized in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4). But see Torres, 487 U.S. at
321-22 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with interpretation ofparty-specification provision
as jurisdictional and characterizing Court as having held Rule 3(c)'s judgment-designation
requirement not to be jurisdictional in Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962».
Rule 3(c): See Smith v. Bany, 502 U.S. 244, 248-50 (1992) (stating that dictates of
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 are jurisdictional and their satisfaction prerequisite to
appellate review; holding that appellant's brief may serve as notice of appeal that Rule 3
requires); Torres, 487 U.S. at 315, 316-18 (stating that Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
3(c)'s requirement that notice of appeal specifY parties taking appeal is jurisdictional prerequisite to appellate ·review, although appeals court should find notice sufficient so long as it
provides functional equivalent of what Rule requires; holding that use of "et al." in notice of
appeal was insufficient to notifY appellees or appellate court that intervening plaintifIwho, due
to clerical error, was not otherwise named in notice was appealing; hence, prior judgment of
dismissal was final as to him); United States v. Universal Mgmt. Serva., Inc., 191 F.3d 750,
756-57 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that, because notice of appeal referred only to summary judgment rulings, court lacked jurisdiction to consider issues raised by motion for reconsideration);
AlliedSignal, Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 18~ F.3d 568, 571-72 (7th Cir. 1999) (stating that
Federal Rule ofAppellate Procedure 3(c)'s requirement that notice of appeal designate what is
appealed from is jurisdictional prerequisite to appellate review; thus, holding that because order
granting preliminary injunction necessarily encompassed refusal to refer antitrust claim to
arbitration, identification of former order in notice of appeal sufficiently manifested intent to
appeal latter, but because injunctive order did not necessarily constitute refusal to stay, there
\Vas no appellate jurisdiction over refusal); Burgess v. Suzuki Motor Co., 71 F.3d 304, 306-07
(8th Cir. 1995) (stating that, although cOurt may construe Federal Rules ofAppellate Procedure
liberally in determining whether those Rules have been complied with, court may not waive
jurisdictional requirement that notice of appeal designate judgment, order or part thereof
appealed from). But see Osterberger v. Relocation Realty Servo Corp., 921 F.2d 72, 74 (5th Cir.
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parable Supreme Court Rules are not so regarded because, while the Court is
comfortable modifying its own rules where that seems appropriate, it believes
that it would be inappropriate for the lower federal courts to detennine that
the procedures that the Court and Congress have promulgated to govern the.
appellate COurtsl64 should yield in particular cases. 16S
Finally, some judge-made doctrines also are regarded as setting jurisdictional bounds upon appellate jurisdiction. In addition to the collateral order
do~e and other doctrines defining "finality, ,,166 an example is the px;ece:de1It
holding that, unless a district court mistakenly believed that it lacked legal
authority to impose a sentence below the range established by the Unitec:i
1991) (stating that. while portion ofFederal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c) requiring notic
of appeal to specifY parties is jurisdictional, portion requiring notice of appeal to designs
properjudgment is construed broadly).
Other requirements of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure are not jurisdictional.
Federal Rule ofAppellate Procedure 3(aX2) provides, "An appellant's failure to tske any ate
other than the timely filing of a notice ofappeals docs not affect the validity ofthe appeal," •8Il
Federal Rule ofAppellate Procedure 3(d)(3) states, "[T]he district clerk's failure to serve noti
does not affect the validity ofthe appeal." See Smith, 502 U.S, at 249 (holding proper brie
not to be jurisdictional requirement). As ofthis writing, the Court has granted certiorari on tb.
question whether a court of appeals must dismiss a prisoner's appeal in which a timely, I!
unsigned, notice ofappeal was filed. Becker v. Montgomery, 531 U.S. 1110 (2001).
But some of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that have an impact on appellate juris
diction have been held to be jurisdictional for the appellate courts. For example, the time limitll
in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) have been held to be jurisdictional when applied in.
conneCtion with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a). See FED. R.,CIv. P. 59(e)("i\,
motion to alter or amend a judgment shall be filed no later than 10 days after entry ofthe judg
ment"); EF Operating COIp. v. Am. Bldgs., 993 F.2d 1046~ 1049 n.1 (3d Cir.) (stating thattit:n.
requirements in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a) and Federal Rule of Civil Proced
59(e) are jurisdictional); Fuente v. Central Elec. Coop., Inc., 703 F.2d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1983) (p
curiam) (stating that ten day period of Federal Rule of civil Procedure 59(e) is jurisdictioDlli)
see also Browder v. Director, Dept.ofCorr., 434 U.S. 257,267,270-71 (1978) (holding app
jurisdictionally defective because untimely motion under Federal Rule of Civil ProcedureS
did not toll time for filing notice of appeal, and observing that time limits of Federal Rules 9
Civil Procedure 52(b) and 59 are mandatory and jurisdictional).
164. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2074, Congress has the opportunity to reject or alter Rulc:ll
proposed by the Court. Section 2074 provides in pertinent part that. "(a) The Supreme Co~
shall transmit to the Congress not later than May 1 ofthe year in which a rule prescribed under
section 2072 is to become effective a copy ofthe proposed rule. Such rule shall tske effect Jl
earlier than December 1 ofthe year in which such rule is so transmitted unless otherwise p
vided by law."
165. See Cross-Sound Ferry Servs., Inc. v. ICC, 934 F.2d 327, 341 (D.C. Cir. 1991
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in denial of petition for review). (in discu .
different meanings that "jurisdi,*onal" has in different contexts, observing that "[s]OlJ1
times ... characterizing a provision as 'jurisdictional' implies that a court cannot temper
application ofthe provision through otherwise available equitable doctrines").
166. See supra notes 64, 66, 154-55 and accompanying text for discussion ofthe colla
order doctrine. Regarding other doctrines defining finality, see generally 15A-B WiUGIIT ET
FlIDERALPRACIlCEANDPROCEDURE: JURISDICIloN2n §§ 3095-3939.10 (1992 & Supp. 2000
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Sentencing Guidelines, a district court's refusal to depart downward is
appealable. 167

B. Reconciling Steel Co. and Swint
There appears to be tension between the Court's denunciation of hypo.cal jurisdiction and its restriction ofthe scope of appellate jurisdiction on
rlocutory appeals. If a case is dismissed for lack of subject-matter juris·etion in the district court, an immediately appealable final judgment is
ed, and the appeals court reviews the dismissal. If a district court assumes or holds that it has subject-matter jurisdiction and adjudicates to final
judgment, if ~d when that final judgment is appealed, the appeals court can
review the district court's subject-matter jurisdiction; indeed, it is the appeals
court's duty to confirm the district court's jurisdiction if there is any question
about it. l68 If a district court assumes or holds that it has subject-matter jurisdiction and another of its orders is properly appealed before final judgment
(whether under the collateral order doctrine, under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) or (b),
pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(t) or 54(b), by grant of a
petition for writ of mandamus, or otherwise), .the question may arise whether
the appeals court is free to review the district court's jurisdiction in the context ofthe interlocutory appeal, even though the district court's affirmation of
its own jurisdiction would not, in and of itself, be appealable before final
judgment. In Swint v. Chambers County Commission,169 the Supreme Court
strongly criticized the doctrine of pendent appellate jurisdiction, which the
Court described as the authority of lI a court of appeals with jurisdiction over
ione ruling to review, conjunctively, related rulings that are not themselves
independentlyappealable."170 Disavowing the thoroughgoing rejection that
its opinion otherwise might have implied, the Court cautioned:
We need not definitively or preemptively settle here whether or when it
may be proper for a court ofappeals, with jUrisdiction over one ruling, to
review, conjUllctively, related rolingsthat arenotthemselves iru:lependently
167. Sffe. e.g., United Staten. Henderson, 209 F.3d 614, 617 (6th Cir. 2000) (taking position described in text); United States v. Matthews, 209 F.3d 338, 352 (4th Cir. 2000) (same);
.. United States v. Wetchie, 207 F.3d 632, 636 (9th Cir. 2000) (same).
168. See Louisville&NashvilleR.R. Co. v.Mottley,211 U.S. 149, 150 (1908)(dismissing
case for lack of federal-question subject-matter jurisdiction, where Court raised issue); Local
1351 Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Sea-Land Servo Inc., 214 F.3d 566, 569-70 (5th Cir. 2000)
(confirming district court's jurisdiction).
169. 514 U.S. 35 (1995).
170. Swint v. Chambers County Comm'n, 514 U.S. 35, 50-51 (1995). For a close examination of the opinion's criticism of pendent appellate jurisdiction doctrine, see generally Joan
Steinman, The Scope ofAppellate Jurisdiction: Pendent Appellate Jurisdiction Before and
After Swint, 49 HAsTINGS L.J. 1337 (1998).
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appealable .... The parties do not contend that the District Court's
decisionto denythe Chambers County Commission's sumnuuyjudgment
motion was inextricably intertwined with that court's decision to denythe
individual. defendants' qualified immunity motions, or that review ofthe
former decision was necessary to ensure meaningful review ofthe latter. 171
The Court thus left the door opento approval ofpendent appellate jurisdiction
over rulings that fit the categories described by the court (that is, tQose inextricably intertwined with the immediately appealable orders or necessary to ensure meaningful review ofthe latter) and perhaps even beyond those parameters.
Based upon Swint, it would be possible to argue that, despite the Court's
condemnation ofhypothetical jurisdiction in Steel Co., when there is an interlocutory appeal, a court of appeals should address only the issues that are
immediately and independently appealable and those that are pendent to them,
as narrowly defined by the Court in Swint. On this view, there would be
tension between Steel Co. and Swint insofar as the former insists that district
court jurisdiction not be assumed, but examined by the court of appeals, and
the latter insists that courts of appeals hearing interlocutory appeals confine
themselves to immediately appealable orders and orders inextricably intertwined with them or necessary to ensure their meaningful review. Recent cas.e
law has tended to detennine whether to entertain issues as to Article III
requirements and as to subject-matter jurisdiction, on the occasion ofinterlocutory appeals, by reference to whether the issues fall within the categories
described by Swint. Some courts regard issues that go to justiciability and to
the district court's subject-matter jurisdiction as necessary to ensure meaningful review ofthe immediately appealable order. l72 Others, rejecting that tack,
have declined to consider such issues when they were not lIinextricably
intertwinedll with the other issues presented.173
171.
172.

Swint, 514 U.S. at 50-51.
See Merritt v. Shuttle, Inc., 187 F.3d 263, 267-69 (2d Cir. 1999) (confirming ap-

pellate jurisdiction under collateral order doctrine and addressing district court's subject-matter
jurisdiction over claims that were basis of appeal in order to ensure meaningful review of order
denying qualified immunity). The court expressly stated that it did not run afoul ofthe bound~
aries on appellate jurisdiction articulated in Swint in determining whether the district court had
subject-matter jurisdiction. [d. at 268. It found such determination necessary to ensure meaningful review of the order denying qualified immunity because, without.such jurisdiction, the
district court would have lacked power to issue the immunity rulings in question. [d. at 269;
see also Larsen v.· Senate ofPa., 152 F.3d 240, 245-46 (3d Cir. 1998), cert denied, LarsenV.
Afilerbach, 525 U.S. 1145 (1999) (reaching justiciability of plaintiff's claim under political
question doctrine, as necessarY to decide § 1292(b)-certified issues on appeal).
173. See Prado-Steiman ex rei. Prado v. Bush, 221 F.3d 1266, 1277-78 (11th Cir. 2000)
(fmding that, outside context ofFEn. R. ClY. P. 23(f) appeals, "issues of standing normally are
not available for review on interlocutory appeal"); Summit Med. Assocs., PC. v. Pryor, 180 F.3d
1326,1335 &n.8(llthCir.1999) (followingMonizv. City ofFortLauderdale, 145 F.3d 1278
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Jurisdictional rulings typically are not inextricably intertwined with the
. rely appealable issues,174 and it is debatable whether they ought to be
idered necessary to ensure meaningful review. On a previous occasion,
etheless argued that, when there is an interlocutory appeal,175 a court of
eats may consider, and indeed should consider, whether the district court
subject-matter jurisdiction over the case. 176 The court of appeals should
ethis inquiry regardless ofwhether any ofthe parties moved, either in the
·ct. court or on appeal, to have the case dismissed for lack of subjectjurisdiction177 and regardless ofwhether there is any factual overlap (or
overlap of legal issues) between the jurisdictional issue and the issues
edby the order that is the occasion for the appeal. I adhere to that view.
the appellate court's duty to raise the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction,
sua sponte - whatever the occasion for a. case being before the appellate
Cir. 1998), in appeal from denial of Eleventh Amendment immunity); Moniz v. City of
Lauderdale, 145 F.3d 1278, 1281 n.3 (lIth Cir. 1998) (holding that appeals court did not
pendent jurisdiction to review ruling that plaintiffhad standing to assert claims in question
se standing issue was neither "inextricably intertwined with" nor "necessary to ensure
'. I review of' qualified immunity ruling); see also In re Vitamins Antitrust Class
oDS, 215 F.3d 26, 31-32 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (declining to exercise pendent appellate jurisdicover propriety of district court's denial of permissive intervention, in conjunction with
rlocutory appeal from rejection ofappellants' bid to intervene as ofright).
174. But see Carter v. West Publ. Co., 225 F.3d 1258, 1262-63 (lIth Cir. 2000) (stating
tupon interlocutory appeal of order granting class certification, court ofappeals could review
rmination that named plaintiffs had constitutional standing to bring class suit because
ding was properly part of class certification analysis).
75. When I speak of "interlocutory appeals," I intend to include all appeals before fiOaJ.
gtnent, including appeals of orders that are considered "final decisions" within the meaning
~8U.S.C. § 1291. This usage is consistent with the Black's Dictionary of Law definitions
"interlocutory" as "[s}omething intervening between the commencement and the end ofa suit
'ch decides some point or matter, but is not a final decision of the whole controversy" and
"interlocutory appeal" as "[a}n appeal of a matter which is not detenninableofthe contrasy, but which is necessary for a suitable adjudication ofthe merits." BLACK'S LAW DIcnQy 815 (6th ed. 1990). A later edition ofBLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY dermes "interlocutOry"
"interim or temporary [order, judgment, appeal, etc.} not constituting a final resolution of
whole controversy," and "iirterlocutory appeal" as "an appeal that occurs before the trial
\Jet's final ruling on the entire case." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 819, 94 (7th ed. 1999).
176. The Court took this approach in Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282
(1940) (considering·issue of subject-matter jurisdiction of district court in action under SecuritiesAct of1933).
In See Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908) (noting that
federal courts have duty to determine whether they have subject-matter jurisdiction and should
address that issue sua sponte if parties have not raised it); Transatlantic Marine Claims Agency,
Inc.v. Ace Shipping Corp., 109 F.3d lOS, 108 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding that even if defendant
challenged only sufficiency of complaint, court was "entitled at any time sua sponte to delve
into" factual basis for subject-matter jurisdiction); Cvelbar v. CBI ill., Inc., 106 F.3d 1368, 1373
(7th Cir. 1997) (stating court's "independent duty to assess sua sponte" questions of federal
jurisdiction).
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court - because judicial action beyond the subject-matter jurisdiction of a
federal district court, as established by Congress, violates separation of
powers, affronts judicial federalism (the relationship between federal and state
courts), and may violate Article ill ofthe Constitution. 118 Moreover, because
the issue is before the appeals court whether or not the parties raised it, and
because the issue is properly addressed before the issues directly raised by the:
immediately appealable order119 and without regard to whether the jurisdic
tiona! and the merits issues share any factual nexus or any overlapping leg
issues, as a matter of linguistic usage, the jurisdictional issue should not b
regarded as being within the court's "pendent" appellate jurisdiction. 180 Onc
that is recognized, the notion that an appeals court may explore the jurisdic
tion ofthe district court only if that issue falls within the exceptions noted·
Swint falls away.l8l
178. See Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545,552-56 (1989) (finding lower court's
cise of supplemental jurisdiction, which had not been explicitly authorized by Congress, tab
unconstitutional usurpation of power); Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303, 3
(1809) (striking down, as violative ofArticle III, statute purporting to confer federal jurisdicti
over all suits involving aliens because Constitution extends judicial power of United States ()
to cases between aliens and U.S. citizens); see generally 13 WRIGIITET AL.,FEDERALPRACI'li
AND PRoCEDURE: JURISDICTION AND RELATED MAITERS 2D § 3522, at 60-62, 66-69 (1984
Supp. 2001) (emphasizing unconstitutionality of federal courts taking jurisdiction over
that they lack jurisdiction to hear under U.S. Constitution and Acts of Congress; restrictions
jurisdiction offederal courts involve "delicate problems offederal-state relations").
179. See Manley, 211 U.S. at 152 (raising issue of subject-matter jurisdiction sua spon
and noting Court's responsibility to do so; not reaching merits of case once Court conclud
that federal courts lacked jurisdiction); Bertulli v. Indep. Ass'n of Continental Pilots, 242 F.3
290,294 (5th Cir. 2001) (concluding that, despite limited scope ofappeal from class certi
tion orders, appeals court may consider plaintiffs' constitutional standing to sue, when revicryV
ing grailt or denial ofclass certification); Children's Healthcare Is A Legal Duty, Inc. v. Deter'll
92 F.3d 1412,1419 (6th Cir. 1996) (Batchelder, J., writing separately) (concluding that, on
lateral order appeal, issue of plaintiff's standing also comes before appeals court); Avitts
Amoco Prod. Co., 53 F.3d 690, 693-94 (5th Cir. 1995) (upon appeal of grant of prelimi
injunction, court determined only that district court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction 0
action and remanded with instructions to district court to remand removed action to state co
Gilder v. PGA Tour, Inc., 936 F.2d 417, 421 (9th Cir. 1991) (reviewing district court's subj
matter jurisdiction before reviewing grant ofpreliminary injunction).
180. If the issue is raised by the appeals court sua sponte, lawyers probably do not consid
it a matter of pendent appellate jurisdiction. We might so regard it if a party seeks to have
appellate court review the district court's denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-rna
jurisdiction in conjunction with the § 1292(aXl) appeal. However, for the reasons stated abo
it seems more accurate to regard the court's jurisdiction to determine the district court's and
own subject-matter jurisdiction as independent (rather than pendent), although admittedly
occasion for immediate appellate consideration of the issue is created by the interlocutory
peal. But for that appeal the jurisdictional issue would be reviewable only after fmal judgm
181. Much of the above discussion concerning pendent appellate jurisdiction is den\'
from Steinman, supra note 170, at 1399·1401.
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In contrast to my view that matters of district court subject-matter jurisdiction should be

dressed on interlocutory appeals regardless ofwhether they fit within the Swint categories of
ptable occasions for pendent appellate jurisdiction, it is my view that, even though personal
. .ction also is a prerequisite to the proper entty ofjudicial orders against parties, appellate
should consider the propriety of a district court's· exercise of personal jurisdiction over
endants, on the occasion of an interlocutory appeal, only when that issue properly can be
lll"d •. as matter of pendent appellate jurisdiction, or when the decision to exercise personal
. • .ction was rendered in an order that was § 1292(b) certified or that entered or denied· an
~@ction and hence is part of an order that is immediately appealable in its entirety. (As
pstrued, §§ 1292(aXl) and 1292(b) directly confer jurisdiction over the entire such orders.
~eYamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199,205 (1996) (stating that under §1292(b),
appellate jurisdiction applies to the order certified ... and is not tied to the particular question
rmulated by the district court"); Smith v.Vulcan Iron Works, 165 U.S. 518,525-26 (1897)
ding §1292(aXl) intended to authorize appeal from whole interlocutory order or decree, not
only that part which grants or continues injunction).) The jurisdiction would be pendent
use appellate courts do not consider issues of personal jurisdiction sua sponte and could
#()tconsider such issues unless the defendants had timely objected to, or moved to dismiss for,
!JIckof personal jurisdiction in the district court and then appealed the denial of their motion
in conjunction with their interlocutory appeal. (Had the defendants failed to make timely
bjection in the trial court, they would have wsived their objections under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(hXl).) Moreover, judicial action in the absence of perIl()na!jurisdiction over defendants violates only the due process liberty interests ofthe individuals involved; it is no longer viewed as an affront to another sovereign. See Ins. Corp. of Jr., Ltd.
x.qompagnie des Bauxites des Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703 n.l0 (1982) (liThe restriction on state
sovereign power . . . must be seen as ultimately a function of the individual liberty interest
preserved by the Due Process Clause"). Consequently, no interests equivalent to those that
pport appellate consideration of subject-matter jurisdiction at the first opportunity dictate
similarly prompt appellate consideration of personal jurisdiction. Thus, if the propriety of the
trial court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendants can be heard on the occasion of
interlocutory appeal, it can be heard only as pendent to that appeal or when the personal
Jurisdiction ruling is part ofan immediately appealable order.
In the former instance, it should be so heard only if the issues raised by the interlocutory
appeal and by the controversy over personal jurisdiction share a common nucleus of operative
factor overlapping legal issues, because only then may the economies gsined by simultaneous
decisions outweigh the policies that normally would postpone review of personal jurisdiction
issues until after fmal judgment The system should work in this way even though personal
jurisdiction is a threshold issue that may be dispositive while the interlocutory appeal may not
have the potential to dispose of the case because, if it were otherwise, the mere fortuity of an
interlocutory appeal would overturn the policies that led Congress to conclude that there ordinarily should be no immediate appeal of denials of motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Limiting pendent appellate jurisdiction over personal jurisdiction issues also has the
virtue of sharply reducing the occasions on which litigants might be tempted to appeal an order
primarily as a vehicle to get an early appellate ruling on personal jurisdiction issues. While
allowing courts of appeals to address unrelated issues of personal jurisdiction on the occasion
ofan interlocutory appeal would not interrupt otherwise uninterrupted trial court proceedings,
it would have other disadvantages: such a system would lessen district court control and
authority, might cause district courts to be less careful in making rulings that they foresaw
would soon be reviewed, would result in the consumption of appellate time and energy that
might never have had to be expended, and would delay the resolution of interlocutory appeals

an

904

58 WASH & LEE L. REV. 855 (2001)

Upon an interlocutory appeal, the court of appeals also has to con:finn
that it has jurisdiction to hear the appeal at that time, under an exception to,
or an interpretation of, the final judgment rule.
Co Appellate Jurisdiction as a Prerequisite to Appellate Action
on the Merits
Just as district courts must have subject-matter jurisdiction over actions
and personal jurisdiction over parties to render binding judgments on the
merits,182 so too appellate courts must have appellate jurisdiction over actions
and personal jurisdiction over parties to render binding judgments. The black
letter principles are well established. Speaking of subject-matter; jurisdiction,
the Court has said, '''On every· writ oferror or appeal, the first and fundamental question is that ofjurisdiction, first, of [the appellate] court, and then of
the court[s] from which the record comes,'''183 regardless of whether the
by expanding their scope. This would create a less efficient system. See Steinman, supra note
170, at 1401-04 (arguing that appellate courts should hear questions of personal jurisdiction
along with § 1292(aXl) appeal only if controversy over personal jurisdiction shares facts or
legal issues with injunctive order that is occasion for appeal).
182. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 11 (1982) states that "[a] judgment may
properly be rendered against a party only if the court has authority to adjudicate the type of
controversy involved in the action." Section 1 also makes subject-matter jurisdiction requisite
for entry ofa valid judgment. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 1 (1982). Judgments
entered by district courts that lack personal or subject-matter jurisdiction are voidable,in.
specified circumstances. Sections 12 and 69 declare the circumstances in which the parties may
challenge a court's subject-matter jurisdiction in subsequent litigation when a court has rendered a judgment in a contested action, while sections 65 and 66 provide the circumstances in
which a default judgment rendered by a court lacking subject-matter jurisdiction may be
avoided. See REsTATEMRNT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 12,65,66,69 (1982) (noting requirements for challenging jUdgment ofcourt without subject-matter jurisdiction). The Restatement
similarly makes personal jurisdiction a prerequisite to entry of a valid judgment. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 1-9 (1982) (explaining requirements for courts to have
personal jurisdiction). It also deClares the methods by which parties may challenge a court'~
exercise ofpersonal jurisdiction for the purpose ofinvalidating its judgment. See REsTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 10,65,66, 78-82 (1982) (describing process through which
judgments may be challenged for lack ofpersonal jurisdiction).
183. Steel Co. v. Citizens for aBetter Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (quoting Great S. Fire:
Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449,453 (1900»; accord United States v. Brown, 218 F.3~
415,420 (5th Cir. 2000), cert denied, 69 U.S.L'w; 3479 (U.S. 2001) (noting that "appellate
jurisdiction is not a matter of consent"); Nilssen v. Motorola Inc., 203 F.3d 782, 784 (Fed. Cir..
2000) (holding that Federal Circuit lacked appellate jurisdiction over state law claims that
remained after patent infringement claim had been dismissed without prejudice because case
no longer arose under patent laws); Brookes v. Comm'r, 163 F.3d 1124,1125-26,1128-29 (9th
Cir. 1998) (supporting dismissal of appeal for lack of jurisdiction for want of final order il}'.
concluding that precedent that permitted appellate review of final decision of tax liabilitY as to.
separate tax years in multi-year claim, without certification as to fmality of order under Rule
54(b), violated Steel Co. 's prohibition against exercise ofhypothetical jurisdiction); WilliaJnson
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arties raise the issue. When a lower court lacked jUrisdiction, the appeals

Court has jurisdiction, not to decide the merits, but to correct the error ofthe

wer.court in entertaining the sOO.184 Ifjurisdiction has ceased to exist in any

deral court, by virtue of a case having become moot for example,185 an
pellate court's primary function is to announce that fact and dismiss the
e}86 Ifthe lower court had original jurisdiction but the appeals court lacks

.lJNUMLife Ins. Co., 160 F.3d 1247, 1250 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that appellate jurisdiction
ys must be resolved before merits); United Ststes v. Vazquez, 145 F.3d 74, 79 (2d Cir.
998) (addressing before merits whether appellant was sufficiently aggrieved to have standing
appeal and whether her notice ofappeal was defective).
184. . United Ststes v. Corrick, 298 U.S. 435,440 (1936); see Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 95
~laining appellate courts' duty to correct lower courts' errors in exercising jurisdiction);
nited Ststes v. Health Possibilities, P.S.C., 207 F.3d 335, 342 n.5 (6th Cir. 2000) (raising sua
IIponte and deciding favorably to relators in qui tam action issue of relators' standing to sue);
Mirage Resorts, Inc. v. Quiet Nacelle Corp., 206 F.3d 1398, 1400-01 (11th Cir. 2000) (reciting
principles that federal appellate court must satisfY itself of both its own jurisdiction and that of
ower courts and dismissing controversy without prejudice upon finding that district court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction); United Transp. Union v. Foster, 205 F.3d 851, 857 (5th Cir.
2000) (invoking obligation to confirm appellate and district court jurisdiction as predicate for
c:x:amining ripeness ofplaintiffs' claims for declaratory reliet); Harline v. DBA, 148 F.3d 1199,
If02-03, 1206 (1Oth Cir. 1998) (relying on this principle to vacate judgment and remand with
instructions to dismiss all claims without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due
to failure to exhaust administrative remedies).
185. See, e.g., Bd. ofEduc. v. Nathan R., 199 F.3d 377, 381 (7th Cir. 2000) (vacating
clistrict court's judgment and remanding with instructions to dismiss aspects of case regarding
claim for special education services where merits became moot after district court issued its
opinion); Friends ofthe Earth, Inc v. Laidlaw Envtl.Servs. (TOC), Inc., 149 F.3d 303,306-07
(4th Cir. 1998) (concluding that action was moot where plaintiffs had not appealed denial of
only forms of relief that might be available to redress their injuries and therefore vacating disttietcourt's order and remanding with instructions to dismiss action), rev'd, 120 S. Ct. 693, 700
(Jan. 12, 2000) (reversing on grounds that case had not become moot); Fidelity Partners, Inc.
v.First Trust Co. of N.Y., 142 F.3d 560, 565 (2d Cir. 1998) (viewing Steel Co. as requiring
court to address whether appeal had become moot, before addressing merits, and suggesting that
it otherwise would have invoked "hypothetical jurisdiction").
186. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 94 (relying onEx parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506,514 (1868» .
.An appeals court's power actually extends somewhat further. See, e.~., U.S. Bancorp Mortgage
Co. v. Bonner Mall P'ship, 513 U.S. 18,20-22 (1994)(concluding tha't even when requirements
of Article ill are no longer met by piece of litigation, federal appellate courts may take some
actions, including vacating judgment rendered by lower court and remanding with directions
10 dismiss, or deciding to let lower court judgment stand, or awarding costs); Willy v. Coastal
Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 137-39 (1992) (explaining that Article ill court's order imposing sanctions
under FED. R. CIV. P. 11 is constitutionally permissible even if it is later determined that court
lacked jurisdiction, reasoning that no constitutional concern is implicated when order does not
address merits of underlying suit, but only collateral issues); United Ststes v. Key, 205 F.3d
773, 775 n.1 (5th Cir. 2000) (ruling on motions to supplement and correct record and for leave
to file exhibits with appellate reply brief in case where appellate jurisdiction was lacking). The
Court in U.S. BancoTp affirmed the principle that, if a case becomes moot, while the Court may
not consider its merits, it may dispose of the case asjustice requires and enter orders that are
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.appellate jurisdiction, the latter must dismiss the appeal, 187 although it may
impose sanctions and enter housekeeping orders, where appropriate. 188
In a number of instances, the Supreme Court has taken a hard line on the
necessity for appellatejurisdiction. For example, in Budinich v. Becton Dick.
inson .& Co., 189 the Court held that, once the appeals court had concluded that
an appeal from a final judgment was untimely, it lacked discretion to make its
jurisdictional ruling prospeCtive only and to consider the merits of the case.I90
The Court so concluded even though the consequence was that the losing
party never could appeal. 191 The Court reached the same conclusion where a:IJ.
appeals court lacked jurisdiction.for want of an immediately appealable final
decision under the collateral order doctrine,l92 and where 'the Federal Circuit
lacked statutory authority to hear a case but had· acted on the merits in the.
interest ofjustice when the circuit court of appeals to which it had transferre4
necessary and appropriate to final disposition. U.S. Bancorp, 513 U.S. at 21-22. There is som~
inconsistency in federal appeals court decisions as to whether a court lacking subject-matter
jurisdiction can properly impose a sanction that terminates a case on the merits. Compare Ray
v. Eyster, 132 F.3d 152, 156 (3d Cir. 1997) (deciding that court without subject matter jurisdiction may not impose sanction that will terminate case on merits) with Allen v. Exxon Corp., 102
F.3d 429, 431 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming dismissals with prejudice, imposed as sanctions,
despite district court's lack ofsubject matterjurisdiction).
187. See Randle v. Victor Welding Supply Co., 664F.2d 1064 &n.l,1067 (7th Cir. 1981)
(stating that court of appeals must dismiss on its own motion when appellate jurisdiction· is
lacking, and doing so in this case); State Fire & Cas. Co. v. Red Top Supermarkets, Inc., 304
F.2d 161, 162 (5th Cir. 1962) (slating that court of appeals without jurisdiction must dismiss
appeal, and doing so here); Lockwood v. Hercules Powder Co., 172 F.2d 775, 776-77 (8th Cir.
1949) (stating that if appealed orders are not appealable, court of appeals is without jurisdiction
and must dismiss appeal. and doing so here); see also cases cited supra note 185.
188. See Judd v. Univ. ofN.M., 204 F.3d 1041, 104445 (10th Cir. 2000) (dismissin.g
appeal for lack of jurisdiction to consider its merits and concluding that court had jurisdiction
to impose filing restrictions on appellant); supra note 186.
189. 486 U.S. 196 (1988).
190. See Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196,203 (1988) (explsining
reasons for appeals court's lack ofjurisdiction). The plaintiffhad not filed the notice ofappeal
within the time limits set by Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 4(aXl) and (aX4), having
erroneously believed that the time to appeal did not begin to run until entry ofthe trial court's
attorney's fee award. See Budinich, 486 U.S. at 197-98 (stating cause for untimely appeal).
191. See Budinich, 486 U.S. at 203 (noting thatjudgment on merits was final when entered
and llppealable at that time). Petitioner's failure to file timely appeal foreclosed his chance to
appeal. [d.
. 192. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 375-77, 379 (1981) (holding that where court of appeals was without jurisdiction to hear appeal under collateral order
doctrine, it was without authority to decide merits and could not make its jurisdictional ruling
prospective). The Firestone Court also noted that, in light of its conclusion that the Eighth
Circuit lacked jurisdiction over the appeal, the Court had no occasion to address the issue ofthe
petitioner's standing to attack the order from which appeal had been taken, an order allowing
respondent to continue to represent the plsintiffs. [d. at 379 n.14.
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e appeal had denied its own jurisdiction and transferred the case back. 193
''Equitable considerations are altogether irrelevant when a court lacks adjuditory power. 11194
.
These scrupulous observances ofthe limits upon federal appellate juris·(;tion do not occupy the field and tell the whole story, however. For examle,ithe Court has reversed appellate judgments without reaching challenges
the appeals courts' jurisdiction, in part on the basis ofthe "traditional pracll
of refusing to decide constitutional questions when the record discloses
grounds ofdecision, whether or not the latter were properly raised by the
·es. Thus, in Neese v. Southern Railway CO.,19S the Court chose not to
h a Seventh-Amendment-based challenge to the court ofappeals' jurisdicn to review the·denial of a motion for a new trial based on alleged excesss ofthe verdict. l96 The Court concluded instead that, on the record, the
Purt of appeals had erred in finding an abuse of discretion by the district
ourt in its denial ofthe new trial motion, upon a remittitur ofpart ofthe ver·ct. l97 One could view this as an instance in which the Court assumed argu-

'ce

193. See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 818-19 (1988)
("acating judgment ofFederal Circuit and remanding with instructions to transfer case to Seventh Circuit, where Federal Circuit lacked jurisdiction and its only choices therefore were to
dismiss or transfer case to court ofappeals that had jurisdiction).
194. See Fetzen v. Andreas, 134 F.3d 873, 877-78 (7th Cir. 1998) (dismissing appeal for
}vant of jurisdiction upon conclusions that nonparty shareholders were entitled to appeal
judgment in shareholders' derivative action and finding, on equitable grounds, that such holding
c()11ld not be made prospective only), aff'd by an equally divided court, Cal. Pub. Employees'
.R..c:t.. Sys., 525 U.S. 315 (1999); see also EI Paso Natural Oas. Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473,
482(1999) (observing that neither R11le 4 nor Rule 26(b) of Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure, and perhaps referring to that set of R11les generally, nor interests animating crossappeal requirement, offered any leeway for making exceptions to cross-appeal requirement);
Landgrafv. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244,274-75 (1994) (mentioning that statutes repealing
grants of jurisdiction operate on pending cases and explaining that Court regards parties as
hIlving "diminished relisnce interests" in matters ofprocedure); McLucas v. De Champlain, 421
U.S. 21, 28-32 (1975) (carefully reviewing Supreme Court's own jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1252-53).
195. 350 U.S. 77 (1955).
196. See Neese v. S. Ry. Co., 350 U.S. 77,77-78 (1955) (reversing court of appeals while
refusing to comment on constitutional question ofjurisdiction when other grounds for decision
were available). The argument was that the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution denies
appellate power to judge excessiveness of a verdict. The Amendment states in pertinent part
that "no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States,
than according to the r11les ofthe common law." U.S. CONST. amend. VIT.
197. Neese, 350 U.S. at 77-78; see also Orunenthal v. Long Island R.R., 393 U.S. 156, 158
(1968) (stating that Court "had no occasion" to consider argument that court of1ippeals exceeded its constitutional or statutory powers in reviewing denial of motion to set aside verdict
as excessive, where it assumed, without deciding, that appeals court was empowered to make
review, and concluded that it nonetheless had erred in disturbing district court's denial of said
motion). The "traditional practice" of refusing to decide constitutional questions when the
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endo that the appellate court had jurisdiction and decided the case in favor of
the party challenging appellate jurisdiction. 19K
As Neese illustrates, in the appellate context, decisions "on the merits"
often are ~ in procedural terms. 199 Because appeals prototypically assert
that the district court judge erred in one or more ways, the issues presented on.
appeal often are framed in procedural tenns: did the district court judge err
in granting or denying a motion, in admitting or refusing to admit evidence,
in giving or refusing particular jury instructions, and the like? These issues
constitute ''the merits" ofthe appeal, although they generally are one or more
steps removed from substantive law or fact questions.
In Norton v. Mathews 200 the Court declined to decide whether the action
properly had been brought in a three-judge district court and hence whether
it correctly was before the Supreme Court on a direct appeal. 201 This time, the
Court justified its bypass of the appellate jurisdictional question on the
grounds that, because the merits question was decided in a companion case,202
resolution of the jurisdictional question would have had no effect on the
outcome: if its jurisdiction had correctly been invoked, the Court would have
affinned summary judgment for the defendant, and if jurisdiction were lacking, the Court would have dismissed the appeal, vacated the judgment, and
remanded, but the identical outcome would have been foreordained in subsequent proceedings before a single federal judge. 203 '
It seems to me that the Court also has taken the position that other values
sometimes can predominate over the need for "actual" appellate jurisdiction.
This position seems implicit in the Court's prescription that, under "law ofthe
record discloses other grounds ofdecision does not explain the Court's assumption in Grunenthal
ofpower to undertake the challenged review under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. See id·
at 156-57 (noting Court's grant ofcertiorari to review ofFederal Employers' LiabilityAct).
198. The party challenging appellate jurisdiction had won in the trial court,. and thus opposed review ofthe denial of a motion for a new trial. The effect offinding error in the appeals
court's reversal ofthe trial court was to atfmn the trial court's judgment on the merits. Thus,
the same party prevailed in the case as would have prevailed had the intermediate court of
appeals been held to lack jurisdiction, as is typical of hypothetical jurisdiction situations. See
infra text accompanying note 230.
199. See Neese, 350 U.S. at 77 (noting that procedural decision that court of appeals
abused its discretion acts as decision based on merits ofcase).
200. 427 U.S. 524 (1976).
201. See Norton v. Mathews, 427 U.S. 524, 530-31 (1976) (refusing to address jurisdic;
tional issues).
202. See Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495,497·503,516 (1976) (upholding denial ofsocial
security benefits to illegitimate children of deceased parent on grounds that Congress's failure
to extend presumption of dependency to illegitimate children not living with their parent at time
ofparent's death did not constitute illegal discrimination).
203. See Norton, 427 U.S. at 525, 528-32 (discussing ramifications of Court's decision to
invoke jurisdiction); supra note 29.
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pi' principles, if a transferee appellate court can find the transfer decision
lausible," its jurisdictional inquiry should end so that cases do not become
ball in a game of "jurisdictional ping-pong. ,,204 Thus, because law of the
e is not itselfjurisdictionat205 an appeals court can assume, without decid,.that it has jurisdiction over an appeal (based on law ofthe case), and proto decide the merits. In my view, that is close to an example ofhypothet(or assumed) appellate jurisdiction, although it is distinguishable from
bst instances in that some court has addressed and decided the issue.
These cases illustrate that, in the context of appellate jurisdiction (as in
realm ofdistrict court jUrisdiction), the Court has rendered some decisions
f have diluted the purity of the principle that courts must not resolve
ritested questions I!on the merits" when their jurisdiction is in doubt.
.... ...

.

D. Hypothetical Appellate Jurisdiction before Steel Co.
1. The Theory
The standard formulation ofthe doctrine ofhypothetical jurisdiction was
Ssentially that, "when the merits of the case are clearly against the party
eking to invoke the court's jurisdiction, the jurisdictional question is espey difficult and far-reaching, and the inadequacies in the record make the
eapoor vehicle for decitting the jurisdictional question, [a court] may rule
the merits without reaching the jurisdictional Contention."206 The primary
ationaIes' for hypothetical jurisdiction were judicial economy and judicial
estraint, althoughit also could serve other institutional values. 207 Federal
Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 818-19 (1988).
Law of the case does not limit a court's power but merely embodies a practice of
Co.urts to refuse, in general, to reopen what has been decided. See United States v. Gamallstidas, 222 F.3d 779, 784-85 (lOth Cir. 2000) (noting that "law of the case" is notjurisdie'()Jlal, but discretionll1)'). See generally Joan Steinman, Law ofthe Case: A Judicial Puzzle in
(Jonsolidated and Transferred Cases and in Multidistrict Litigation, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 595,
~?7-613 (1987) (describing how "law ofthe case" precludes relitigation of issues within single
and establishes rules of sound practice that permit progress toward judgment without
disabling courts from altering interlocutory decisions when appropriate); Allan D. Vestal, Law
()ftheCase: Single-SuitPreclusion, 12UTAHL.REv. 1, 14 (1967)(describingand evaluating
.I1Ow "law ofthe case" operates).
206. House the Homeless, Inc. v. Widnall,94 F.3d 176,179 n.7 (5th Cir. 1996). Professor
Idleman characterizes this as the standard formulation. Idleman, supra note 4, at 245. The
Court in Steel Co. summarized the doctrine as making it proper for a court to proceed to the
merits when the merits question is more readily resolved than jurisdictional objections and the
prevailing party on the merits would be the same as he who would prevail were jurisdiction
denied. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83,93 (1998); see Idleman, supra
note 4, at 246-47 (describing other formulations).
207. See Idleman, supra note 4, at 247, 312-13 (discussing rationales for hypothetical jurisdiction); infra text accompanying notes 226-27 (discussing institutional values); see also ComJl1ent, supra note 34, at 713 (arguing that "the principled exercise of hypothetical jurisdiction
205.

case
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courts believed it pennissible to reap these benefits and to slight the ordinary
sequence of decision. because, with the litigation's outcome remaining the
same, there was no unfairness to the parties.
How do the doctrine and these justifications apply to hypothetical appellate jurisdiction?
a. Application ofthe Doctrine

The doctrine can apply to appellate jurisdiction. Cases on appeal can
pose merits questions that are more readily resolved than objections to the
appellate court's jurisdiction, and the prevailing party on the merits can be the
person who would prevail if appellate jurisdiction were denied. Questionsof
appellate jurisdiction can be difficult and far-reaching, and the inadequacies
in the record can make a case a poor vehicle for deciding the jurisdictional
question.
b. Justifications: Judicial Economy, Judicial Restraint, Other
Institutional Values, and Fairness

(1) Judicial Economy

The doctrine's requirementthatthemerits be easily, oratleastmoreeasily,
resolved than the jurisdictional issue is a critical underpinning ofthe judicial
economy argument. Without relative ease ofresolution, the economies to be
gained would be small.208 But, ifthe merits are substantially easier to resolve
than the issues of appellate jurisdiction, the appellate court saves substantial
resources in focusing only on the fonner. There is economy in appellate judges
sparing themselves lithe time and energy [required for] puzzling overthe correct
answer to an intractable jurisdictional matter, when (assukng an easy answer
on the substantive merits) the same party would win or lose regardless."209
Moreover, as Professor Idleman has written, "a circuit court's use ofthe doctrine essentially precludes certiorari review ofthe jurisdictional ruling, and,
the extent the jurisdictional issue might have been clarified by. further factfinding or argument, obviates the need for either a remand or for supplemental
briefing."210 Thus, appellateuse ofhypotheticaljurisdictionmay save resources
ofthe United States Supreme Court, ofintennediate appellate courts, ofdistrict
courts, and ofparticipants in their processes. While Professor Idleman may

to

can avoid unnecessary consideration of constitutional questions, conserve judicial resources,
and aid in the administration ofjustice").
208. See Idleman, supra note 4, at 252-53 (explaining that judicial economy is gained
when outcome is same regardless if based on lack ofjurisdiction or Qn lack of merits). If the
jurisdictional issue were easily resolved, there would be no reason to bypass it. Id. at 254.
209. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 111 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
210. Idleman, supra note 4, at 247.
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ebeen thinking primarily about courts ofappealshypothetica11y assuming
district court's jurisdiction and proceeding to the merits, his explication of
'cial economies to be gained by a hypothetical assumption ofjurisdiction
lies equally to appellatejurisdiction.211
As indicated above, the condition of exercising hypothetical jurisdiction
by some copts, that the record or briefing of the jurisdictional issue be
equate, also relates to judicial economy.212
.Hypothetical jurisdiction under such circumstances plainly saves the
parties and the court the time and resources that further developmentofthe

record [or further brief-writing] would inevitably entail. In particular, to
the extent the jurisdictional question is tied to ... undetermined facts, this
requirement makes most sense at the appellate level, where there is little
capacity for fact-finding and resolution of the jurisdictional issue would
therefore require a remand. 213

quoted statement holds true whether the jurisdictional question as to which
record is inadequate, or that has not been adequately briefed, involves
.ct .court or appellate jurisdiction.
By allowing a court to reach the merits, the exercise of hypothetical
.sdiction, if pennissible, also would enable courts, especially courts of
peals, to establish precedent on merits issues, reducing uncertainty in the
bstantive law. Particularly when that precedent would eliminate nonmeriO()us·suits, substantial economies would result for both courts and parties.214
()\Vever, to the extent that hypothetical jurisdiction would be exercised in
tions that are easy to resolve on the merits precisely because precedent
eady has been set on the issue presented, this argument loses much of its
ch.
Prior to Steel Co., the discretionary nature ofthe Supreme Court's juris'On,21S the low probability that the Court would 8rant certiorari in any

In. Of course, as Idleman observes, the failure to confront a jurisdictional question can
I>c=iuneconomical insofar as it creates or perpetuates uncertainty and future litigation over the
.same jurisdictional issue. [d. at 248,255-56. Moreover, the assertion of hypothetical jurisdicti()Il where jurisdiction, if examined, would be found not to exist, is uneconomical insofar as it
eeps courts engaged in adjudicsting cases that they otherwise would have dismissed (in the
9~ of a district court) or remanded (in the case of an appellate court). See id. at 256 (noting
Mw judicial economy may be lost if courts utilize hypothetical jurisdiction to avoid deciding
jurisdictional issues).
212. [d. at 257-58.·
213.

[d.,

214. See id. at 310 (explaining attraction to courts of usiIlg hypothetical jurisdiction to
eliminate suits without merit).
215. Where a statute provides for "appeal" to the Supreme Court and appellate review is
requested, the Court is obligated to take and decide a case. However, under current statutes,
almost all cases go to the Court by writ of certiorari, and the Court has unfettered discretion as
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particular case,216 and the Supreme Court's apparent approval ofhypotheti
appellate jurisdiction, gave courts of appeals minimal reason to fear a Su
preme Court reversal founded upon their exercise of hypothetical appellalt}
jurisdiction. Thus, courts ofappeals could largely rest assured thattheir efforts
on the merits would not be wasted. 217 After Steel Co., the risk is far grea
that the Supreme Court will reverse, require attention to the issue of appella
jurisdiction, and create the risk that the appellate court's decision on
merits will have to be vacated.
(2) Judicial Restraint
As Professor Idleman has noted, "[I]t is rather "ironic to depict the
sumption of jurisdiction as an act of 'restraint' ... when there may ben.
jurisdiction at all." 218 Nonetheless, the argument that exercise ofhypotheti
jurisdiction is an exercise in judicial restraint has roots in the canon that
court should not decide a constitutional question when it can decide a case

as

to whether to grant the writ. See generally ERWIN CImMERINsKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTIC>
§10.3.2 (3d ed. 1999) (distinguishing between writs of certiorari and direct appeals). Rule 1
of the Supreme Court Rules states that "[a] petition for writ of certiorari will be granted olll
for compelling reasons," and indicates that the reasons that the Court will consider includ
whether a matter is an important federal question and is a subject on which federal courts 0
appeals or such courts and state courts of last resort, or state courts of last resort amon
themselves, are in conflict; whether an important question of federal law should be settled.~
the Court; whether an important lower federal court decision conflicts with decisions ofib
Court; and whether a decision has so far departed from the accepted and usual course ofjudie'
proceedings as to call for an exercise ofthe Court's supervisory power. SUP. CT. R. 10.
216. Data compiled by the Harvard Law Review for the 1996-99 Supreme' Court Te
(the last Terms for which the data has been published, at present) indicates that review w
granted in the following percentage of cases in which it was sought: 1996-97 Term: 3.6
1997-98 Term: 3.56%; 1998-99 Term: 3.5%. See The Supreme Court, 1998Term-TheSUI~
tics, 113 HARv. L. REv. 400,406-07 (1999) (discussing statistics ofnumbers of eases reac'
Supreme Court); The Supreme Cour~ 1997 Term - The Statistics, 112 HARv. L. REv. 366,37
73 (1998)(same); The Supreme Court, 1996Term- The Statistics, 111 HARV':L. REv. 431(1997) (same). The notes to the respective tables explain how the figures were derived.
For a combination of reasons, it also was unlikely that the issue of the propriety ofh
theticaljurisdiction ever would have been squarely presented. Among other things, ifthe 10
court was correct on the merits, which it likely would be on a merits issue viewed as
resolved, the losing party would not likely seek appellate review because the alternative 0
come of dismissal from federal court for lack ofjurisdiction, to be left to a state court preece
ing that would likely reach the same result, would not be attractive. See Idleman, supra not
4, at 278, 305-08 (listing reasons why loSing parties may choose not to appeal).
217. In the wake of Steel Co.• the Supreme Court could grant certiorari. vacate the ju
ment, and reverse for reconsideration in light of Steel Co., if the Court thought that a court
appeals was guilty ofimpermissibly exercising hypothetical appellate jurisdiction.
218. Idleman, supra note 4, at 249. Idleman then argues that the actual applications
hypothetical jurisdiction do nottit comfortably with the restraint rationale. ld. at 250~52.
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er basis. 219 This rationale can apply in the context of appellate jurisdicwhen the jurisdictional issues to be foregone are of constitutional stature,
. sues of mootness may be. The restraint argument also may be rooted in
'dea that courts should, if possible, avoid decisions ofjurisdictional questhat touch upon delicate matters of separation of powers, as issues of
'¢iability may do. 220 This rationale can apply in the context of appellate
diction, because issues ofjusticiability (including limitations on adjudicaof IIpolitical questions II) can be presented in the context ofappellate juris·on. By contrast, the rationale that avoidance of a jurisdictional issue can
er.the values of federalism by llminimiz[ing] the intrusion of the federal
'.<;iary into the business of the states ll (for example, when the immunity of
~~~or state officials would be in question)221 seems not to be as relevant
eI1intennediate appellate, rather than federal district court, jurisdiction is
OCUS of attention, While district court jurisdiction typically has federalimplications because the l,itigation, that the federal courts are not empowto hear typically belongs to the state judiciaries, the division of authority
~ federal trial and intennediate appellate courts is, for the most part, a
:tter of federal concern only.222 The exercise of federal appellate jurisdicId. at 248. The Supreme Court has counseled that federal courts should not decide
tional questions unless it is necessary to do so; thus, a federal court should consider
there is a non-eonstitutional ground of decision, and, ifthere is, should decide the case
t ground. See Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 99 (1981) (implementing requiretl:J.at, prior to reaching constitutional questions, federal courts must consider non-eonstitugrounds for decision, by considering whether district c.ourts have authority under Federal
to impose sweeping limits on communications by named plaintiffs and their counsel to
~tive class members, and deciding case under FederalRules, despite Court's grant of
§l'Bri to decide whether order so limiting such communications was constitutionally per"l:)l~); Ashwander ,v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concur(summarizing rules through which Court has avoided passing upon constitutiollal ques,including rule that Court will not pass upon properly presented constitutional question
ordpresents some other ground on which case may be decided); Burton v. United States,
.'(J'.S.283, 295 (1905) (noting that it is not "habit" ofCourt to decide constitutional quessunless absolutely necessary to decision of case). However, the canon permits courts to
idconstitutional questions only "where the saving construction is not 'plainly contrary to
itltent of Congress,''' Miller v. French, 530 U.S.327, 341 (2000) (quoting Edward J. De010 Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575
8», and where the court is not pressing statutory construction "to the point ofdisingenuous
·on." George Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U.S. 373,379 (1933).
O. See Idleman, supra note 4, at 24849 (noting that political question doctrine impliII. separation ofpowers concerns).
21. Id. at 249.
22. Professor Rhonda Wasserman traced the bar of appellate review of remand orders in
effort to relieve the Supreme Court of an overloaded docket in the days prior to the creation
;the intermediate federal appellate courts, a rationale that has long since lost its relevance. See
()nda Wasserman, Rethinking Review a/Remands: Proposed Amendments to the Federal
ovalStatute, 43 EMORY L.J. 83, 100-01 (1994)(explaining rationale behind bar ofappellate

er
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tion can, however, continue an intrusion ofthe federal judiciary into the busi7
ness ofthe states. Moreover, when the jurisdiction ofthe U.S. Supreme Court
to hear appeals from the highest court of a state is the focus, avoidance ofa
jurisdictional issue can furth~ the values of federalism by minimizing intrusion of the federal judiciary into the business of the states. For example,
intrusion might be avoided if the Court declined to question the clarity of a..
declaration by the highest court of a state that its decision was supported by
an adequate and independent state ground. 223 Under current law, however, if
the adequacy and independence of the state ground is not sufficiently clear,
the Court will review the state court decision, rather than dismiss the case,
vacate for clarification, .or take some other less intrusive tack. 224
Insofar as courts, in deciding whether to exercise hypothetical jurisdic
tion, also looked to whether deciSion of the jurisdictional issues would ha
far-reaching implications (seeking to avoid decision ofsuch issues, as a rna
of self-restraint) and gave this prong of the test a meaning independent
concerns about separation of powers or federalism, 225 the focus bec
review ofremand orders). However, the bar has both additional purposes and effects that rela
to federalism: it reduces disruption of state judicial proceedings with the concomitant delay.an
possible harassment that appeal ofa remand order might entail, but when the remand is erron
ous, the barbas the effect of denying defendants the congressionally conferred right to liti
in a federal forum, claims within the district courts' jurisdiction. [d. at 108, 132; see Heatoll
Monogram Credit Card Bank, 231 F.3d 994 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting that justification for rule
non-review of28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) remands is preventing delay in trial of remanded cases
extended litigation over jurisdictional issues); Comment, Removal, Waiver, and the Mythie
Unreviewable Remand in the Fifth Circuit, 45 BAYWRL. REv. 723, 735, 748 (1993) (notingthll.t
bar furthers state court's interest in speedy resolution of merits). For criticisms of 28 U.S.
§ 1447(d), see Michael E. Solomine, Removal, Remands, and Reforming Federal Appella;
Review, 58 Mo. L. REv. 287,232-33 (1993) (arguing that § 1447(d) needs to be repealed
modified); Joan Steinman, Postremoval Changes in the Party Structure o/Diversity Cases:
Old Law, the New Law, andRule 19, 38 KAN. L. REv. 863, 951-54 (1990) (describing perve
aspects of law governing reviewability of remands and dismissals); Joan Steinman, Rem
Remand, andReview in Pendent Claim andPendentParty Cases, 41 VAND. L. REv. 923, 109
(1988) (arguing that Congress "should reconsider the statutory prohibition against appelli!
review ofremand orders").
223. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983)(declaringthat "[i]fthe state
decision indicates clearly and expressly that it is ... based on bona fide separate, adequate,
independent grounds, we ... will not undertake to review the decision").
224. See id. at 1038-39 (discussing various approaches Court historically had taken Wlt
unsure whether state court decision was supported by adequate and independent.state ground
Thus, one might conclude that the notion that avoidance of jurisdictional issues can furth
federalism by minimizing intrusion into the business ofthe states now seems inapplicable in
context of Supreme Court review of final decisions from the highest court of a state because
is only by questioning its jurisdiction, on grounds such as the adequate and independent
ground doctrine, that the Supreme Court can avoid intrusion upon state judiciaries.
225. Idleman indicates that some courts contlated these concerns. See Idleman, supra
4, at 254-55 (stating that, if implicatioJis of jurisdictional determination were
"
related concerns, such as the sepilration ofpowers and federalism, would likely be rniIlLimizeO'

co
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llether the jurisdictional decision would likely affect large ~umbers of liti-

ants. In the context of appellate jurisdiction, this prong would "mean" that,
Other things being equal, an appellate court would tend to hypothetically
sume (rather than decide an issue ot) appellate jurisdiction ifdecision ofthe
e would likely affect large numbers of appellants or appellees, more than
hen the issue would likely affect few, if any, parties beyond those presently
efore the court.
(3) Other Institutional Values

Exercises of hypothetical jurisdiction may (a) contribute to reasoned
dgments as to the circumstances in which federal courts may reserve diffit questions ofjurisdiction in favor of deciding more easily resolved merits
sues;226 (b) avoid disagreements with coordinate federal courts onjurisdic'()nal issues, thereby avoiding inconsistency; (c) lead to the resolution of
bstantive law issues; and (d) conserve federal judicial resources by dismissclaims on grounds that would prevent the parties from later re-asserting
ose claims. 227 These values can be served by hypothetical appellate jurisdicon, as well as by hypothetical district court jurisdiction.
When it is unclear how a jurisdictional question should be resolved, an.
or in concluding that jurisdictionexists or anarguendo assumptionthatjurisction exists seems less serious than a clearly erroneous assertion ofjurisdicC?n.. For that reason, at least arguably, competing policies such as those favorg the avoidance of constitutional questions, conserving judicial energy, and
.••••• proving judicial administration in other respe$, mightjustify the assertion
{hypothetical appellate jurisdiction in cases involving difficult jurisdictional
lIes as to which there are substantial grounds. for difference ofopinion. 228
226. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, nO-II (1998) (O'Connor, J.,
ncurring) (opining that Court's opinion should not be read to exhaustively list circumstances
which federal courts may exercise judgm,ent in reserving difficult questions of jurisdiction
encase could be resolved on merits in favor of same party). See generally Idleman, supra
~?te4,at 312-13 (noting that courts' use of hypothetical jurisdiction can preserve institutional
'VIl1ues of federal courts - "exercise of judgment, respect for coordinate federal courts, and
lllaintenance ofthe Article mjudiciary as a forum formeritorious suits")~ Kathleen M. Sullivan,
The Supreme Court, 1991 Term. - Foreword: The Justices o/Rules and Standards, 106 HARv.
79-80 n.395 (1992) (discussing reasoned judgment, described as capacity which,
~~tradition, courts always have exercised, and reasoned elaboration, described as judicial
Uleth0d that requires judges to investigate and to creatively extend purposes oflegislature).
227. These grounds would include failure to state claims upon which relief can be granted,
pllrticular parties' lack of standing to sue, and the like. See Idleman, supra note 4, at 313
(Iloting that Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Steel Co. sought to avoid limiting federal courts'
~seofreasoned judgment in reserving difficult issues ofjllIisd,iction).
228. See Comment, supra note 34, at 727, 729-32 (listirig advantages in judicial economies
gained by courts' use of hypothetical jurisdiction, especially in cases where jurisdictional issues
could go either way).

¥·.REv.24,
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It also may be that appellate courts, by virtue oftheir place in the judicial
system, should have greater discretionthan district courts to exercise hypothet..
ical jurisdiction. Although intennediate courts ofappeals (unlike the Supreme
Court) do not have predOlllitUmtly discretionary dockets, it can be argued that
they too should have some ability to postpone d~ion ofcertain issues, while
those issues percolate through other courts or while other events transpire that
facilitate resolution. Exercise of hypothetical jurisdiction could be a use:fu1
tool for allowing the resolution of jurisdictional issues to be postponed to a
time when a court can better resolve the issues,229 a tool that augments the
jurisdictional discretion that appellate courts have under such statutes and rules
as 28U.S.C. § 1292(b) and Rule 23(f), and onpetitions for extraordinary writs.
(4) Avoidance ofUnfairness

The requirement that the merits be resolved against the party see
appellate jurisdiction also is essential to the exercise ofhypothetical appella
jurisdiction. Ifa court dismisses for lack ofappellate jurisdiction, the decisio
below stands. Thus, a court can assume hypothetical appellate jurisdicti
only if its decision on the merits has the same consequence as a dismissal fOT
lack of appellate jurisdiction would have; that i~, only if its decision on the.
merits goes against the appellant, who seeks appellate jurisdiction, and favors.
the challenger of appellate jurisdiction, who would be the winner below and.
the appellee. The effect of either a dismissal for lack of appellate jurisdicti0Il
. or a decision on the merits must be the equivalent of an affirmance. 230
This "fits" with the theory that, since the litigation's outcome is the sam7
whether the route to it is jurisdictional or on the merits, there is nounfaimes.s
to the parties in slighting the ordinary sequence of decision. In the context ()
229. See also id. at 732, 744 n.172 (arguing that "[c]onsiderations ofjudicial economy ...
justifY allowing the range of discretion to increase with the degree of authority attaching to th~
court's judgment").
'
230. For example, assume that plaintiff P wins in the trial court, defendant D appeals, and.
P challenges appellate jurisdiction. A successful challenge to jurisdiction would lead to djS..
missal ofthe appeal and maintenance of P's win at trial. The appeals court can assume hYIK'7
thetical appellate jurisdiction only if its decision on the merits is in favor of P and against
appellant D, who seeks appellate jurisdiction. Similarly, assume that defendant D wins in the
trial court, plaintiff P appeals, and D challenges appellate jurisdiction. A successful cha1lengt:
to jurisdiction would lead to dismissal of the appeal and maintenance of D's win at trial. Th~
appeals cOurt can assume hypothetical appellate jurisdiction only if its decision on the merits
is in favor ofD and against appellant P, who seeks appellate jurisdiction.
As others have noted, by contrast, when one's focus is district court jurisdiction, it is no
true that the consequence is the same whether a court roles for a party on jurisdictional grounds.
or on the merits, for res judicata effects will attach only to a decision on the merits. Moreover,
"[P]rivate agreements among the psrties or between the parties and their attorneys or indem7
nitors may also be affected by the form of the court's decision." Clow v. United States Dep't
of Housing & Urban Dev., 948 F.2d 614, 627 n.4 (9th Cir. 1991) (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting).
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othetical district court jurisdiction, th~re may be unfairness if a party
rs an adverse judgment onthe merits -which presumptively will have res
'cata effect - when the judgment-rendering court lacked jurisdiction to
the judgment and when an appeals court that did not hypothetically
e the district court's jurisdiction would have vacated the judgment and
ly dismissed the case without prejudice. 231 This argument ofunfaimess
pplicable in the context ofhypothetical appellate jurisdiction, however.
long as the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the case and
onaljurisdiction over the parties, its final judgment on the merits, ifany,
yalid,. and is entitled to res judicata effects, regardless of whether the
pelIate court correctly assumed jurisdiction over the appeal and affinn.ed the
gment. 232 It is not clear that the losing party is treated unfairly by the use
hypothetical appellate jurisdiction except in the sense that one might
sely say it is "unfair" for an appellate coint to assert jurisdiction over an
peal, and render a decision on the merits against a party, when it lacks juris·ttion to hear the appeal. Other litigants, who find themselves faced with an
erse precedent that the appeals court really did not have jurisdiction to
~te, seem to have a stronger argument of "unfairness" than the losing party
the case giving rise to the precedent. 233
31. See Idleman, supra note 4, at 253-54 (opining that adverse judgment, with prejudice,
unjust when courts lack jurisdiction, and that similarly-situated litigants might receive
. dictional diamissal from different panel).
232. See U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall P'ship, 513 U.S. 18,22 (1994)
plying binding effect ofjudgments that are not reviewed on appeal in explaining that vacatur
lears the path for future relitigation ofthe issues between the parties" (quoting United States
Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36,40 (1950))). See generally JACK H. F'RmDENTHAL ET AL.,
PROCEDURE § 14.7, at 666 (3d ed. 1999) (expounding upon requirements for application
judicata that there be valid, fmal,judgment on merits, and noting that "[m]ost courts treat
judgment as fmal ... if it conclusively disposesqfthe lawsuit in the rendering court, notwithding that an appeal has been taken or the time to appeals has not expired."); supra note 230
laining assertion that appellate court would be affirming trial court's judgment).
233.
The litigants would not have any due process or similar argument because they would
bound by the judgment of the trial court, which had jurisdiction, and there is no constrtu'ollalright to an appeal. See, e.g., Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) (observing in
elony case that there is no "constitutional right to appeal"); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S.
51,656 (1977) (stating that it is well established that there is no constitutional right to appeal
()fconviction); Hill v. Hawes, 320 U.S. 520, 525 (1944) (Stone, C.J., dissenting) (noting that
federal courts there is no right to appeal save as it is granted by Congress or by rule of court
llth0rized by Congress); United States v. Anglin, 215 F:3d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 2000)
(reitemting that there is no constitutional right to appeal, and that would-be appellant must find
rightto appeal in applicable statute). If the appeals court truly lacked jurisdiction, however, its
decision on the merits might be subject to collateral attack. See Mark A Hall, The Jurisdic~onal Nature o/the Time to Appeal, 21 GA. L. REv. 399,404 n.24 (1986) (arguing that if
IJntimeliness of appeal were truly jurisdictional defect, decision on merits of untimely appeal
"Would be forever subject to collateral attack). Ordinarily, a party that had an opportunity to
litigate subject matter jurisdiction may not reopen that issue in a collateral attack. See Ins. Corp.
ofIr., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 n.9 (1982) (noting that
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2. The Practice
Although exercised far less often than hypothetical jurisdiction conceIll
ing matters going to district court jurisdiction, hypothetical appellate jurisdi
tion had been exercised by the intennediate federal appellate courts. They
done all ofthe following:
.
- bypassed the jurisdictional question whether appellant had timely
its notice of appeal, because of a factual dispute as to when appellant's
59(e) motion was served;234
- assumed, without deciding, that a notice of appeal adequately
the court to which the appeal was being taken, as required by Federal Rulec)
Appellate Procedure 3(C);23S
- asserted hypothetical appellate jurisdiction over the appeal of a .
inal sentence, assuming, without deciding, that a plea agreement did not
the defendant's appeal, where the agreement contained a waiver of the .
to appeal a sentence within an indicated range but the district court had
the defendant that he could appeal the sentence if he thought there was aJI
thing illegal about it;236
- asserted hypothetical appellate jurisdiction over particular decisi
by the Interstate Commerce Commission where the decision of a segment
a case as to which appellate jurisdiction was clear fully determined the 0
principles of res judicata apply to jurisdictional issues); see also Comment, Hypothetical.li
diction andlnterjurisdictional Preclusion: A "Comity" o/E"ors, 28 PEPP. L. REv. 75,85,
100 (2000) (urging that state courts should be free to relitigate non-merits issues that fede
courts have decided when exercising hypothetical jurisdiction).
234. Forster v. County of Santa Barbara, 896 F.2d 1146, 1147 n.2 (9th Cir. 1990).T
reference is to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See also Karscsonyi
United States, No. 97-1220, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 15107, at $4 (2d Cir. June 10, 19~
(concluding that court did not have to decide whether particular motion was civil or crimi
and how long appellant had to appeal under Federal Rules ofAppellate Procedure 4(aX1)
(b), where appeal was meritless in any event); United States v. Shecldey, No. 96-1786,1~
U.S. App. LEXIS 32024 (2d Cir. Nov. 10, 1997) (same); United States v. Connell, 6 F.3d
29 n.3 (lst Cir. 1993) (questioning whether district court had jurisdiction to entertain m'
for reconsideration long after appeal period had expired, but foregoing issue where appeal
easily resolved in favor ofparty challenging appellate jurisdiction).
235. See Brooks v. Toyotorni Co., Ltd, 86 F.3d 582,583,586-87 (6th Cir. 1996) (ac
ing appeal and dismissing appeal on merits, thus allowing district court judgment to stand).
Brooks court explicitly chose to pretermit the jurisdictional issue because it was stro
inclined to hold that appellate jurisdiction existed - where defects in the notice of appeal
not mislead or prejudice appellees and a proper notice would not have told them anything
could not readily have inferred - but it was concemed that such a decision would Conflict
a holding of the Sixth Circuit sitting en bane. ld. Brooks's vitality, in light of Steel Co.,
subsequently questioned in United States v. Webb, 157 F.3d 451, 453 (6th Cir. 1998). See
Caribbean Transp. Sys., Inc. v. Autoridad de las Navieras, 901 F.2d 196, 197 (1st Cir.l
(assuming that court had jurisdiction despite errors in notices of appeal and finding
arguments to be without merit).
236. United States v. Shepard, 207 F.3d 455, 456 n.2 (8th Cir. 2000).
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me ofthe segment (composed of other ICC decisions) as to which appellate
U:risdiction was disputed;237
___ asserted hypothetical appellate jurisdiction over the grant of a motion
r summary judgment and indeed over an entire case, despite the lack of a
ule 54(b) certification, where the claims that technically were not yet reolved would be governed by law ofthe case on pure questions oflaw;238
- asserted hypothetical appellate jurisdiction over the appeal ofan order
quiring a witness to appear :ih response to an IRS summons, where the
pellee conceded error as to the matter appealed;239
- asserted hypothetical appellate jurisdiction over orders ofthe Federal
ommunications Commission, while bypassing issues of prudential stand.240
- asserted hypothetical appellate jurisdiction over district court orders,
out resolving whether the rulings were immediately appealable under
e collateral order doctrine or otherwise as final decisions under 28 U.S.C.
§1291;241
237. Burlington N. R.R. v. ICC, 985 F.2d 589, 592-94 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (invoking
ypothetical jurisdiction doctrine rather than resolving questions of appellate jurisdiction under
8U.S.C. § 1336(b) and 49 U.S.C. § 10501(d), where resolving merits-issues required no extra
nditure of judicial resources because court had necessarily resolved those same issues in
portion of case oYer which court plainly had jurisdiction); see also Kaiser v. Armstrong World
Indus., Inc., 872 F.2d 512, 513-14 (1st Cir. 1989) (assuming, without deciding, that court had
jurisdiction over plaintiffs whose names did not appear in notice of appeal where court held that
Jlamed appellant's action was time-barred and no argument was raised below that other plain. s' claims stood on any different footing with respect to statute ofIimitations); S. Pac. Transp.
Co.v. Usery, 539 F.2d 386,389 n.1 (5th Cir. 1976), (concluding that where finding that court
lacked jurisdiction would produce same result as decision on merits and merits already were
before court in other cases, court would not reach question whether order appealed from was
reviewable).
238. Federal Ins. Co. v. Scarsella Bros., 931 F.2d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 1991).
239. United States v. Troescher, 99 F.3d 933, 934 & n.1 (9th Cir. 1996).
240. Busse Broad. Corp. v. FCC, 87 F.3d 1456, 1462-63 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The FCC
argued, inter alia, that the appellants lacked prudential standing to challenge its waiver of its
"duopoly rule." [d. at 1462. Although the court was unsure whether a situation had to meet all
the usual requirements of hypothetical jurisdiction doctrine before the court could bypass a
prudential standing issue, the court concluded that the case met all the usual criteria [of the
merits being clearly against the party seeking jurisdiction, the jurisdictional question being
exceptionally difficult and far-reaching, and inadequacies in the briefing making the case a poor
vehicle for deciding the jurisdictional question]. [d. In addition, the parties who had lost below
had filed a notice of appeal under 47 U.S.C. § 402(b)(6) and a petition for review under 47
U.S.C. § 402(a). [d. at 1460. On the ground that its analysis would be the same either way, the
court also did not decide which provision governed. [d.
241. Crocco v. Xerox Corp., 137 F.3d 105, 108-09 (2d Cir. 1998). The ruling in question
remanded a claim to an ERISA plan administrator. The circuits are split on whether such orders
are fmal appea1able orders. See id. Compare Perlman v. Swiss Bank Corp. Comprehensive
Disability Protection Plan, 195 F.3d 975, 978-80 (7thCir. 1999) (holding remands to ERISA
plan administrators to be fmal appealable decisions), and Snow v. Standard Ins. Co., 87 F.3d
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- asserted ·hypothetical appellate jurisdiction in the face of unresolved
questions ofappealability under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(I), as well as unresolved
questions concerning the standing to appeal ofthe appellants and concerning
whether some appellants had waived their right to appeal;242
327,332 (9th Cir. 1986) (same), with Petralia v. AT&T Global Info. Solutions Co., 114 F.34
352,354 (1st Cir. 1997) (concluding that remands to ERISA plan administrators are not "fmal
judgment[s]"), and Shannon v. Jack Eckerd Corp., 55 F.3d 561, 563-64 (11th Cir. 1995)
(holding that such remands are not final appealable decisions). The Second Circuit in Crocco
also reversed the district court's determination that Xerox, plaintiff's employer, was a proper
party, without discussion of whether the court had pendent appellate jurisdiction over .thlIt
ruling. Crocco, 137 F.3d at 109. The court noted that the remedy plaintiff sought, theawarel
ofbenefits, was available without Xerox's presence as a party. [d.; see also SEC v. Am. Capital
Inv., Inc., 98 F.3d 1133, 1136, 1139-42 (9th Cir. 1996) (concluding that where court had.
jurisdiction over appeal of one order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291(aXl), court properly exercis4:<l
hypothetical appellate jurisdiction over appeals of additional orders whose status as fin
appealable orders was unclear, appeal ofwhich may have been rendered moot, and as to one 0
which it was unclear whether appeal had been timely); United States v. Stoller, 78 F.3d 710
715 (Ist Cir. 1996) (asserting jurisdiction over appeal from denial of motion to dismiss counts
of indictment On double jeopardy/multiple punishment grounds where immediate appealabir
of order was unclear but merits would be resolved in favor of party challenging jurisdiction);
Jeffers v. Heavrin, 10 F.3d 380, 382 n.2 (6th Cir. 1993) (addressing merits of interlocuto
appeal of denial of qualified immunity, despite contention that there were unresolved pend~
state claims, to serve judicial economy and because district court may have thought that
ruling disposed of aU claims); R.I. Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Howard Communications Corp.;
980 F.2d 823, 829 (1st Cir. 1992) (concluding that court did not need to resolve whether 10
court's finding of civil contempt was appealable because fine and sanctions were warranted);
FDIC v. Caledonia Inv. Corp., 862 F.2d 378, 380-81 (Ist Cir. 1988) (affirming on merits aft
assuming that appellate jurisdiction would exist despite absence of Federal Rule of Ci
Procedure Rule 54(b) certification where judgment was rendered that disposed of fewer
all claims in consolidated action but all claims in component thereot); Locals 2222, 2320-232
mEW v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 628 F.2d 644, 646-47 (Ist Cir. 1980) (assu •.
without deciding, that order remanding to arbitration was appealable where jurisdictional.qu
tion was "close" and overlapped with central substantive issue on merits and where distri
court's decision would be sustained whether appellate jurisdiction was exercised or not); Mas.
chusetts v. Hale, 618 F.2d 143, 145 n.3 (1st Cir. 1980) (choosing not to resolve close issue
appealability concerning whether interlocutory order in question arose in proceeding in b
ruptcy or in controversy arising in bankruptcy proceeding where merits compelled a.tIirmafi
and court's views on merits might provide useful guidance in similar situations); Brick v. C
Int'!, Inc., 547 F.2d 185, 186-87 & n,S (2d Cir. 1976) (affuming denial ofclass certification
denial of re-transfer of case, based on arguendo assumption that appeal was allowable un
"death knell" d o c t r i n e ) . ·
.
242. See Isby v. Bayh, 75 F.3d 1191, 1195-97 (7th Cir. 1996) (exercising hypoth •.
appellate jurisdiction and affirming class action settlement in face of issues as to whether·.
proval of settlement fell within 28 U.S.C. § 1292(aXl), as to whether objectors lacked stand
to appeal because they had failed to intervene, had been denied intervention or for oth
reasons, and as to whether SOme of objectors had waived .their right to appeal); see also M8J'
grafv. Storage Tech. Corp., No. 97-1166, 1998 U.S. App. LEXlS 1237, at *6-7 (10th Cir.J
28, 1998) (assuming appellant's standing to appeal in favor of resolving merits, which we.
much easier to resolve); New York by Vacco v. ReeOOk Int'!, Ltd., 96 F.3d 44, 48-49 (2d ~
1996) (concluding first that non-intervening beneficiaries ofparens patriae suit had no stand
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- asserted hypothetical jurisdiction rather than resolve whether an issue
could properly be heard under the doctrine ofpendent appellate jurisdiction;243
- assumed jurisdiction arguendo where it had been argued that the
'a~peal should be dismissed as moot;244
-'
- declined to decide whether appellate jurisdiction was precluded by 28
U.S.C. § 1447(d), where the challenger ofjurisdiction easily prevailed on other
grounds;245
--- asserted hypothetical appellate jurisdiction to review a final order
excluding an alien from the United States pursuant to the court's habeas jurisdiction, despite uncertainty as to whether § 440 (a) of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act affected that jurisdiction, when the court had
determined that petitioner was not entitled to reliefin any event;246
- asserted hypothetical appellate jurisdiction over an appeal from a
judgment of conviction and sentence, despite the absence of a certificate of
appealabilitf47 and without addressing the appellate court's jurisdiction to
to. appeal approval- of settlement,. then reviewing merits of their claims in view of circuit split
on standing to appeal of absent class members and citing other cases in which courts had
liSSumed standing arguendo or purported to make alternative holdings on merits); United States
v. Saccoccia, 58 F.3d 754, 767 n.6 (lst Cir. 1995) (entertaining criminal defendant's argument
that his trial and conviction transgressed principle of specialty, among other reasons because
it was easier to dismiss his arguments on merits than to resolve dispute over whether criminal
defendant has standing to raise such violation); In re Villa Marina Yacht Harbor, Inc., 984 F.2d
546, 548 n.2 (lst Cir. 1993) (bypassing question whether district court order was appealable
injunction, to resolve merits).
243. - See Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Berg, 61 F.3d 101, 104-05 (lst Cir. 1995) (concluding
that regardless of whether refusal to allow set-offwas appealable in conjunction with appeal of
confirmation of arbitration award or otherwise, refusal was not legal error so jurisdictional issue
did not need to be decided).
244. See RNR Enters., Inc. v. SEC, 122 F.3d 93, 96 (2d Cir. 1997) (concluding that
interests in judicial efficiency and restraint justified arguendo assumption of jurisdiction and
consideration of merits where jurisdictional issue as to mootness was not previously decided
and was difficult, issue was of constitutional stature, oral argument had indicated that further
evidence might be necessary, the legal argumentation provided was incomplete, issue was "farreaching" because it concerned investigative powers of administrative agency, and merits clearly
favored party challenging appellate jurisdiction).
245. Menorah Ins. Co. v. INX Reinsurance Corp., 72 F.3d 218, 223 n.9 (lst Cir. 1995).
246. Hernandez-Rodriguez v. Pasquarell, 118 F.3d 1034, 1045-47 (5th Cir. 1997); see also
Wong v. Dchert, 998 F.2d 661, 662-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (assuming, without deciding, jurisdiction
over appeal oforder granting summary judgment against plaintiff in his action to enjoin INS and
others from deporting him, when that jurisdictional question was far more difficult than issue
onmerits).
247. The certificate is required by 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(I)(B) (1994), in some circumstances. See Mackeyv. Dutton, 217 F.3d 399 (6th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1087 .
(2001) (stating that, when habeas petitioner seeks to appeal dismissal ofhis petition after effec- tive date of Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), right to appeal is governed by certificate of appealability requirements established by that statute). But see Walker
V. O'Brien, 216 F.3d 626 (7th Cir.), cut. denied, Hanks v. Pinfrock, 121 S. Ct. 606 (2000)
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grant or deny such a certificate in the absence of a district court ruling
whether to grant one;248 and .

- bypassed various other issues, characterized by the courts as jurisdic
tiona!, in favor of deciding cases more easily on merits grounds. 249
I will not undertake here to assess whether each one ofthese assertions.o
hypothetical jurisdiction was justified under the specific, and somewha
varying, conditions that the various courts ofappeals had established as neces
sary for an exercise ofhypothetical jurisdiction. I am not so much conce
here with how well the courts respected the doctrinal requirements that
themselves framed as I am with whether and when hypothetical jurisdiction'
theoretically defensible in the context of appellate jurisdiction and with ho
much in tension the doctrine, in that context, is with the Supreme Court'
denunciation of hypothetical jurisdiction in Steel Co. In a later Part, I .
indicate how I believethese exercises ofhypothetical appellatejurisdiction
against those standards. First, however, I want to explore what, ifany, help
perspective can be shed by other doctrines concerning appellate jurisdiction.
(concluding that state prisoners' habeas petitions ·challenging constitutionality of prison disci
linary proceedings as to fact or durstion of confinement are not subject to AEDPA's certifi
ofappealability requirement).
248. United states v. Williams, 158 F.3d 736, 740-42 & n.4 (3d Cir. 1998). In this c:asc;
decided after Steel Co., the court reasoned that, if it determined not to issue the certifi
because the appellant failed to demonstrate his entitlement to one, it would find that the co
lacked jurisdiction to proceed. /d. Ifit were to find itselfpowerless to issue the certificate, tb.
same consequence would follow. [d. It said, "In these circumstances, ... Steel Co. does no
preclude us from treating WilIiams~s notice ofappeal as a request for a certificate ofappealabili
and then denying it on the merits without first determining that Williams was not obliged initiaU
to apply to the district court." [d. at 742. While the court recognized that it might have b •••.•.•
appropriate to dismiss the appeal or remand to the district court for it to consider whether to gran
a certificate of appealability, it chose not to do so because appellant's attorney acted in go"
faith, the result reached on the merits was straightforward, and the court did not want to protnu:
the proceedings. [d. at 742 n.4; see also United States v. Eyer, 113 F.3d 470, 474-75 (3dCir
1997) (bypassing problems with certificate of appealability that could be considered jUfisdi
tional, on basis of hypothetical jurisdiction doctrine, in part because order appealed from w
undoubtedly final and only statutory provisions relating to such certificates cast doubt on court'.
jurisdiction).
I intend the list in text, supra, at notes 234-49 to be illustrative, not exhaustive.
249. See United States v. Pion, 25 F.3d 18,22 n.3 (1st Cir. 1994) (bypassing questio
characterized by court as jurisdictional, whether criminal defendant's constitutional challenges
to jury composition are barred ifnotmade in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1867(e) (1994), whe:n:
jurisdictional question was difficult, parties had not raised it, and appellant would lose argument
on merits); Switlik v. Hardwicke Co., 651 F.2d 852, 856 n.3 (3d Cir. 1981) (in action to enjoin.
enforcement of state court judgment as violating plaintiff's First Amendment rights, d .,
to consider whether plaintiff had alleged state action sufficient to establish federal claim, sta~
that, to extent presence of state action is jurisdictional requirement, case was appropriate for
assuming jurisdiction arguendo because state action issue was highly complex, its resolution
posed high risk ofbeing constitutionally erroneous, and judgment could be affirmed under wellsettled principles ofres judicata and collateral estoppel).
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3. The Perspective Shedby Other Doctrines Concerning
Appel/ate Jurisdiction
In the cases described above, the courts acted upon assumed or hypotheappellate jurisdiction. In other cases, appellate courts found other ways
'UstifY their exercise of appellate jurisdiction.

a.

Characterizing Potential Barriers as Non-Jurisdictional

Appellate courts sometimes have found that they had authority to address

l"its issues after characterizing as non-jurisdictional matters that otherwise

'uld have precluded the courts' consideration of those issues or cases. 250
i'example, courts of appeals generally hold that they have jurisdiction to
the merits ofissues and ofarguments not considered by the diStrict court
elfirst raised on appeal. Generally, they will not reach such matters, but the
,u:rts· categorize the governing principle as a rule of practice that is subject
exceptions and leaves them discretion. 251 The Supreme Court has done
50. See Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 865 & nJ (6th Cir. 2000) (indicating that
'ct court certification pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(aX3) that appeal could not be taken in
d faith is not jurisdictional bar to appeal); United States v. Guzman-Landeros, 207 F.3d
~4, 1035 (8th Cir. 2000) (deteJDlining that failure to advise appellant of his right, under
aty, to contact his consul was not jurisdictional defect and was therefore foreclosed by his
ofguilty to being alien found in United States after deportation).
251. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106,120-21 (1976) (stating that what questions may
addressed for first time on appeal is left primarily to discretion of courts of appeals and
ognizing that there are circumstances in which federal appellate court is justified in resolving
.11e not passed upon below, such as when proper resolution is beyond doubt or where injustice
er\Vise might result); HOJDlel v. Helvering; 312 U.S. 552,556-59 (1941) (stating that rule
f appellate court ordinarily will not consider issues not raised below is essential so that
'gants may not be surprised on appeal by final decision of issues upon which they had no
portunityto present evidence or legal argument, but adding that "[a] rigid and undeviating ...
'ce under which courts of review would invariably ... decline to consider all questions
.ch had not previously been specifically urged would be out of haJDlony with ... the rules
fundamental justice"); United States v. Torres-Rosa, 209 F.3d 4, 7 (1 st Cir. 2000) (stating
1, "'absent the most extraordinary circumstances, legal theories not raised squarely in the
oWer court cannot be broached for the first time on appeal,'" and that this principle applies with
undiluted force in criminal cases (quoting Teamsters Union. Local No. 59 v. Superline Transp.
Co., 953 F.2d 17,21 (1st Cir. 1992»; Jolly v. Knudsen, 205 F.3d 1094, 1097 (8th Cir. 2000)
(stating principles recited in text); Gardenhire v. Schubert, 205 F.3d 303, 319 (6th Cir. 2000)
(applying principle that appellate courts are free to decline consideration of arguments made for
first time on appeal); Pacheco de P~ v. AT&T Co., 139 F.3d 1368, 1372 n.5(llth Cir. 1998)
(exercising discretion to reach theories to support district court's jurisdiction, argued and
supported by evidence but not decided below, where record was more than adequate, and
judicial economy and fairness favored disposition of all asserted grounds); Dehran v. United
States, 117 F.3d 495, 502-03 (11th Cir. 1997) (stating these principles; noting underlying
policies, including that of avoiding prejudice to parties and serving judicial economy, and that
little gain in judicial economy is achieved by refusing to consider pure legal arguments, as to
which review is de novo; observing that court is justified in exercising its discretion to hear
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something similar in repeatedly declining to decide whether the "not pressed
or passed upon below" rule252 is jurisdictional or merely prudential. 253 The
Court usually says that it need not decide the character of the rule because,
even assuming that the rule is merely prudential, the circumstances pres
justify no exception. 254 By leaving the issue unresolved, however, the Co
has left the door open to characterizing the rule as non-jurisdictional
entertaining unpressed, unaddressed issues if and when appropriate circum
stances are presented. 255
A second example: Federal Rule ofAppellate Procedure 4(a)(3) provide
for the filing of a cross';appeal within fourteen days after the date when th
first notice of appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed
Rule 4(a), whichever ends later. 2S6 Courts of appeals penni! appellees.vvh
newly raised argument where interest of substantial justice is at stake; and reaching issue p
sented for fJrst time on appeal where proper resolution was beyond doubt). See generally No
Pushing Aside the General Rule in Order to Raise New Issues on Appeal, 64 IND. L.J. 98
1005-13 (1989) (examining general rule and principal exceptions, and proposing rule statin.
circumstances under which new issue should be heard on appeal).
252. This rule is that a federal claim must have been addressed by, or at least properl
presented to, a state court before the Supreme Court will entertain it.
253. See, e.g., Adams v. Robertson, 520 U.S. 83,90 (1997) (concluding as described
text at notes 249-50); Yee v. City ofEscondido, 503 U.S. 519, 533 (1992)(same); .Bankers Li
& Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71,79 (1988) (same; noting that "[e]arly opinions seel11
to treat the requirement as jurisdictional, whereas more recent cases clearly view the rule
merely a prudential restriction"); Dlinois v. Oates, 462 U.S. 213,217-24 (1983) (discussing"
pressed or passed upon below" rule); see also Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 539 (19
(describing Court as having found itself without jurisdiction to decide issue in Sochor
Florida, 504 U.S. 527, 533-34 (1992), because defendant had failed to preserve his obj •.•.
in state courts, and his failure was adequate and independent ground for state court's ruling).
The Court has concluded that in cases arising in federal courts the "not pressed or
upon below" rule is only prudential. See Carlson v: Green, 446 U.S. 14, 17 n2 (1980) (stati
that, while Court normally does not decide issues that were not presented below, it may d()1l()
The Court chose to entertain such a question when respondent did not object, the issue
squarely presented and fully briefed, and was an important, recurring issue, so that intere
judicial administration would be served by addressing it. Id.
254. Adams v. Robertson, 520 U.S. 83,90-92(1997); Yee v. City ofEscondido, 503 U.
519,533 (1992); Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 79-80 (1988); D1inois
Gates, 462 U.S. 213,221-24 (1983).
255. So long as the Court is declining to hear issues, it is not exercising hypothetical a
late jurisdiction over them. If and when it should desire to hear an unpressed, unaddress
issue, it would seem under Steel Co. that the Court would have to address whether it has j>'
diction to do so. Of course, if it then were to decide that the practice of eschewing such isSIJ
is merely prudential, it could hear the issue without violating Steel Co. Only if the Court
to assume without deciding that it had jurisdiction to hear an unpressed, unaddressed issue
did so, would it be exercising hypothetical appellate jurisdiction. But the point in the text is
.
courts have many ways of getting to the merits, one of which is to characterize as
tional a matter that otherwise would preclude their consideration ofan issue or case.
256. FED. RMP. P. 4(aX3).

pass

I
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enot cross-appealed to advance alternative grounds to affirm the judgment
w; to that end, the courts often say that appellees may support the judgthrough any matter appearing in the record, and may attack the lower
's reasoning or emphasize matters overlooked by the·tria1 COurt. 257 By
ast, the courts generally declare that "[a]n appellee who fails to file a
s-appeal cannot attack a judgment with a view towards enlarging his own
1811 and receiving more extensive relief than he received from the trial
••258 However, several courts of appeals have held that the filing of a
·ce. of cross-appeal is nata jurisdictional prerequisite and, in certain
:urrlStanlces, may be waived by the court of appeals so as to enable it to
issues, raised by the appellee, that otherwise would be beyond the scope
57. See EI Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473,479 (1999) (stating this prinleas law and citing both United States v. American Railway Express Co., 265 U.S. 425, 435
24), and Union Tool Co. v. Wilson, 259 U.S. 107, 111 (1922), as authority for it); Resolution
SiCorp. v. Fid. & Deposit Co~, 205 F.3d 615, 635 (3d Cir. 2000) (reciting principles stated
); see also Froebel v. Meyer, 217 F.3d 928, 933 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that "[n]o crossis necessary unless the appellee wants the ·court of appeals to alter the judgment, not just
ning, ofthe district court"); McLaughlin v. Bd. ofTrustees, 215 F.3d 1168, 1172 (10th
2000) (explaining that court ofappeals may aflinn on any ground supported by record).
8.. Spurlock v. FBI, 69 F.3d 1010, 1018 (9th Cir. 1995); see Dodd v. Hood River
.1JD.ty, 59 F.3d 852, 864 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating similarly that such appellee may not obtain
Ifiappellate court relief more extensive than it received from district court); see also El Paso
(ural Gas Co., 526 U.S. at 479 (stating this principle as law, and citing as authority for it
qrley Construction Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 300 U.S. 185, 191 (1937);Am. J9.'. Express
.,265 U.S. at 435; Union Tool Co., 259 U.S. at 111; andMVonough v. Dannery,3 U.S. (3
1.)188,198 (1796».
A number of courts of appeals hold that the filing of a cross-appeal is a jurisdictional
requisite to the court's entertainment of arguments that seek enlargement ofappellee's rights
remedies. See, e.g., Johnson v. Teamsters Local 559, 102 F.3d 21, 28-9 (1st Cir. 1996)
issing late-filed cross-appeal for lack of jurisdiction after implying from broad language
orres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312 (1988), concerning mandatory nature of
'.g rules in Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 3 and 4, that cross-appeal time limit in
eral Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(aX3) is mandatory and jurisdictional); EF Operating
tp.v. Am. Bldgs., 993 F.2d 1046, 1049 n.1 (3d Cir. 1993) (interpreting recent Supreme
urtJurisprudence as "seriously undennin[ing) the notion that the filing of a cross-appeal is
rule of practice," and concluding that court had no jurisdiction to review denial of motion to
Iniss for lack ofpersonal jurisdiction, absent cross-appeal, when appellant had appealed grant
summary judgment to appellee); Francis v. Clark Equip. Co., 993 F.2d 545, 552-53 (6th Cir.
~3)(dismissing contentions that district court erred in denying motion for JNOV, based on
principle that filing of notice of cross-appeal is jurisdictional when appellee wishes to attack
}lllI't.of final judgment to enlarge his rights or reduce those of his adversary); Rollins v. Metro.
J..ifeIns. Co., 912 F.2d 911, 917 (7th Cir. 1990) (refusing to consider. for lack of appellate
'~sdiction, appellee's attack on imposition of constructive trust, but in dicta clearly indicating
its view that district court did not err); Savage v. Cache Valley Dairy Assoc., 737 F.2d 887, 889
(10th Cir. 1984) (holding that filing of timely cross-appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional, and
dismissing late-filed cross appeal); see also Langnes v. Green. 282 U.S. 531,538 (1931) (stating
in. dicta that Court's decisions do not deny power ofeourt to review objections by respondent,
~though he has not applied for certiorari, ifCourt finds good reason to do so).
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of the court's jurisdiction.2s9 As explained by the Court of Appeals for
Ninth Circuit, liThe rationale ... lies in the notion that the filing ofthe ini
notice of appeal invokes the court's jurisdiction over the parties and the cas
and that, once this jurisdiction has been invoked, the court has the autho .
to fully adjudicate the appeal." 260 In deciding whether to allow a cross-app
notice ofwhich has not been properly filed, courts consider factors such
the interrelatedness ofthe issues on appeal and cross-appeal (particularly
whethertheyinvolvethe sameparties),whether anotice ofcross-appealwas
merely late or not filed at all, whether the ... district court opinion should
have putthe appellee onnotice ofthe need to file a cross-appeal. the extent
of any prejudice to the appellant caused by the absence ofnotice, ... in a
case involving the certification of an interlocUtory appeal- whether the
scope ofthe issues that could be considered on appeal was clear[,]261
any prejudice to the parties ifthe court refuses to entertain the matters
without formal cross-appeal, and the interest injudicial efficiency.
The Supreme Court in 1999 avoided deciding the status ofthe prohibitio
onmodifying judgments in favor ofa non-appealing party as either an unquali
fied limit on the power of appellate courts or a rule of practice subject to ex.
ceptions. It said that, even ifthat prohibition is not strictly jurisdictional,
comity considerations that had been invoked by the court ofappeals as reas
to make an exception to the rule were inadequate to defeat the instituti.
interests in fair notice and repose that the rule advances. 262 While explicitl
declining to decide whether the rule is jurisdictional and acknowledging Co
statements that might be taken to suggest the possibility of exceptions, th
Court intimated thatitwould decide that the prohibitionwas absolute, ifforced
to a decision. .It did this by characterizing the prohibition as "firmly en"
trenched, II . and by observing that, "in more than two centuries of repeatedl
259. Accord Texport Oil Co. v. MIV Amolyntos, 11 F.3d 361, 366 (2d Cir. 19.93) (stati
principle recited in text and exercising discretion to disregard lateness of cross-appeal's filin
where appeal and cross-appeal were closely interrelated, involved same parties, notice was la
by only one business day, and cross-appellee was neither surprised nor prejudiced); Spann v
Colonial Vill., Inc., 899 F.2d 24, 33 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (stating that omission of cross-appeal
be.excused when circumstances warrant that because cross-appeal is not jurisdictional require-men!, and entertaining cross-appellant's arguments regarding personal jurisdiction where uncertainty generated by absence of judgment conforming to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58'~
separate document requirement explained and excused failure); see Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v.
Mendocino County, 192 F.3d 1283, 1298 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that filing ofnotice ofcros&-.
appeal is required as rule of practice~ which court can waive; it is not non-waivable jurisdie-tional requirement); see also Marts v. Hines, 117 F.3d 1504 1506 (5th Cir. 1997) (allowing
modification ofdecision so as to benefit non-cross-appealing ~).
.
260. Mendocino, 192 F.3d at 1298.
261. ld. at 1299.
262. See EI Paso Natural Gas Co" 526 U.S. at 480.
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endorsing the cross-appeal requirement, not a single one of om holdings has
ever recognized an exception to the rule.11263 The Court noted that it had
(Irepeatedly expressed the rule in emphatic terms,"264 although normally with
reference to certiorari jurisdiction, rather than to the jmisdiction ofthe courts
appeals. Justice Souter commented in his opinion for the Court that the
ourt had made clear that it was a. mistake to read one ofits cases as countecing exceptions to the cross-petition requirement, although dicta in that
inion sometimes had been otherwise construed. He also emphasized the
·tutional policies that underlie the cross-appeal requirement: the interests
"putting opposing parties and the appellate courts on notice ofthe issues to
e litigated and encouraging repose ofthose that are not.11265
A third example: In a 1999 case, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
ircuit held that the question whether parties and trial courts maymanufacture
ppea1S through the voluntary dismissal, without prejudice, of claims that
remain after other claims have been dismissed with prejudice is not jurisdic·onal. 266 Although concluding that the grant of voluntary dismissal constituted a clear abuse of discretion which ordinarily would warrant reversal and
remand for completion ofthe case, in the unique posture ofthis case, the court
concluded that fairness to the certified plaintiff class justified reaching the
267 Courts also conclude that some time limits are not jurisdictional.268

of

merits.
263.
264.
265.

[d. at 480.
[d. at 481 nJ.

[d. at 482.
266. Great Rivers Coop. v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 198 F.3d 685,688-89 (8th Cir. 1999)
(concluding that district court judgment was nonetheless "fmal decision" within meaning of 28
'(J.S.C. § 1291 (1993». But see Chappelle v. Beacon Communications Corp., 84F.3d 652, 654
<2d Cir. 1996) (dismissing appeal for lack of jurisdiction upon concluding that voluntary
dismissal without prejudice is not final judgment because dismissed claims can be revived);
:Mesa v. United States, 61 F.3d 20, 21-22 (11th Cir. 1995) (same); Cook v. Rocky Mountain
BaIlk Note Co., 974 F.2d 147, 148 (10th Cir. 1992) (same); Cheng v. Comm'r, 878 F.2d 306,
309';11 (9th Cir. 1989) (same); Ryan v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 577 F.2d 298,303 (5th
Cir. 1978) (same).
267. OreatRivers Coop. v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 198 FJd 685, 690 (8th Cir. 1999). The
unique circumstances included the parties and district court having gone to great lengths to create
~final order, including giving notice to the plaintiff class, and the parties having fully briefed and
argued the merits ofthe partial summaryjudgment orders that had been entered. [d.
268. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 533-34 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting
that time limits for invoking Court's certiorari jurisdiction in criminal cases emanating from
Iltate courts are non-jurisdictional); Taglianetti v. United States, 394 U.S. 316,316 n.l (1969)
(concluding that 30 days allowed by Supreme Court Rule 22(2) to file petition for certiorari is
not jurisdictional). Taglianetti was followed in Schacht 11. United States, 398 U.S. 58, 63-64
(1970) (noting that "procedural rules adopted by the Court for the orderly transaction of its
business are not jurisdictional"). See also United States v. Lummi Indian Tribe, 235 F.3d 443,
448 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58's separate document
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b. Liberally Interpreting or Excusing Jurisdictional Requirements,
Treating Notices ofAppeal as Petitions for Writs ofMandamus, and
Offering Dicta or Alternative Rulings on Matters Found to Be
Beyond the Courts' Jurisdiction

In still other cases (that is, where courts do not avoid an obstacle
decision on the merits by deeming the obstacle non-jurisdictional),
reach the merits
liberally interpretmgjurisdictional requirements in or
to hold that the parties or lower courts complied with them,269 excus'

after

requirement for judgments is not prerequisite to appellate jurisdiction); Quinn v. Haynes,
F.3d 837, 843 (4th Cir. 2000) (affinning that appellate court has jurisdiction to hear ap
despite non-complliince with Rule 58's separate document requirement, when three-factor
is met); In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 221 F.3d 449, 459 (3d Cir. 2000) (concluding
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)'stime limit is not jurisdictional, and "courts may, in thci
discretion, consider untimely objections" to taxation of costs); Soberay Mach. & Equip. Co. v:
MRF Ltd., 181 F.3d 759, 770 (6th Cir. 1999) (concluding that untimely motion to revi
taxation of costs may properly be entertained because Federal Rule of Civil ProCedure 54(d)
time limit is not jurisdictional); Lerro v. Quaker Oats Co., 84 F.3d 239, 241 (7th Cir. 1996
(noting that computational limits addressed in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. (6 aren
jurisdictional); Wujik v. Dale & Dale, 43 F.3d 790, 792 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that time lint'
for removal of case is not jurisdictional and may be waived); WhiteN. Bentsen, 31 F.3d 474
475 (7th Cir. 1994) (determining 21-day limit imposed by EEOC regulation for seeking revi
of administrative decision on Title VII claim not to be jurisdictional); Hunger v. Leininger, 1,5
F. 3d 664, 668 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding failure to meet statutory deadline for submi .
objections to magistrate judge's recommended decision not to be jurisdictional); Wood-I¥
Sys. Corp. v. United states, 4 F.3d 961, 962-64 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (indicating that Claims Co
Rule 6(a), which is similar to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a) and provides method
computation of time prescribed or allowed, should be construed liberally and leniently, and ill
notjurisdictional).
269. See, e.g., Fornan v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962) (holding that appellants had compliec.l
with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c)'s requirement that notice of appeal "designa~
the judgment, order or part thereof being appealed," despite ineptness of notice); Weissy.
Cooley, 230 F.3d 1027 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding notice of appeal, filed after grant of sumnJ.ll.l?'
judgment to one defendant, to be adequate to confer appellate jurisdiction over entire matter
including earlier dismissal of claims against other defendants, who never had been f0nnall
served); Cuoco v. Moritsugu,222 F.3d 99, 110 (2d Cir. 2000) (liberally construing Rule 54(b?
to allow court to exercise jurisdiction over cross-appeal from pBrtiaI final judgment dismissiJl~
claim against some defendants, where entire case was before court ofappeals through interlocu..
tory appeal by other defendants); Aqjelino v. N.Y. Times Co., 200 F.3d 73, 86-87 n.21 (3d Cir
1999) (concluding that dismissal of severed claims was not appllaIable until district court
finally disposed of all claims made by all parties to action in its pre-severance posture, with.
consequence that appellants' notice of appeal was timely); AIIiedSignal, Inc. v. B.F. Goodric~
Co., 183 F.3d 568, 571-72 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that notice of appeal gave adequate notice
of intent to appeal trial court's refusal to refer antitrust claim to arbitration where preliminarY
injunction from which appeal was explicitly taken necessarily encompassed aforementioned
refusal; stating that, in Seventh Circuit, "'an error designating the judgment or a part thereofwill
not result in a loss of appeal if the intent to appeal . . . may be inferred from the notice and .
the appellee has not been mislead by the defect,''' (quoting Cardoza v. Commodities Futures
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'lJl'isdictional requirements in "unique circumstances, ,,270 Or avoiding possible
rading Comm'n, 768 F.2d 1542, 1546 (7th Cir. 1985»); United States v. Vazquez, 145 F.3d

4, 79 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing principle that notices ofappeal are to be liberally construed, taking
to account parties' intentions, in holding notice of appeal sufficient to allow review of
'smissal of defendant's counterclaims); Good v. Ohio Edison Co., 104 F.3d 93,95 (6th Cir.
991) (holding that premature notice of appeal ripens upon entry of proper certification
lJrsuant to Rule 54(b) regardless of whether certification is entered nunc pro tunc); Martinez
. Arrow Truck Sales, Inc., 865 F.2d 160, 161-62 (8th Cir. 1988)(holding that subsequent Rule
4(b) certification validated otherwise premature notice of appeal in absence of prejudice to
onappealing party; citing cases reflecting division offedera1 courts of appeals on this issue);
derson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 630 F.2d 677,680-81 (9th Cir. 1980) (assuming appellate
'sdiction over merits where portion of case remaining in district court at time of appeal had
bsequently been deCided); see also Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S.
73, 378-79 (1985) (stating that appellate court had jurisdiction to review district court's denial
fmotion to dismiss complaint as barred by res judicata where district court certified its denial
ursuant to § 1292(b) only after defendant appealed order holding it in criminal contempt for
fusing to comply with discovery order); Baldwin County Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S.
47, 161-62 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (viewing as "jurisdictional" question whether lOaf limit for filing petition to appeal certified interlocutory order, imposed by 28 U.S.C.
1292(b) and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 5(a), can be circumvented by re-entry of
terlocutol)' order, and concurring in majority's holding that there is jurisdiction over interlocl)' appeal taken in such circumstances).
One also could put into this categol)' the pragmatism that the Court has brought to making
edeterminations that decisions are "final" for purposes of28 U.S.C. § 1291, and the determiations regarding what constitutes the grant or denial of an injunction within the meaning of28
.S.C. § 1292. See Carson v. Am. Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 83 (1981) (allowing appeal from
rder refusing to enter proposed consent decree to settle class action on terms that would have
ncompassed immediate injunctive relief for plaintiff class); Gillespie v. United States Steel
orp., 379 U.S. 148,152-54 (1964) (discussing "pragmatic fmality" doctrine); Gen. Elec. Co.
. Marvel Rare Metals Co., 287 U.S. 430,433 (1932) (upholding appeal of dismissal for want
fjurisdiction of counterclaim in which defendants sought injunction against plaintiff's alleged
ringement of patent); Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201, 203-06 (1848) (allowing
peal from order that provided for immediate execution of command that property be delivered
r sale to assignee in bankruptcy where all matters in controversy, except for accounting, had
completed); supra notes 64,66, 154-55 (concerning Supreme Court decisions pursuant
cOllateral order doctrine). See generally 15AWRIGHT ET AL., supra note 66, § 3903 (Leading
inality Decisions); § 3911 (Collateral Orders); § 3913 (Pragmatic Finality) (noting that
c:quirement of finality should be construed practically rather than technically); 16 WBIGIIT ET
.AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION 20 §§ 3921, 3924 (1996 & Supp. 2000)
(discussing injunctions and appeals ofgrants ofinterlocuWl)' injunctions).
In theel)', as a matter of philosophy in construing jurisdictional provisions, at least some
courts are of the view that, "[b]ecause the Constitution gives Congress discretion to confer
jurisdictional power on the federal courts of appeal, 'federal courts should proceed with caution
in construing constitutional and statutory provisions dealing with [their] jurisdiction.'" Rembert
".Apfel, 213 F.3d 1331, 1334 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Univ.ofS. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co.,
168 F.3d 405, 409 (11th Cir. 1999».
270. See, e.g., Hollins v. Dep't of Corrections, 191 F.3d 1324, 1326-29 (11th Cir. 1999)
(holding habeas corpus petitioner's failure to file timely notice of appeal excused due to unique
circumstances and further holding that appeals court had jurisdiction where belated filing
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jurisdictional bars by treating notices ofappeal as petitions for writs ofman271
damuS.
Sometimes courts offer dicta or alternative rulings on the matters
that they concluded they lacked jurisdiction to hear. 272
derived from counsel's reasonable and good faith reliance on district court's electronic docket
sheet - constituting specific assurance by judicial officer - which failed to show that fmalorder
had been entered, thereby lulling petitioner into inactivity); Schwartz v. Pridy, 94 F.3d 453,
455·56 (8th Cir. 1996) (determining that technically untimely notice of appeal vested appellate
jurisdiction in court where party relied in good faith on court clerk's erroneous refusal to accept
his timely notice ofappeal and erroneous representation that his premature notice of appeal was
sufficient); Prudential-Bache Secs., Inc. v. Fitch, 966 F.2d 981, 984-86 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding
appeal timely filed under unique circumstances doctrine where appellant reasonably relied upon
clerk's inaccurate notification of date on which district court's order was entered). But oS
Moore v. S.C. Labor Bd., 100 F.3d 162, 164 (D.C. Cir. 1996) Qimiting unique circumstanc
doctrine to reliance upon written court orders or oral rulings made during hearing, and rejecting
its use where relied upon statements were made by clerk's office statl); United Statesv. Heller,
957 F.2d 26, 29-32 (1st Cir. 1992) (concluding that, under Supreme Court precedent, unique
circumstances doctrine may apply only when judicial officers upon whose acts parties rely are.
judges, not when they are clerk's office employees); see also Quinn v. Haynes, 234 F.3d 837,
843 (4th Cir. 2000) (finding that time to appeal had not begun to run, and appeal consequently
was not untimely, where district court had failed to comply with separate document requirement
of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58); Songbyrd, Inc. v. Estate of Grossman, 206 F.3d 172,
177-78 (2d Cir.), cut denied, 531 U.S. 824 (2000) (concluding that retransfer motion, made
in transferee district court, should be required to preserve opportunity for review of transfer
order in transferee circuit, because court of appeals normally has no jurisdiction to review
decision of district court in another circuit, but excusing absence of such motion because this
Circuit had not imposed that requirement in past and Estate did not contend that lack of
retransfer motion forfeited opportunity for review).
271. See, e.g., Bacher v. Allstate Ins. Co., 211 F.3d 52, 57 nJ (3d Cir. 2000) (recognizing
that court could treat notice of appeal as petition for mandamus, but declining to consider that
option here); Morris v. West, 232 F.3d 906, No. 00.7032, 2000 U.S. App. Lexis 5095, at "'2
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (treating appeal as petition for writ of mandamus); Phinney v. Wentworth
Douglas Hosp., 199 F.3d 1,3 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that if court lacked appellate jurisdiction
over magistrate's order requiring party to pay sanctions for discovery violations because settlement may have rendered issue moot, court would treat notice of appeals as request for writ of
mandamus, and grant that request); United States v. Gonzales, 150 F.3d 1246, 1250 & nJ (lOth
Cit. 1998) (construing intervenor's appeal and defendants' cross-appeals as petitions for writs
of mandamus and noting that writ of mandamus is appropriate vehicle for reviewing orders
sealing or redacting court documents in criminal proceedings); Parretti v. United States, No. 9655371, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 33294, at "'2 (9th Cir. Dec. 17, 1996) (treating appeal from
order denying motion to disqualifY U.S. Attomey as petition for mandamus, but denying
petition); Mangold v. Analytic Servs" Inc., 77 F.3d 1442, 1453 (4th Cir. 1996) (treating notice
ofappeal ofremand order as petition for writ ofmandamus); WIlkins v. Erickson, 484 F.2d 969,
971 (8th Cir. 1973) (treating appeal oftrarisfer order as petition for mandamus).
272. See Horton v. Bd. ofCounty Comm'rs, 202 F.3d 1297, 1299-1302 (11th Cir. 2000)
(concluding that 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) deprived court ofjurisdiction to review remand order that
court found to be based on exhaustion or ripeness grounds, but explaining in extended dicta
why district court erred in remanding); United States v. Universal Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 191 F.3d
750,757,759 (6th Cit. 1999) (concluding that it lacked appellate jurisdiction to consider issues
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The Supreme Court itself has approved and utilized a number of these
·ces. 273 In Torres v. Oakland Scavenger CO.,274 for example, the Court
ted that, although the requirements ofFederal Rule ofAppellate Procedure
(t) [(1)(B)]275 are jurisdictional and their satisfaction a prerequisite to
pellate review, "mere technicalities" should not stand in the way of considnon of the merits, and courts should find a notice of appeal sufficient so
.~ as it is the functi~nal equivalent of what the Rule requires. 276 In Smith
. Barry,277 invoking these principles, the Court reversed an appellate court's
nclusion that a brief never could be considered a notice of appeal and
manded for the appeals court to determine whether appellant's brief coned the information required to function as a notice ofappeal. 278 The Court
d.ill motion for reconsideration, including malfeasance of appellants' original trial counsel
whether individual could be personally subject to injunction, but addressing those. very
es, prefacing its remarks with, "[i]n so far as we would be required to consider [the m.erits
the issues] as properly appealed").
273. In Mayacamas Corp. v. GulfttreamAerospace Corp., 806 F.2d 928,930-31 (9th Cir.
87), the court of appeals declined to treat the notice of appeal as a petition for mandamus
h.ere the party seeking review had not shown that serious hardship or pi'ejudice would result
om a refusal of its request. On the appeal ofthe case, the Supreme Court volunteered that it
k no position on whether the court of appeals had acted appropriately in declining to treat
etitioner's notice of appeal as an application for writ of mandamus. Gulfstream Aerospace
(lrp...v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271,289 n.14 (1988). I found no other opinion in which
e .Court discussed treating a notice ofappeal as a petition for writ ofmandamus.
74. 487 U.S. 312 (1988).
75. See supra note 163.
276. See Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312,316-17 (1988) (concluding that
'l\lee to name party in notice of appeal is more than excusable informality and constitutes
. • ictional failure which court of appeals cannot waive). Unfortunately for Torres, the Court
llnd a failure to comply with the specificity requirement of Rule 3(c) ofthe Federal Rules of
pellate Procedure, even liberally construed. [d. at 317. Due to a clerical error, the name of
9rres, one of several intervening plaintiffs, was omitted from the notice of appeal filed with
e< Ninth· Circuit, in a case in which that court reversed the district court's dismissal of the
m.plaint for failure to state a claim. [d. Partial summary judgment was then granted against
()cres on the ground that the prior judgment of dismissal was final as to him, given his failure
appeal it. [d. at 313-14. The Supreme Court, holding to be jurisdictional both the requireent ofFederal Rule ofAppellate Procedure 3(c) that the notice of appeal specify the parties
. g the appeal and the requirements of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4 setting time
'ts for ftling of a notice of appeal, held on these facts that the court of appeals was correct
.a~it never had jurisdiction over an appeal by Torres. [d. at 317-18. It therefore affirmed the
dgment against Torres. [d. at 318.
277. 502 U.S. 244 (1992).
278. See Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 245 (1992) ("hold[ing] that a document intended
serve as an appellate brief may qualify as the notice of appeal required by [Federal Rule of
ppellate Procedure] 3"). Smith had filed a notice of appeal that was invalid and ineffective
nder Federal Rule ofAppellate Procedure 4(aX4) because.premature, having been filed before
etrial court's disposition of a timely motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.. [d. at
He then ftled an "informal brief," within the deadline for filing a notice of appeal. [d.
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also has approved some belated filings of notices of appeal under a "unique
circumstances" doctrine. 27!! And, in some very important cases, it has offered
dicta on issues it found to be beyond its jurisdiction. 280
While one certainly can distinguish the latter types ofcases281 from exercises of hypothetical jurisdiction, they lie along a spectl;U1l1 of devices that
appellate courts have used, and continue to use, to reach the merits of cases.
Understanding this context may be important in determining how broadlyand
stringently (or, conversely, how narrowly and unrigorously) condemnations of
hypothetical jurisdiction should be interpreted and applied in the context of
appellate jurisdiction.282 For example, this survey might lead one to conclude
Smith held that a document intended to serve as an appellate brief also can qualifY as the notice:
of appeal required by Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. [d. at 245..It
reasoned, inter alia, that because the purpose of a notice of appeal is to provide notice to oth
parties and the court, "the notice afforded by a document, not the litigant's motivation in filing
it. determines the document's sufficiency as a notice of appeal." [d. at 248. Furthermore,
Rules' contemplation of a briefthat is distinct from the notice of appeal did not preclude a court
from treating a briefas a notice ofappeal. [d. at 249. "Proper briefing is not ... ajurisdictiollal
requirement" under the Federal Rules ofAppellate Procedure. [d. Indeed, "failure [ofan appellant] to take any step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the validitY
ofthe appeal ...." FED. R.MP. P. 3(a).
279. See Panhorst v. United States, 241 F.3d 367, 370-72 (4th Cir. 2001) (questioni
continuing validity of unique circumstances doctrine, in light of more recent Supreme Cou
decisions); Thompson v. INS, 375 U.S. 384,386-87 (1964) (approving some belated filings
notices of appeal under "unique circumstances" doctrine (quoting Harris Truck Lines, Inc.
Cherry Meat Packers, Inc., 371 U.S. 215,217 (1962»). But see Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney,
489 U.S. 169, 178-79 (1989) (declining to apply rationale of Thompson to facts of case at bar).
280. See, e.g., U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall P'ship, 513 U.s. 18, 28-2~.
(1994) (in case involving motion to vacate judgment of court ofappeals by reason of settlement,
explaining relevance of Court's holding to motions, in courts of appeals, to vacate district co
judgments); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 452, 454 (1857) (holding
slaves were not citizens and thus could not invoke diversity jurisdiction, but nonethel
rejecting Scott's claim on merits that his residence in Dlinois made him free and declared
sauri Compromise unconstitutional); MarbuIY v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137, 167-68, 1
80 (1803) (holding that Court could not constitutiollally hear, as matter of original jurisdicti
MarbUl)"s petition for writ of mandamus to compel Secretai)' of State to deliver partic
commission for offices, but nonetheless addressing merits issues including whether commissio
had vested).
281. I refer to those cases holding threshold matters that are being assumed to be non-ju ..
dictional, those cases holding jurisdiction to exist upon a liberal interpretation ofjurisdictio
requirements, and those cases excusing jurisdictional requirements in unique circumstances.
282. Just as exercises ofhypothetical jurisdiction at the district court level have been argue
to be supported by analogy to other doctrines and policies that undermine the absolute purity~
the "jurisdictional axiom" that 'courts are powerless to act without jurisdiction over the subj
matter, and that any order or judgment issued by a court without such jurisdiction is void
unenforceable," Comment, supra note 34, at 714, so exercises ofhypothetical appellate jurisdi
tion may be supported by doctrines and policies that moderate the hard edges ofthe requireme
that appellate courts decide cases only when they have jurisdiction over them.

an
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tour courts have found so many ways to finesse jurisdictionalproblemsthat
one more, hypothetical appellate jurisdiction, can not much matter.
ter.natively, one might conclude that if nothing in the existing arsenal of
.·•diction-finessers suffices to give an appellate courtjurisdiction over a case
.. sue, that court ought to enforce the Steel Co. rule against allowing the
to assume their jurisdiction hypothetically and reach the merits.

The Implications o/Steel Co./or Hypothetical Appellate Jurisdiction
In. theory, federal courts could disregard Steel Co.' s repudiation ofhypo'cal jurisdiction, on the grounds that it was mere .dictum, but the courts'
ra.Ct.1ce is to give such "considered dicta" great weight, bothout ofrespect for
Court and because that dicta is likely to foreshadow how the Court would
~cideanissue ifthat issue were squarely presented for decision. 283 Assumthen that the courts will take the denunciation seriously, what might this
in the context of hypothetical appellate jurisdiction?
J. A Broad Reading

A broad reading of Steel CO.'s denunciation of hypothetical jurisdicwould disapprove all instances in which federal appellate courts avoid
.ons concerning their appellate jurisdiction and reach the merits of cases
en and because the merits ate more readily resolved and the prevailing
ClI'ty below would prevail regardless of whether appellate jurisdiction were
t;rcised. At a minimum, a broad reading would disapprove all exercises of
othetical appellate jurisdiction that were not harmless error. Presumably,
~.•·•.error would be harmless when proper examination of the jurisdictional
. sue would have led to the conclusion that appellate jurisdiction existed. On
.·s "strongest" view, it would make no difference if the jurisdictional issue
eing bypassed were of constitutional dimension, statute-based, rule-based,
fa. function ofjudicial glosses on jurisdictional texts for, ifthe denunciation
'~grounded upon the need to keep courts within the bounds of authorized
·~d.icial action and thereby preserve fundamental principles of separation of
p",ers, any assumption ofappellate jurisdictionthat would exceed that which
l:tas. been authorized would violate the Court's objectives.285
284

283. See Natural Res. Det: Council v. NRC., 216 F.3d 1180, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(quoting earlier cases for proposition that carefully considered language of Court, even if dicta,
generally mu.st be treated as authoritative, and relying upon such language of Court in D.C.
Circuit's decision); Idleman, supra note 4, at 316-17 (noting that "considered dicta" ofSupreme
Court commands obedience by lower courts). But see supra text accompanying note 74 (questioning applicability ofthis norm when less than majority ofCourt subscribes to dicta).
284. See supra Part I.
285. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83,94 (1998) (declining to
endorse doctrine of hypothetical jurisdiction as doc1rine exceeds "authorized judicial action");
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In its· strongest fonn, this interpretation would entail viewing even
merely statutory and rule-based elements of jurisdiction (which carry. Co
gress's imprimatur) as important components of separation of powers,'
the legislature "restraining the [appellate] courts from acting at certain tim
and even restraining them· from acting permanently regarding certain sub
jects."286 The Court's reference in. Steel Co. to jurisdictional elementst.1llf
restrain the courts from acting at certain times easily can be understood
apply to statutory requirements for interlocutory appea1s. 287 On this vievv,i
would be inappropriate for courts to engage in. ad hoc weighing of the
cems for efficiency that underlie appellate jurisdictional rules (such as
final judgment rule) against the like-kind concerns that underlie the
ofhypotheticaljurisdiction. One would conclude that implicitly Congress
the. Court, as rule promulgator, have decided that the need for statute-orbased jurisdiction that a court has found to exist, rather than assumed ar
endo, prevails over any competing policies. Indeed, this view is most co~'
tent with the common law requirement that appellate courts confirm th
jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits. To the extent that appeals co
can merely assume their jurisdiction hypothetically, the requirement that j .
diction be confirmed becomes illusory.288 This "strong" position also
ports entirely with the long-standing admonitions against federal courts'
where they cannot because action is beyond the bounds of authorized judic'
c
activity and hence ultra vires.
While this understanding of Steel Co. might imply that all theexampl
listed above of courts exercising hypothetical appellate jurisdiction· w
wrong, I believe that, when one considers the Court's own qualifications
its denunciation and other factors, that inference would be unjustified.

2. Narrower Readings
Narrower readings of Steel Co. of course have different implications:
see also Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000) (observing that poW~r
judicially create non-constitutional rules of procedure for federal courts exists only in ab
of relevant Act of Congress, and that "Congress retains the ultimate authority to modifY or
aside any judicially created rules of... procedure that are not required by the Constitution").
286. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 101.
287. The same may be 1nJe of the reference to jurisdictional elements that restraili
courts from acting even permanently regarding certsin subjects, see Steel Co., 523 U.S. atl
(noting restrictions on courts' authority to entertain certain subjects), if one interprets the
sion to "any subjects" as applicable to subjects as to which losing litigants have failed to
an appeal.
288. On this broadest reading ofSteel Co., the position sketched above would ~OV"111 ~.. ~
if the "merits" issue partook to some degree ofa jurisdictional nature or the "jmisdi1ctioli18l"
partook to some degree ofnon-jurisdictional qualities.
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a. Reading Steel Co. to preclude advisory opinions and opinions as to
'sputes that do not constituteArticle m cases or controversies. To the degree
e Steel Co. Court was concerned that hypotheticaljurisdictionproduces only
othetical judgments, that is, advisory opinions of the sort that the Court
disapproved from. very early on,289 its concerns would seem to be satisfied
~Olong as an Article ill case or controversy is presented. The concerns under)ling the prohibition against advisory opinions relate to constitutional matters:
keeping the coUrts out of matters that belong in the legislative sphere for
of an actual dispute between adverse litigants or because the courts are
(}tin a position to have an effect. 29O As the Court stated in Flast v. Cohen,291
[T]he implicit policies embodied in Article ill, and not histOty alone, impose the role against advisoty opinions. [The role] implements the separation of powers ... [and] also recognizes that such suits often "are not
pressed before the Court with that clear concreteness provided when a
question emerges preciselyfram.ed andnecessmyfor decisionfrom a clash
of adversary argument exploring every aspect ofa multifaceted situation
embracing conflicting and demanding interests. "192

If the Court's intent was solely to deter federal courts from reaching
merits questions without first detennining that an Article m case or controersy is present,293 federal appellate courts' hypothetical assumption that the
l11el"ely statutory, rule-based or common law requirements of their ownjurisdiction are satisfied, in order to reach more easily resolved merits issues,
289.. See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346,362 (1911) (finding nonjusticiab1e suit
authorized by Congress to test constitutionality ofparticular law, when interests ofplaintiffs and
defendant government were not· at all adverse and, in Court's view, courts were being asked to
issue advisory opinion on constitutionality of statute), noted in Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 101; Haybum's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 411 (1792) (concluding that federal courts could not express
nonbinding opinions on amount of benefits owed to Revolutionary War veterans, and stating
that making mere recommendations regarding pensions was "not ofa judicial nature").
.
290. See Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113-14
(1948) (concluding that federal courts could not review Civil Aeronautics Board decisions that
President could disregard or modifY, because judicial decisions would then be mere recommendatioils that would amount to advisory opinions); United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 305
(1943) (declining to hear collusively brought suit, for lack ofgenuine adversary issue); Muskal.
219 U.S. at 361-62, supra note 289. See generally ERWIN CImMmUNsKY, FEDERAL JURISDICnON §2.2, at 56 (3d ed. 1999) (observing that "the other justiciability doctrines [concerning
standing. ripeness and mootness] exist largely to ensure that federal courts will not issue
advisory opinions").
291. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
292. Id. at 96-97 (quoting in part United States v. Fruehauf, 365 U.S. 146,157 (1961».
293. . See supra text accompanying notes 24-26. ''Narrowly viewed. the basic principle of
Steel Co. is that an Article m court. cannot decide the merits ofa dispute without first verifying
that the Article mcase-or-controversy requirements have been satisfied." Idleman, supra note
4, at 318.
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would not run afoul of Steel Co. Thus, for example, while avoidanceofilie
questions whether a case had become moot and whether the appenant had
Article ill standing to appeal would be impermissible,294 avoidance ofissues
concerning merely prudential or statute-based standing, and assumption,
without decision, that the requirements of 28 U.S.C. §. 1291 or § 1292 (Or
other jurisdictional statutes) are satisfied, or that the requirements of Rule
54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or of Rules. 3 arid 4 of the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure (or other '~urisdictional" Rules) are
satisfied, would not run afoul of Steel Co. The vast majorityof the pre-8teel
Co. exercises of hypothetical appellate jurisdiction were of this variety.295
They bypassed rule-based jurisdictional questions concerning the timeliness
of appeals and the adequacy of notices of appeal designating the court of
appeals or the appellants, and they bypassed statute-basedjurisdictional questions concerning the finality oflower tribunal decisions or the decisions' satis-.
faction .of the requirements for interlocutory appeal or miscellaneous' other
statutory requirements that the courts had found to be '~urisdictional.II Some..
times the exercises of hypothetical appellate jurisdiction bypassed issues of
statutory or prudential standing.296 Questions such as which federal. appel294. Possible examples of such impermissible exercises of hypothetical jurisdiction would
be the cases cited supra at note 242, in which the courts bypassed issuesconceming parties'
standing to appeal, although the cases are not always clear as to whether their conc",m was
stitutional standing or merely statutory or prudential standing requirements, and the cases cited
supra at note 244, in which the court bypassed a constitutional issue as to whether an appCai
was moot.
295. See supra text 8CC()mpanying notes 234-35, 237-38, 24043, and 245-49. Professor
.
Idleman notes that Steel Co.
does not necessarily prohibit . . . courts from deciding merits issues where non·
Article ill jurisdictional requirements are not verified, as long as the Article ill
requirements are met . . .. This would encompass not only statutory .orjudge-made
requirements, including the prudential aspects of standing, ripeness, and mootness
as well as the complete diversity requirement, but possibly also various non-Article
ill constitutional requirements such as those arising from the Eleventh Amendment
or the doctrine of sovereign immunity. It may even include the political question
doctrine insofar as [it] may not be a genuine case-or-controversy component of
Articleill ....
Idleman, supra note 4, at 319.
,
296. The courts sometimes have bypassed questions as to whether litigants had waived
their right to appeal. See United States v. Shepard, 207 F.3d 455, 456 n.2 (8th Cir. 2000)
(asserting hypothetical appellate jurisdiction over appeal of criminal sentence by assuming,. and
not deciding, that plea agreement did not bar defendant's appeal); Isby v. Bayh, 75 F.3d 1191,
1195-97 (7th Cir. 1996) (exercising hypothetical appellate jurisdiction and affirming class
action settlement in face of issues as to whether appr:oval of settlement fell within 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(aXl), as to whether objectors lacked standing to appeal because they had failed to intervene, been denied intervention, or for other reasons, and as to whether some objectors hacJ
waived their right to appeal). Insofar as the courts' jurisdiction turned on a common la'Y
doctrine ofwaiver, the courts' exercise ofpower seems generally acceptable because the courts

con-
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te<court has jurisdiction to hear a case, at what point in a case's progress
\"lV8.l'd final judgment an appellate court. may address the issues the case
.• eS, and which issues may be reviewed on an interlocutory appeal or after
judgment, are simply not of constitutional.stature. Article m requires
yacase arising under the laws ofthe United States (including the Constitu·611·.. and Treaties)· and certain other specified cases, or a controversy between
ecified persons and entities. 297 Moreover, constitutionally-grounded federconcerns rarely playa part in matters of intermediate federal appellate
'tlrisdiction, although they arguably have a role in the prohibition on federal
,urt review of remand orders predicated on lack of federal subject-matter
lIJisdiction.298
In some of the cases in which hypothetical appellate jurisdiction was
. . ed, none of the still narrower exceptions designated b-e, below, seems
plicable. Those cases would remain good law, however, if Steel Co. precludes appeals courts from addressing merits issues only when those courts
ve not addressed jurisdictional issues of constitutional magnitude, as well
on some other possible views of Steel Co. 's proper scope.

b. Reading Steel Co. to permit one jurisdictional question to be avoided
"assumed in favor ofdeciding another such question. If Steel Co. pennits
jurisdictional question to be avoided or particular aspects ofjurisdiction
be assumed in favor of deciding another such question, as it generally is
erstood to do,299 then exercises ofhypothetical jurisdiction with respect to
~9measpects of appellate jurisdiction arepennissible when the court is
~dressing other aspects of appellate jurisdiction or perhaps is addressing
300
llSpects of the district court's jurisdiction over the case.
c.. Reading Steel Co. to permit procedural issues to be addressed in
,rdvance ofjurisdictional issues. IfSteel Co. permits at least some procedural
issues to be addressed in advan'?C ofjurisdictional issues,301 then exercises of
1tllve the discretion to hold that the appellants had not waived their right to appeal. This would
seem to be, if anything, more acceptable than courts' assuming arguendo the satisfaction of
basic, statutory, jurisdictional requirements and doctrines interpreting those requirements.
297. The aspects of an Article ill case or controversy, that is, constitutional justiciability
(standing, ripeness, non-mootness, and exclusion of political questions) would not be properly
assumed.
298. .see supra notes 221-22 and accompanying text.
299. See supra text accompanying notes 38-40.
300. See United States v. Hurd, No. 98-7129, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 8715, at n.1 (10th
Cir. May 7, 1999) (concluding that despite serious question as to whether Hurd had filed timely
notice ofappeal, court did not need to remand for specific findings upon which that issue would
turn when court was remanding for entJy oforder dismissing appellant's post-judgment "motion
to dismiss" for lack ofdistrict courtjurisdiction to consider that motion).
301. See supra text accompanying notes 48-59.
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hypothetical appellate jurisdiction while the court decides non-jurisdictional
issues of appellate procedure also may be permissible.302
d. Reading Steel Co. to permit hypotheticaljUrisdiction when a merits
determination does not reqUire a precedential holding. IfSteel Co., byvUtue
ofthe earlier Supreme Court eases that it embraces, pennits hypotheticaljuris":
diction when a merits determination does not require a precedential holding,303
then several exercises of hypothetical appellate jurisdiction cited above are
pennissible.304

e. Reading Steel Co. to permit courts to speak to merits issues in dicta.
If Steel Co. permits courts to speak to merits issues in dicta, then exercises of

hypothetical appellate jurisdiction followed by non-merits.(for example, procedural) holdings and by opinions in which the court speaks to merits issues
in dicta also appear to remain legitimate, so far as Steel Co. is concerned}~5
Such dicta might, however, test other constraints upon judicial behavior.
3. My Own View o/the Implications o/Steel Co.for Hypothetical
Appel/ate Jurisdiction

My view is that Steel CO.'s denunciation of hypothetical jurisdiction
should not be given its broadest possible reading, nor its narrowest reading,
as described above. I believe that courts and commentators properly understand it to permit (1) one appellate jurisdictional question to be avoided or
assumed in favor of deciding another such question, and issues of appellate
procedure to be addressed in advance of appellate jurisdictional issues; and
(2) courts of appeals to speak to merits issues. in dicta, insofar· as .that. is
proper, independent of matters of hypothetical jurisdiction. It also may be
proper, or at least harmless, for courts of appeals to exercise hypothetical
appellate jurisdiction when its .meritsdetermination will not constitute . .~
precedential holding. Because the effect of its decision will be an aftirman~
of the decision below,306 the court's decision will not alter the rights of the
parties, and if its merits determinationwill not constitute a precedential holding, its decision will not affect others.
302. This limitation of Steel Co. would not, however, allow an appellate court to decide
non-jurisdictional issues of district court procedure in advance ofissues ofappellate jurisdiction
because the former would be part ofthe merits ofthe appesl. See supra text accompanying note
199 (discussing how merits ofappeals tend to be procedural).
303. See supra text accompanying notes 35-36.
304.. See, e.g., the cases cited supra at notes 237-39.
305. Accord Idleman. supra note 4, at 333 (explaining that courts could "comment(] on
the merits in the absence ofverified subject-matterjurisdiction").
306. See supra text accompanying note 230.
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Beyond these deductions, I have concluded that Steel Co. should be read
preclude exercises ofhypothetical jurisdiction in which a court of appeals
. e might assume arguendo that the case before it satisfies Article ill
. ements or the jurisdictional requirements of congressional statutes such
28U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1292, and 1295, as interpreted bythe courts (including
scope of pendent appellate jurisdiction), but that Steel Co. should be read
fpermitcourts of appeals to assume arguendo that the cases before them
tisfy the requirements of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure or the
eral Rules of Civil Procedure. More accurately, for reasons that appear
low, I believe that neither the doctrine of hypothetical jurisdiction nor its
unciation should have any bearing upon the appellate courts' application
fthe Federal Rules. However, even if or to the extent that the Court insists
those rules are jurisdictional within the meaning of the doctrine, then
'teel Co. should be read to permit courts of appeals to assume arguendo that
··~·cases before them satisfy the requirements oft,he Federal Rules ofAppelate Procedure or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, insofar as cases arise
t meet the requirements ofthe hypothetical jurisdiction doctrine. When the
equirements of the doctrine are not met, federal appeals courts should read
~d apply the Rules liberally, in some respects more liberally than they have
dOne to date.
The conclusion that Steel Co. should be read to preclude. exercises of
ypothetical jurisdiction in which a court of appeals assumes arguendo that
e C3.$e before it satisfies Article ill requirements is inescapable. This is the
are minimum that the case represents, for a federal court acts outside the
roadest possible scope of its jurisdiction if it acts on a case that does not fall
Within the judicial power a$ defined in Article ill.
The jurisdictional requirements imposed by congressional statutes such
as 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1292, and 1295, are of sufficient stature, by virtue of
.their source, and of sufficient importance as a matter of policy, that they too
should not be subject to judicial circumvention through exercises ofhypothetical appellate jurisdiction.307 Over the years, commentators sometimes have
§:iticized Congress for making the requirements of these statutes "jurisdictional, 11308 and it may well be that our system would work better if the final
307. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427,441 (1956) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (stating that "§ 1291 is not a technical rule in a game. It expresses not only a deeply
rooted but a wisely sanctioned principle against piecemeal appeals governing litigation in the
federal courts.").
308. See Paul D. Carrington, Toward a Federal Civil Interlocutory Appeals Act, 47 LAw
& CONI'EMP. PROBS. 165, 170 (Summer 1984) (proposing that defects ofappellate jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 et seq. or under rules of court be waivable and appellate jurisdiction
conferred by consent of parties). Carrington argues that law treating untimeliness as jurisdic;.
tional in the sense that it cannot be waived and must be raised by the court sua sponte is "a
fetish which serves no significant systemic interest. II Id. He would fix time limits for the raising
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decision "rulelt and the other prerequisites to .appellate attention, mandated by
these statutes, were not l~urisdictional" and therefore deemed to be unwaivable and subject to appellate policing even when the parties fail to object to
defects in compliance. However, in light ofthe fact that, under the Constitu-.
tion, federal appellate courts possess only those powers of review that are
granted by acts of Congress,309·those courts are duty-bound to review only
those matters that Congress has in fact, at any given time, authorized them to
hear. As long as the statutes set the scope and the boundaries of appellate
jurisdiction, and Congress does not Itdemote" matters such as the existence of
;;1 Itfinal decision II to something other than jurisdictional criteria, thelfederal
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eIlate courts must confine their decisionmaking on merits issues to the
eals that meet those jurisdictional requirements. An unexamined assumpofjurisdiction would contravene an appellate court's duty to confinn its
jurisdiction.
Although the line .between "mere" common law and statutory interpretasometimes is fuzzy,310 courts should give equal respect to judicial inter"008 ofthose jurisdictional statutory requirements. Statutes'meanings
~inextricably intertwined with their interpretation by the courts, so it would
4ifficu1t, if not impossible, for courts to give due deference to statutory
'sdictional requirements if the courts were free to give significantly less
enceto judicial cOnstructions ofthose statutes. For example, because the
11ateral order doctrine is now regarded as interpretation ofthe final decision
e,3l1 if appeals courts may not hypothetically assume that a final decision
. the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 is presented, it follows that they
y may not hypothetically assume that the order from. which an appeal
been taken falls ·within the collateral order doctrine. I believe that the
peof pendent appellate jurisdiction upon interlocutory appeals also is a
ofinterpretation ofthe statutes authorizing interlocutory appeals. 312 If
t.view is correct, appeals courts also may not hypothetically assume that
non-discretionary requirements for exercise ofpendent appellate jurisdicpnhave been satisfied, and move to the merits ofthe pendent issues.
If one were similarly to treat Rule 54(b)' s allowance of an immediate
ppeal when a district court reaches a final decision as to one or more but
~er than all ofthe claims in a multi-claim or multi-party case as an interpretionof § 1291 's final decision requirement - substituting the claim, for the
yil.action, as the unit as to which final decision must have been reached, eisatisfaction ofthat requirement also would not be subject to hypothetical
sumption. 313
310. See Karen Nelson Moore, The Supreme Court's Role in Interpreting the Federal
les a/eivilProcedure, 44 HAsTINGS L.J. 1039, 1095 (1993)(stating that, "[i]n both the statutotyand Rules arenas, there is a continuum between the interpretation ofa text and the developm.ent offederal common law").
311. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Hamilton County, 527 U.S. 198,204 (1999) (describing
Court as having interpreted 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to pennitjurisdiction over appeals that meet con~i1ions of collateral order doctrine); Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911,915 & n.3 (1997) (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1291 its authorizing immediate appeal of rejection of qualified immunity
defense,which court construes as fmal decision); United States v. Tsosie, 966 F.2d 1357,1359
(1 ()th •Cir. 199~) (characterizing collateral order doctrine as interpretative rule for courts to
construe statutotyjurisdictional requirements).
312. See Steinman, supra note 170, at 1375-88,1393-99,1429-43.
313. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427,433-35 (1956) (describing Rule
54(b), as amended, as providing practical means of pennitting appeal from final decisions on
individual claims in multi-claim actions without waiting for final decisions on all claims in case,
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By contrast to the foregoing treatment ofstatute-based and statute-deri:
jurisdictional requirements, I believe that neither the doctrine of hypotheti
jurisdiction nor its denunciation should have any bearing upon the appellit
courts' application ofthe Federal Rules. However, even if or to the extent
the Court insists that those Rules are jurisdictional within the meaning of
doctrine, Steel Co. should be read to permit courts ofappeals to assume
endo·that the cases before them satisfy the requirements of the Federal R
of Appellate Procedure and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, insofar
cases arise that meet the requirements ofhypothetical jurisdiction doctrine.
As described earlier, the U.S. Supreme Court, and the federarapp
courts, have characterized a few of the mandates ofthese Rules to be juris'
tional. 314 But, despite these judiCial pronouncements, the Federal Rules
Civil Procedure explicitly declare that those Rules "shall not be constru
extend or limit the jurisdiction" of the district courts,315and the Federal
of Appellate Procedure explicitly declare that those Rules "do not extend
limit the jurisdiction ofthe courts of appeals.,,316 The fact that, by their ()
tenns, the Rules do not, and cannot properly be construed to, extend or· .'
the jurisdiction ofthe appeals courts supports the argwnentthat they are.
jurisdictional within the meaning of Steel Co.' s prohibition of hypotheti
jurisdiction. 31 ? Indeed, it has been argued that a delegation of rul
.
relaxing former general practice that all claims had to be finally decided before appeal coul
entertained from final decision upon any ofthem). The Sears Court also held Rule 54(b)
a valid exercise ofthe Court's rulemaking authority which does not supercede any statute
trolling appellate jurisdiction, and which scrupulously recognizes the statutory requirelDe
a final decision. Id. at 438. It ststed that the Rule "merely administers that requirement
practical manner." Id. at 438; see also Cold Metal Process Co. v. United Eng'g & Foundry
351 U.S. 445,453 (1956) (holding that Rule 54(b), as amended, does not impair statutory
cept offinality embraced in § 1291, and is within Court's rulemaking power).
On the other hand, the Rule's requirement of "despatch" by the district court, to
appeals court, goes beyond anything in § 1291. For reasons elaborated below in the disc
ofFederal Rules generally, I would treat that aspect as being subject to hypothetical assUID
314. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
315. FED.R.CIv.P.82.
316. FED. R. APP. P. 1(b).
317. See Center for Nuclear Responsibility v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Com
781 F.2d 935, 941 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1986)(ststing that time limits estsblished by Federal R
Appellate Procedure 4 are not truly jurisdictional (citing 9 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRA
, 204.02[2] at 4-16 (2d ed. 1983»); Haney v. Mizell Mem'l Hosp., 744 F.2d 1467, 147~
(11th Cir. 1984) (indicating that failure. to comply witb Rule 4(a) docs ilot affect subjectjurisdiction of appellate court; "[r]ather, a timely notice of appeal is better understood
'mandatory prerequisite to the exercise of appellate jurisdiction'" (quoting United Sm
Ward, 696 F.2d 1315,1317 (11th Cir. 1983))); Sanchez v. Bd. ofRegents, 625 F.2d 521,
n.l (5th Cir. 1980) (noting that Federal Rule ofAppellate Procedure 4(a) "cannot ... affi
subject-matter jurisdiction and is rather a mandatory precondition to the exercise of juris
tion"); see also 9 MOORE'S FJIDERALPRACTICE 'If 204.02[2] (2d ed. 1996) (stating that requ
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ority to define the subject-matter jurisdiction of the district or federal
ppe1late courts, within the limits ofArticle m, § 2, would be unconstitutional
ecause it would violate Article ill's grant ofthat power to Congress alone. 318
While only Congress may confer jurisdiction on the federal courts of
ppeals, it is well-established that Congress may delegate to the courts the
ower to regulate their own practice,319 and it is similarly well-established that
courts have some inherent authority to regulate their procedures and the·
.ractices ofthose who appear before them. 320 More specifically, it is clearthat
ongress has delegated to the Court some power to regulate the timing of
ppeals. These delegations need not violate Congress's own authority to deter. the subject-matter jurisdiction of the courts ofappeals, and all the courts
t have considered the issues to date have concluded that these delegations
o not do so. Thus, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e), authorizing the Court to prescribe
esto provide for appeal of interlocutory decisions not otherwise provided
runder § 1292,321 and Rule 23(f), promulgated pursuantthereto, Rule 54(b)
fthe Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure, and Rules 3 and 4 ofthe Federal Rules
fAppellate ~f0cedure, all of which govern.the timing of appeals, all have
ent that notice of appeal be timely-filed "is not jurisdictional in the sense of subject matter
....•. iction, since both the time limits and the circumstances in which they may be extended are
fixed by the rules~" indicating that time limit is instead "(m)andatory precondition to the exercise
9fjjurisdiction~" and citing Bankers Trust Co. 11. Mallis, 435 U.S~ 381, 387 (1978), for proposi~on that .Supreme Court in past years showed its awareness of distinction by placing quotation
~ks around term. "jurisdictional" when speaking of filing of notice of appeal)~ 16A WRIGHr
ETAL., FlIDERALPRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION 3D § 3947.1 (1999) (asserting that
Statutes giving Court power to make rules of appellate procedure do not give Court authority to
'. inish or enlarge jurisdiction of courts of appeals, and that jurisdictional ststutes are "totalIy
Ccted in scope or interpretation or application by promulgation ofAppellate Rules").
318. See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1,10 (1941) (observing that there are limitations on authority to prescribe rules that were not mentioned in Rules Enabling Act, including
~the •inability of a court, by rule, to extend or restrict the jurisdiction conferred by statute")~
LARRY L. TEPLy & RALPH U. WHI'ITEN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 457 (2d ed. 2000) (implying that
lx>thtext and history of Article ill indicate that determination of inferior federal courts' jurisdiction cannot be delegated).
.
319. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989) (upholding Congress's
~legatirin of authority to United States Sentencing Commission ofjudicial branch to promulgate federal criminal sentencing guidelines)~ Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 9-10 (finding that Congress
hBsability to delegate to federal courts Congress's power to regulate practice and procedure of
federal courts by making rules not inconsistent with statutes or Constitution of United States)~
Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42-43 (1825) (Marshall. C.J.) (noting that
Congress may delegate powers that it may rightfully exercise itself).
320. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32,35,43-51 (1991) (discussing federal
courts' inherent power to manage their own proceedings and to control conduct of those who
appear before them, in such ways as fashioning appropriate sanctions for misconduct).
321. See also 28 U.S.C. § 2072(c) (1994) (authorizing Court, by rule, to define when district court ruling is fmal for purposes ofappeal under § 1291).
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been upheld against challenge. 322 Additionally, the courts, through casela
have long fashioned doctrines governing the timing ofappeals. 323 As the F'
Circuit recently commented, all ofthese affect when the courts ofappeals rna
hear appeals, but not the matters reviewable; the timing is "an issue apart fr:
the right to confer ... jurisdiction."324 This again suggests that the Rules
not truly jurisdictional or jurisdictional within the meaning of Steel Co.'
prohibition on the exercise ofhypothetical jurisdiction.
Moreover, (with the possible exception of the :final decision aspect
Rule 54(b) discussed above), I do not believethat the Rules are of suffici
importance, as a matter ofpolicy, that the federal appellate courts shpuld
power to liberally construe them or even to hypothetically assume the Rule
satisfaction and reach the merits. The other aspects of the Federal Rules
Appellate Procedure and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that have b
characterized as jurisdictional. are essentially procedural rules, ~adopted
facilitate orderly transaction of the appellate courts' business. They prescri
the details ofthe methods by which parties can invoke the jurisdiction
to those courts by Congress. Appeal periods "involve primarily the intere
ofthe immediate parties, not fundamental societal interests. "32S "There is.
question of the courts' basic capacity or competency to exercise judi.'
authority. There is also no question of ... political sensitivity vis-a-'
another forum or sovereign. ,,326 As a result, the interests in assuring· a
rately described and timely filed appeals are substantially accomplished by
vigilant application of Rules 3 and 4, when they are raised by the partieSc
Moreover, even if one posited that there are efficiency values seryed by Rut
3 and 4 which are not subject to .waiver by the parties, that would not resp
322. See Sears, Roebuck Dr. Co. v. MackCy,351 U.S. 427.438 (1956)(upholdingR
54(b»; Cold Metal Process Co. v. United Eng'g &. Foundry Co., 351 U.S; 445. 453 (195
(upholding Rule 54(b»; Bolin v. Sears. Roebuck &. Co.• 231 F.3d 970. 973-74 (5th Cir.200
(upholding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 12?2(e) against chall
that § 1292(e)'s grant of authority constitutes impermissible delegation of power to co
jurisdiction, and holding that "the Supreme Court may address the timing of appeals lIB inte
tial rulemaking without affecting Congress's authority to determine the subject matter juris
tion ofthe lower federal courts" (emphllBis in original». But see TEPLy &. WHITTEN, supra
318. at 461-62 (seeing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(1) as extension of ~ppellate juris
tion and thus questioning its constitutionality. although acknowledging that limitedness
extension might save validity ofRule by rendering it regulation of mere procedural detail VI
is within judicial rulemaking power).
323. See supra text accompanying notes 154-56.
324. Bolin. 231 F.3d at 974.
325. Hall. supra note 233. at 400; see supra text accompanying note 308 (discussing
ity requirement).
326. Hall. supra note 233. at 420.
327. Accord id. at 424 (advocating mandatory application of Federal Rule
Procedure 4(a) when it is raised by parties).
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~argument

that courts should be free to forego those efficiencies when
believe that other efficiencies can be gained, and the interests ofjustice
by doing so - as was the situation when appellate courts exercised
0th.etical appellate jurisdiction through an assumption that the Rules'
. ements had been satisfied.
'Whatshould we make of the Court's holdings that certain requirements
eFederal Rules of Appellate Procedure are jurisdictional? We have to
ese declarations as among the profligate uses ofthe tenn and IItranslate"
se~eclarations to discern their precise meaning. As then-Judge Ginsburg
noted,
"When we employ the word to mean many things-from the absence of a
PRnstitutional grant of judicial power to a statutory limit on time to
~ppeal- we ought tobear firmly in mind that lithe tendency to assume that
a word which appears ... in connection with more than one purpose ...
has .·and should ·have precisely the same scope in all of them, runs all
through legal discussions. It has all the tenacity oforiginal sin and must
constantly be guarded against. 11328

It: or to. the extent that, notwithstanding all ofthe above, the Court were

istthat the Rules are jurisdictional within the meaning of Steel Co.'s
I.jJibition on hypothetical jurisdiction, I would argue that Steel Co. nonethe~~ll0uld be read to permit courts of appeals to assume arguendo that the
~~b.efore them satisfy the requirements of the Federal Rules of Appellate
cedure and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, insofar as cases meet the
.• ements ofhypothetical jurisdiction doctrine.
.In support of that conclusion, I offer the following: First, the Rules
viously) are not congressional statutes. Although they do bear Congress's
rimatur, in the sense that they exist by the grace of Congress, which has
power to veto them and chose not.to do SO,329 as the Court's creation, the
~sshould be subject to judicial relaxation. This is true in part because the
aJ'ation ofpowers issues that arise iffederal courts disregard or circumvent
Ilgressionallegislation concerning appellate jurisdiction are not so acute if
28. Center for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatol}' Comm'n,
81F.2d 935, 945 n.4 (D.C. Cu. 1986) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Walter Wheeler
()0Ic, ''Substance'' and "Procedure" in the Conflict a/Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333, 337 (1933».
J29. As previously noted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (1994), Congress has the opportuityto reject or alter Rules proposed by the Court. Section 2074 provides in pertinent part that,
(a)The Supreme Court shall transmit to the Congress not later than May 1 ofthe year in which
rule prescribed under section 2072 is to become effective a copy ofthe proposed rule. Such
e shall take effect no earlier than December 1 ofthe year in which such rule is so transmitted
ess otherwise provided by law." The absence of adverse action by Congress is taken to
dicate that Congress found "no transgression oflegislative policy." Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.,
312 U.S. 1, 16 (1941).
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federal courts take some liberties with Federal Rules. 330 As Justice Bar
wrote, concurring in a 1970 case,
As amatter ofstatutoIyinterpretation, the Court has notpresumedtheright
to extend time limits specified in statutes where there is no indication ofa
congressionalpmpose to authorize the Court to do so. Because we cannot
"waive" congressional enactments, the statuto:ry time limits are treated as
jurisdictional. On the other band, forthe time requirementof[aparticular
Supreme Court Rule], established under abroad statuto:ry delegation, it is
appropriate to applythe "general principle" that '" lilt is always withinthe
discretion ofa court ... to relax or modify its procedural roles adopted for
the orderly transaction ofbusiness before it when[,] in a given easeL] the
ends ofjustice require it' "331
The same principle that the Court applied to Supreme Court Rules in the
quoted above should govern the roles governing the courts of appeals,
those courts, unless prohibited by holdings of the Supreme Court, should
able, in the interests ofjustice, to exercise discretion to relax thecproced
rules adopted for the orderly transaction oftheir business or, when the
sites of hypothetical jurisdiction doctrine have been met, to assume that
requirements ofthose roles have been satisfied:
The Rules' time limits for filing an appeal and concerning the naming
parties, identification of the judgment or order from which appeal is
and identification of the court to which it is being taken, may be "man
requirements,332 but these Rules "merely prescribe the method by which
jurisdiction granted the courts by Congress is to be exercised."333 The
ment that appellants identify the court, the appellants, and the matters
330. See Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58, 64 (1970) (rejecting argument that S.
Rule 22(2) was jurisdictional and could not be waived by Court). The Court.noted that
Rule contained no language that called for 80 harsh a result, and that the Rule wlls not
by Congress but promulgated by the Court under authorization by Congress to prescribe
concerning the time limitations for taking appeals and applying for certiorari in criminal
Id. The Court further commented that the "procedural rules adopted by the Court for the ord~
transaction of its business are not jurisdictional and can be relaxed by the Court in the
.. '
of its discretion when the ends ofjustice 80 require." Id.
331. Id. at 68 (Harlan, 1., concurring) (quoting Am. Farm Lines v. Black Ball, 397 1.1.
532,539 (1970) (in tum, quoting NLRB v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 205 F.2d 763, 764 (8th
1953»).
332. Hall, supra note 233, argues thatthe Rules' timing requirements, although manda
in the sense that courts have no authority to excuse untimely appeals when parties have .
the defect, should be waivilble by the parties, and that the courts need not raise such issues
sponte. The requirement that a court have personal jurisdiction over the parties in a civil acti
too, could be viewed as mandatory, while also waivable by the parties and a matter that co
do not raise sua sponte.
333. 12 CHAlU.ES ALANWRIGHf ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL
§ 3141 (1997) (speaking in connection with Federal Rule ofCivil Procedure 82, but in
that is equally applicable to Federal Rules ofAppellate Procedure).
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appeal is taken, provide notice to the appeals court and to the other
·esofth.e subjects and place ofthe appeal. 334 . In serving this function, they
ogous to a summons and complaint. But, just as defects in trial court
el:1.fe waivable and correctable by transfer to a court in which the action
tiihave been brought,335 just as complaints can be amended to add plain.(as well as defendants) until the statute of limitations has ron and, in
ceswhen "relation back" ofthe amendment is appropriate, even thereaf7~andjust as complaints are charitably construed and liberally amendable
ogas adversaries are not prejudiced,337 an error in the identification ofthe
to which appeal is taken should simply be corrected by transmission or
fer ofthe appeal to the proper court of appeals. 338 Moreover, broad conerion, or even timely amendment, of the specification of the orders being
pealed and of the parties who are appealing should be pennissible, in the
c::retion of the court of appeals and in the interests of justice.339 As the
34. See Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312,318 (1988)(notingthatpurpose
specificity requirement concerning appellants' identity is to provide notice to opposition and
court); .Anderson v. District of Columbia, 72 F.3d 166, 168 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (stating that
entral to the specificity requirements of Rule 3(c) is the principle affair notice to the opng party and to the court. ").
35. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(hX1) (stating circumstances in which defense of improper
ue is waived); 28 U.S.C. § 1406 (2001) (providing for transfer of cases laying venue in
Dg division or district).
3(1. See Slaughter v. S. Talc Co., 949 F.2d 167,174-75 (5th Cir. 1991) (fmding that
endment of products liability complaint to add wrongful death claims and to substitute
Mws. for allegedly injured deceased husbands related back to filing date oforiginal complaint,
~thus were not time-barred, where claims arose out of same iJVury as originally pleaded,
fendants had notice of amendment within limitations period and, by amendment, widows
Ilght to recover, as representatives of estates, for injury originally alleged and also as individuinjured in their own right); Neufield v. Neufield, 910 F. Supp. 977,985-86 (SD. N.Y. 1996)
tins that claims of plaintiff who was added in amended complaint related back to original
.. g date where substance ofplaintitI's claims was fully set forth in original complaint).
337. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(1) states that "[alII pleadings shiI1J. be so construed
to do substantial justice," and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) states that leave to
!UDend a pleading "shall be freely given when justice so requires."
338. 28 U.S.C. § 1631 (1994)authorizes transfer from one federal court of appeals to
another "in which the ... appeal could have been brought atthe time it was filed," in order to
cure the filing ofan appeal in the incorrect court. See also Bradley v. Work, 154 F.3d 704, 70607 (7th Cir. 1998) (allowing docketing statement to cure defects in notice of appeal, which had
not named court to which appeal was taken); Ortiz v. John O. Butler Co., 94 F.3d 1121, 1125
(7th Cir. 1996) (holding it sufficient that intent to appeal to Seventh Circuit appeared from fact
that that was only court to which appeal could have been taken and appellees were not misled);
,Anderson v. District of Columbia, 72 FJd 166, 168 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (forgiving appellant's
naming of wrong appellate court in his notice of appeal where it was obvious in which court
appeal properly lay, for there was only one court to which he could properly appeal).
339. See generally 16AWRIGHTET AL., FEDERALPRAcnCE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION 3D § 3949.4 (1999) (stating that "[a]mendment ofthe notice ... may be allowed, particu-
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citations in the margin indicate, courts frequently do follow these nonos.By
the same token, the appeals limitation period set in Rule 4 would better be
viewed as analogous to a statute of limitations (rather than as a jurisdictional
limit), setting a definite time when litigation shall be at an end, but waivable
by the parties and not to be raised by a court sua sponte. 34O
Nothing in the view that these requirements are mandatory is inconsistent
with the idea that appeals courts should, in some circumstances, be able to
assume the requirements to be met. Requirements can be mandatory upon the
parties and something that the courts must enforce upon a complaint of noncompliance registered by other litigants, while still being matters that a court
can assume to have been satisfied, in the absence of any party ~laint of
non-compliance, and ifthe circumstan~ otherwise make such an assumpti
appropriate. 341
It is the Court's conclusionthat intennediate appellate courts have a dutY
to raise sua sponte a failure to comply with certain requirements, includiJj
especially the requirement oftimely filing ofthe notice of appeal, that
most inconsistent with my position that federal appeals courts should be
recognized to have power, at least in some circumstances, to assume compti"
ance and proceed to the merits. As to this, I say that the Court should either.
(1) abandon this position altogether, recognizing that, in imposing a dutyt()
raise suchmatters sua sponte, it has gone too far in treating certain ofthe RuleS'

Seems

Iarly if the amendment is made within the time allowed for initial filing," id. at 60-61). Notic~s
are to be given a liberal in~retation. [d. at 61-65. "[A] notice ofappeal that names the finll1
jUdgment is sufficient to support review of all earlier orders that merge in the final judgment."
[d. at 72-73.. Some postjudgment orders may be so inseparable from the judgment as to
encompassed by a notice of appeal filed beforeently of those orders. [d. at 73. The Adviso!?,
Committee Notes to the 1993 amendments to Federal Rule ofAppellate Procedure 3(c), which;
in several respects liberalized the requirements for specifYing appellants, made clear th
Committee's intent that an appeal not be dismissed when it is clear from the notice that a p
intended to appeal. The Notes declare, "If a court determines [that] it is objectively clear
a party intended to appeal, there are neither administrative concerns nor fairness concerns th
should prevent the appeal from going forward." FED. R. APP. P. 3(c) Advisory CoDlmittee Note·
340. See FED. R. CW. P.8(c) (making statutes oflimitations waivable affirmative defenses);
Hall, supra note 233, at 414-15 (citing Browder v. Die., Dep't of Corrections,434 U.S. 257'
264 (1978) (finding that purpose ofappeal limitations periods is to set defmite time when litiga..
tion shall end unless, within time prescribed, application to appeal has been made and, if it hlIs
not, to adviseprospectivc appellees that they are free oftheir adversary's demands».
341. See Hall, supra note 233, at 411-18 (arguing that federal courts have "confused
distinct questions: the authority to excuse untimely appeals once raised and the authority
notice untimely appeals sua sponte"). Writing in 1986, Hall obsecvcd, "OOn each instance wh
the Supreme Court has referred to the thirty-day appeal period [set by Rule 4(a) ofthe Fed
Rules ofAppellate Procedure] as 'mandatory and jurisdictional,' ... the only issue was wheth
the court ofappeals had authority to relax the exact requirements ofRule 4(a). In none ofth
cases did the Supreme Court or the court of appeals notice a timing defect on its Own."
410 (footnotes omitted). The observation appears still to be accurate at this writing, in 2001.

be
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uiremeJrtS as ifthey were trulyjurisdictional, or (2) recognize exceptions to
duty, including· one for situations in which specifiable requisites for the
cise ofhypotheti.cal '~urisdiction" have been satisfied. 342 It may be that the
es will be rare that satisfy the requirements of hypothetical jurisdiction in
econtext of Rules;.based issues. That is, it may be rare that the '~urisdic
'()tla1!! question posed by a Federal Rule will be especially difficult while the
erits. of a case are clearly against the appellant. Rarity is not a compelling
on to deny the courts power to assume· satisfaction ofthe '~urisdictional"
illes' requirements, however. In the many cases where the requirements of
otheti.cal jurisdiction are not met, federal appeals courts should read and
ply the Rules liberally. In light ofwhat I hope will be increasing realization
tthe Rules are not trulyjurisdictional, the courts should read and apply them.
some respects more liberally than they have done.

IV. Observations on the Effects ofthe Denunciation ofHypothetical
Jurisdiction and Conclusion
The denunciation. of hypothetical jurisdiction, when it precludes the
f.ll"cise of such jurisdiction, has the virtue of compelling resolution ofjuris·cti.onal issues, thereby reducing procrastination, postponement and uncer. as to those matters.343 Insofar as Steel Co. precludes district courts from
lJJ~ in exercises of hypothetical jurisdiction, appellate courts have to
jurisdictional determinations that otherwise would have been finessed,
dertaking that.review either early in litigation (if the district court dismisses
r1a<:k ofjurisdiction), after final judgment (if the district court holds that it
.Oes have jurisdiction and adjudicates the case to final judgment), or in
njunction with authorized interlocutory appeals.
Atthe same time, precludingthe appellate courts' exercise ofhypotheti.cal
llrisdiction, concerning either their own or district court jurisdiction, elim:les or at least postpones appellate decision ofmerits issues that parties seek
have resolved. Appellate courts may find themselves making law on fewer
bstantive law issues, both because district courts will not reach those issues
hen they dismiss for lack ofjurisdiction and because appeals courts will not

'ew

342. To the degree that Steel Co. leaves the door open to exercises of hypothetical appelIatejurisdiction (i.e" to the extent that there is power to act) when only statutory, rule-based,

common law or prudential jurisdictional "requirements" are implicated, one should still ask
",hen, as a matter of policy and discretion, the power should be exercised. The courts of
appeals' efforts to articulate those considerations was ongoing at the ~e that the Court excoriated hypothetical jurisdiction in. Steel Co., which stopped the development of that body of
~petrine in its tracks. Insofar as the courts find that they continue to have latitude to develop
the doctrine - in the context of either appellate jurisdiction or original, typically district court,
'l1risdiction - they can pick up where they left off.
343. See Idleman, supra note 4, at 283-M(explaining that hypothetical jurisdiction perpetted itself, causing courts to defer decisions on jurisdictional matters, leading to uncertainty).
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reach substantive law issues on the merits when they vacate judgments
dismiss cases for lackoffederal subject-matterjurisdiction or lack ofappella
jurisdiction. This consequence may not be bad; it may even be good, if
courts do not have jurisdiction to decide those issues. However, when appe
late courts do not answer substantive law questions, society loses somethi
of value. Even when merits issues are relatively "easy," the lack of answ
leaves uncertainty that has real and sometimes great effects in society.
guidance to primary conduct that appellate courts·can give is lost, at leastfi
a time, with consequences for how tUne, energy, and other resources
expended in the world, and with consequences for future litigation that
likely be necessary to authoritatively answer the questions left unresolved.
Whenthe potential obstacle to appellate decision is posed only by F
Rules,344 not by legislation nor by the Constitution, the hann attendant up
delay ofthe merits decision may far exceed that attendant upon relaxation
the Rules. For the several reasons discussed above, appellate 9?urts sho
enjoy freedom to relaxtheir application ofthe Rules, in view ofthe fact that
Rules' requirements are not truly jurisdictional mandates. Given the Rut
promulgation by the Court and the weakness ofthe systemic interests that
further, even ifthe Supreme Court insists that certain Rules' requireinents
"jurisdictional," the appeals courts should be recognized to haVe poweJ:'
assume that the rule-imposed appellate '~urisdictional" requirements have
satisfied, and to reach the merits, in the exercise of their sound dis
under a doctrine ofhypothetical appellate jurisdiction. The courts
should have at least that much ability to control their agenda. 345

344. Again excepting the final decision aspect of Federal Rule of Civil Procedwe
which is derived from § 1291.
345.

It is a familiar adage that "[h]e who controls the agenda controls the outcome.·

1fi'.t."J:!J.,JtJl,l~
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Appendix
§§ 1251-59 and 1291, 1292 and 1295 (1999) provide as follows:

Original jurisdiction
Supreme Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all
oversies between two or more States.
) The Supreme Court shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of:
JAll actions or proceedings to which ambassadors, other public ministers,
, or vice consuls offoreign states are parties;
Z).A1l controversies between the United States and a State;
~)All actions or proceedings by a State against the citizens of another State
J:"against aliens.
1252-repealed]
1253. Direct appeals from decisions ofthree-judge courts
*cept as otheryvise provided by law, any party may appeal to the Supreme
ourt from an order granting or denying~~after notice and hearing, an interlocry or permanent ~unction in any civil action, suit or pfOCPA".djng required
YanY Act of Congress to be heard and determined by a district court ofthree
@ges.
1254. Courts ofappea1s; certiorari; certified questions
ases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by the
llowing methods:
1) .By writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of any party to any civil or
riminal case, before or after rendition ofjudgment or decree;
2) By certification at any time by a court of appeals of any question of law
irJ.aily civil or criminal case as to which instructions are desired, and upon
certification the Supreme Court may give binding instructions or require
1:he. entire record to be sent up for decision ofthe entire matter in controversy.

such

[§§ 1255-56-repea1ed]

§1257. State courts; certiorari
(a) .Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in
'Yhich a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ
()f certiorari where the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States is
clrawn in question or where the validity of a statute of any State is drawn in
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question on the ground of its being repu8nam to the Constitution, treaties,
laws ofthe United States, or where any title, right, privilege, or immunity·
specially set up or claimed under the Constitution or the treaties or statutes 0
or any commission held or authority exercised under, the United States.
(b) For the purposes of this section, the tenn "highest court of a State".·'
eludes the District of Columbia Court ofAppeals.
§ 1258. Supreme Court 'of Puerto Rico; certiorari

Final judgments or decrees rendered by the Supreme Court of the Comm
wealth of Puerto Rico may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ
certiorari where the validity ofatreaty or statute ofthe United States is dra
in question or where the validity of a statute of the Commonwealth of
Rico is drawn in question on the ground ofits being repugnant to the C
tion, treaties, or laws of the United States, or where any title, right, privile
or immunity is specially set up or claimed under the Constitution
treaties or statutes of, or any commission held or authority exercised
the United States.
§ 1259. Court ofAppeals for the Armed Forces; certiorari

Decisions ofthe United States Court ofAppeals for the Anned Forces may
reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ ofcertiorari in the following cases:
(I) Cases reviewed by the Court of Appeals for the Anned Forces un
section 867(a)(I) oftitle 1 0 . (2) Cases certified to the Court ofAppeals for the Armed Forces by the Judg
Advocate General under section 867(a)(2) oftitle 10. "
(3), Cases in which the Court of Appeals for the Anned Forces granted.
petition for review under section 867(a)(3) oftitle 10,
(4) Cases, other than those described in paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of'
subsection, in which the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces gran
relief
§ 1291. Final decisions of district courts

The courts of appeals (other than the United States Court ofAppeals for th
Federal Circuit) shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all :final decisions 0
the district courts ofthe United States, the United States District Court for the
District ofthe Canal Zone, the District Court ofGucUn, and the District Court
ofthe Virgin Islands, except where a direct review may be had in the SUPren:Je
Court. The jurisdiction of the United States Court ofAppeals forthe F
Circuit shall be limited to the jurisdiction described in sections 1292(c)
(d) and 1295 ofthis title.
.
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§1292. Interlocutory decisions
(a) Except as provided in subsections (c) and (d) of this section, the

courts ofappeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from:

(l) Interlocutory orders of the district courts of the United States, the
United· States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the District
(AuIt ofGuam, and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, or ofthe judges
~eof, granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions,
()r refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions, except where a direct review
may be had in the Supreme Court;
(2) Interlocutory orders appointing receivers, or refusing orders to wind
llP receiverships or to take steps to accomplish the purposes thereof, such as
directing sales or other disposals ofproperty;
(3) Interlocutory decrees of such district courts or the judges thereof
detennining the rights and liabilities ofthe parties to admiralty cases in which
appea1sfrom final decrees are allowed.
(b) When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherWise appealable under.this section, shall be of the opinion that such order
in:yolves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground
for difference of oPinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may
.~terially advance the ultimate tennination of the litigation,· he shall so state
iItwriting in such order. The Court ofAppeals which would have jurisdiction
pfan appeal of such action may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal
to be taken from such order, if application is made to it within ten days after
entry of the order: Provided, however, That application for an appeal
shall not stay proceedings in the district court unless the district
judge or the Court ofAppeals or a judge thereofshall so order..
(c) The United States Court ofAppealS for the Federal Circuit shall have
exclusive jurisdiction (1) of an appeal from an interlocutory order or decree described in
sp.bsection (a) or (b) of thiS section in any case over which the court would
have jurisdiction ofan appeal under section 1295 ofthis title; and
(2) of an appeal from a judgment in a civil action for patent infringement
which would otherwise be appealable to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit and is final except for an accounting.
(d)(l) When the chiefjudge ofthe Court of Intemational Trade issues an
(lrder under the provisions of section 256(b) of this title, or when any judge
of the Court of Intemational Trade, in issuing any other interlocutory order,
includes in the order a statement that a controlling question oflaw is involved
with respect to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion
and that an immediate appeal from that order may materWly advance the
ultimate tennination of the litigation, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit may, in its discretion, pennit an appeal to be taken from

the
ljereunder
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such order, ifapplication is made to that Court within ten days after the entry
of such order.
(2) When the chiefjudge of the United States Court of Federal Claims
issues an order under section 798(b) of this ti.tle~ or when any judge of the
United States Court of Federal Claims, in issuing an interlocutory order,
includes in the order a statement that a controlling question oflaw is involved
with respect to· which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion.
and that an immediate appeal from that order may materially advance the
ultimate termination of the litigation, the United States Colirt of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit may, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken frolIl.
. such order, if application is made to that Court within ten days after the entry.
. of such order.
(3) Neither the application for nor the granting of an appeal under this
subsection shall stay proceedings in the Court ofInternational Trade or in
Court of Federal Claims, as the case may be, unless a stay is ordered bya
judge of the COlirt ofIntemational Trade or ofthe Court ofFederal Claims or
by the United States Court ofAppeals for the Federal Circuit or a judge ofthat
court.
(4)(A) The United States COlirt of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall
have exclusive jurisdiction of an appeal from an interlocutory order of~
district colirt of the United States, the. District Court of Guam, the District
Court of the Virgin Islands, or the District Court for the Northern Mariana
Islands, granting or denying,· in whole or in part, a motion to transfer ati aCtion
to the United States Court of Federal Claims under section 1631 of this title.
(B) When a motion to transfer an action to the COlirt of Federal Claims
is filed in a district court, no further proceedings shall be taken in the district
court until 60 days after the court has ruled upon the motion. If an appeal is
taken from the district court's grant or denial ofthe motion, proceedings shall
be further stayed until the appeal has been decided by the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit. The stay ofproceedings in the district court shall not
bar the granting of preliminary or injunctive relief, where appropriate and
where expedition is reasonably necessary. However, during the period in
which proceedings are stayed as provided in this subparagraph, no ~ferto
the Court of Federal Claims pursuant to the motion shall be carried ollt. .
(e) The Supreme Court may prescribe rules, in accordance with section
2072 of this title, to provide for an appeal of an interlocutory decision to the
courts ofappeals that is not otherwise provided for under subsection. (a), (b),
(c), or (d).

the

[§ 1293 is repealed; § 1294 concerns appellate venue.]
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1295 1urisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal

Cuit
(a) The United States Court ofAppeals for the Federal Circuit shall have
lusive jurisdiction (1) of an appeal from a final decision of a district court of the United
the United States District Court for the District ofthe Canal Zone, the
.ct Court of Guam, the District Court ofthe Virgin Islands, or the District
for the Northern Mariana Islands, iftbe jurisdiction ofthat court was
,in whole or in part, on section 1338 of this title, except that a case
61'Ving a claim arising under any Act of Congress relating to copyrights,
I11sive rights in mask works, or trademarks and no other claims under .
1338(a) shall be governed by sections 1291, 1292, and 1294 of this

es,

·on

e;
(2) of an appeal from a final.decision of a district court of the United
1:es, the Uni~ States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the
~ct ofGuam, the District Court ofthe Virgin Islands, or the District Court
r the Northern Mariana Islands, if the jurisdiction of that court was based,
yvhole or in part, on section 1346 of this ~e, except that jurisdiction of an
peal ina case brought in a district court under section 1346(a)(I), 1346(b),
46(e),or 1346(t) of this title or under section 1346(a)(2) when the .claim is
ded upon an Act of Congress or a regulation of an executive department
rviding for internal revenue shall be governed by sections 1291, 1292, and
94 ofthis title;
(3) of an appeal from a final decision of the United States Court' of
ral Claims;
(4) ofan appeal from a decision of(A) the Board of Patent Appeals and interferences of the Patent and
fademark Office with respect to patent applications and interferences, at the
ce ofan applicant for a patent or any party to a patent interference, and
such appeal shall waive the right of such applicant or party to proceed
er section 145 or 146 oftitle 35;
(B) the Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and
. 'ector of the United States Patent and Trademark Office or the Commis()n.er of Patents and Trademarks or the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
yvith respect to applications for registration ofmarks and other proceedings as
provided in section 21 of the Trademark Act of 1946 (15 U.S.C. 1071); or
(C) a district court to which a case was directed pursuant to section 145
or 146 or 154(b)oftitle 35;
(5) of an appeal from a final decision of the United States Court of
International Trade;
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(6) to review the final determinations of the United States International
Trade Commission. relating to unfair practices in import trade, made under
section 337 ofthe TariffAct of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1337);
(7) to review, by appeal on questions of law only, findings of the Secretary of Commerce under U.S. note 6 to subchapter X of chapter 98 of the
Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (relating to importation of
instruments or apparatus);
(8) ofan appeal under section 71 ofthe Plant Variety Protection Act (7
U.S.C. 2461);
(9) of an appeal from a final order or final decision ofthe Merit Syste.triS
Protection Board, pursuant to sections 7703(b)(I) and 7703(d) oftitle 5;
(10) of an appeal from a final decision of an agency board of~
appeals pursuant to section 8(g)(1) ofthe Contract Disputes Act of 1978 (41
U.S.C. 607 (g)(I»; and
(II) ofan appeal under section 211 ofthe Economic Stabilization Act ()f
1970;
(12) ofan appeal under section 5 ofthe Emergency PetroleumAllocatioti
Act of 1973;
(13) ofan appeal under section 506(c) ofthe Natural Gas Policy Act of
1978; and
(14) of an appeal under section 523 ofthe Energy Policy and Conserva.7
tionAct.
,
(b) The head of any executive department or agency may, with tb.
approval ofthe Attorney General, refer to the Court ofAppeals for the F
Circuit for judicial review any final decision rendered by a board of contract:
appeals. pursuant to the tenns of any contract with the United States awarded
by that department or agency which the head of such department or agency
has concluded is not entitled to finality pursuant to the review standar~
specified in section IO(b) of the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 (41 U.S.cp.
609(b». The head of each executive department or agency.shall make an)'
referral under this section within one hundred and twenty days after .tll.
receipt of a oopy oftile final appeal decision.
(c) The. Court ofAppeals for the Federal Circuit shall review the rna
referred in accordance with tile standards specified in section IO(b) of
Contract Disputes Act of 1978. The court shall proceed with judicial revi
on the administrative record made before the board of contract appeals
matters so referred as in other cases pending in such court, shall detemrlnetll
issue of finality of the appeal decision, and shall, if appropriate, render judg
ment thereon; or remand the matter to any administrative or executive bod
or official with such direction as it may deem proper and just.
[§ 1296 - repealed]

